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I. INTRODUCTION
Temporary protection is widely regarded as an international legal norm
now obligatory in certain circumstances on states with regard to their
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treatment of a mass influx of refugees, or of persons fleeing situations of
armed conflict or civil strife.' As a recognized status, it is the most recent
of the three major possibilities for protection of refugees a state can
offer-the other two being the now-universal obligation of non-refoule-
ment (non-return)2 and the non-obligatory protection of political asylum.3
Despite the controversy temporary protection has generated, it has
special significance to the Palestinian refugee situation. For historical,
legal, and political reasons, Palestinian refugees and stateless individuals
have been effectively denied many of the minimal legal protections avail-
able to other refugees under the regime of the 1951 Geneva Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. This denial has had grave conse-
quences for Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories and in the dias-
pora, the latter including those in Arab states.4 The implications of the
legal lacunae in which Palestinians find themselves are more stark in the
1 Writing in 1986, Deborah Perluss and Joan Hartman argued that state practice
had solidified "temporary refuge," the non-formalized predecessor to the formal
status of temporary protection, into binding customary law for persons fleeing armed
conflict. Deborah Perluss & Joan Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a
Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551 (1986). Joanne Thorburn indicates the
formalization of temporary protection came about in the 1970s, during the mass
refugee crisis of the Vietnamese boat people, when the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner ("ExCom") issued its first official document calling for definition and
formulation of temporary refuge. See Joanne Thorburn, Transcending Boundaries, 7
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 459 (1995). For a summary of different views on temporary
protection, see Nadia Yakoob, Workshop Report: Report on the Workshop on
Temporary Protection: Comparative Policies and Practices, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 617
(1999). Commentators point out significant differences between the non-formalized
and formalized concepts of temporary refuge and temporary protection. See, e.g.,
Donatella Luca, Questioning Temporary Protection, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 535
(1994).
2 See generally Guy GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 117-
71 (2d ed. 1996); 2 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ASYLUM, ENTRY AND SOJOURN (1975); James C. Hathaway, A
Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129
(1990).
I Despite efforts of the UNHCR and other international bodies, political asylum
has never been accepted as an obligation on any state. See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra
note 2, at 108 (stating that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights codifies the
right to "seek and enjoy" asylum, but not the right to be granted asylum); GOODWIN-
GILL, supra note 2, at 174-82; see also Katherine L. Vaughns, Taming the Asylum
Adjudication Process: An Agenda for the Twenty-First Century, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1, 11 (1993); Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 22d
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
1 For a short overview of the historical and legal context of the current situation for
Palestinian refugees and stateless persons and consequences to their human rights,
see Susan M. Akram, Reinterpreting Palestinian Refugee Rights Under International
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post-Oslo era-when a politically negotiated resolution of the Israeli-Pal-
estinian conflict appears more remote than ever-and Palestinians, par-
ticularly in the West Bank and Gaza, have been subjected to heightened
oppression and terror tactics by their Israeli occupiers.' The escalating
Israeli violence, directed at a Palestinian population held captive in towns
and villages by curfews and checkpoints, as well as the ongoing Israeli
policy of ethnic cleansing,6 is causing a renewed exodus of Palestinian
refugees.
It is in this post-Oslo, second intifada framework that a regularized
program of temporary protection appears to be a particularly attractive
option for Palestinians fleeing renewed conflict in the occupied territo-
ries, as well as for Palestinian refugees already in the diaspora who lack
third-state citizenship, and for those remaining in Arab states. This article
argues for an internationally harmonized approach to temporary protec-
tion for Palestinian refugees and stateless persons. Temporary protection
would offer diaspora Palestinians in any of the main regions to which
they have fled the protection rights they currently lack, along with many
of the concomitant rights of an individual granted asylum, but without the
permanent status accompanying integration or resettlement that might
compromise their rights to return to their places of origin.
Currently, the promise of an independent Palestinian state is more
remote than ever, particularly in the absence of political will amongst the
relevant states to enforce its realization. Harmonized temporary protec-
tion would create an incentive for participating states to engage in the
implementation of durable solutions for this population, and temporary
protection tied to refugee choice and right of return would provide tre-
mendous incentives to the Arab states and to the refugees themselves to
commit to the process. Moreover, the international community's experi-
ence over the last forty years of implementing refugee solutions clearly
shows that the only solutions that have been durable are those based on
equitable responsibility-sharing driven by refugee choice. On the other
hand, if some form of Palestinian state emerges without a just and dura-
ble solution to the refugee problem, temporary protection within the Pal-
estinian state would offer protection to Palestinian refugees living in the
territory based on a distinct legal status (which differs from the status of
non-refugee citizens) until such time as those who so choose can return to
their original homes and lands within the pre-1948 boundaries of the state
of Israel. Finally, the status of temporary protection with the expectation
of repatriation to place of origin is fully consistent with principles of
international law on the right of return, as well as with principles gov-
Law and a Framework for Durable Solutions, in PALESTINIAN REFUGEES: THE RIGHT
OF RETURN 165 (Naseer Aruri ed., 2001).
See infra notes 190-91, 201, 205-08, 212-16, 221-38 and accompanying text.
6 See infra note 120.
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erning the design and implementation of durable solutions for refugees in
general and Palestinian refugees in particular.
Part II establishes the legal framework of temporary protection and its
place in refugee and human rights law. Part III discusses the particular
historical, legal and political issues involved in the Palestinian refugee sit-
uation relevant to the need for a harmonized rights-based temporary pro-
tection regime. Part IV illustrates the failures of the existing regional
approach to temporary protection and examines the principles necessary
for a rights-based framework for temporary protection. Finally, Part V
argues for an internationally-harmonized approach to temporary protec-
tion for Palestinian refugees and stateless persons, applying rights-based
principles to the search for durable solutions for the Palestinian refugee
problem.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF TEMPORARY PROTECTION AND ITS
PLACE IN REFUGEE AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. International Legal Framework: The Refugee Convention and
Protocol
The current international legal regime for refugees is a relatively recent
one, established under the framework of the 1951 Geneva Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Convention"), 7 its compan-
ion 1967 Protocol ("Refugee Protocol"),' and the Statute of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR").9 With the entry
into force of the Refugee Convention and the establishment of the
UNHCR, the international legal norms affecting bilateral and multilat-
eral arrangements concerning refugees shifted in a number of significant
ways. First, the prior practice of recognizing refugees as groups or cate-
gories changed to an individualized assessment of whether a person quali-
fied as a "refugee" under a specific, case-by-case definition.1" Second,
the Refugee Convention definition was intended to be ideologically neu-
tral, an objective definition that would view refugee determinations on a
non-political basis." Third, the Refugee Convention brought about a
7 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
8 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967).
9 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A.
Res. 428(v), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950) [hereinafter
UNHCR Statute].
10 See Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REV.
733, 806 (1998); Hathaway, supra note 2, at 139; see also Erika Feller, The Evolution
of the International Refugee Protection Regime, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 129, 130-32
(2001); ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND THE
REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 3-29 (1989).
11 See Steinbock, supra note 10, at 739-40; see also Feller, supra note 10, at 131-32.
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new focus on international responsibility-sharing of refugee flows, 2 mov-
ing away from the prior focus on refugees as a solely regional or bilateral
problem.' 3 The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Pro-
gramme ("ExCom") was established as the entity that would provide the
mechanism for determining how such international responsibility toward
refugees would be shared. 4 With this regime in place, the international
community initiated a consensus model of refugee problem-solving, shar-
ing the responsibility of implementing a multileveled durable solution
process driven by the pivotal principle of refugee choice. 5
The Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol incorporate two essen-
tial state obligations: the application of the now universally-accepted defi-
nition of "refugee," which appears in article 1A(2) of the Refugee
Convention, and the obligatory norm of non-refoulement, which is incor-
porated in article 33.1 of the Refugee Convention.' 6 There have been
12 The authors are grateful to Joan Fitzpatrick for pointing out the pejorative
connotation of "burden-sharing," and will use here the less common but accepted
equivalent term, "responsibility-sharing." See Joan Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection
of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 279, 289 (2000).
13 The preamble of the Refugee Convention, which reflects the responsibility-
sharing commitment of the state parties, notes "that the grant of asylum may place
unduly heavy burdens on certain countries and that a satisfactory solution of a
problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and
nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation." Refugee
Convention, supra note 7, pmbl., 189 U.N.T.S. at 150-52.
1" The UNHCR ExCom was set up in 1958 by the Economic and Social Council
("ECOSOC"). It originally comprised twenty-four states, but has grown over time to
its present membership of fifty states. In addition to decisions of the ExCom,
UNHCR's mandate is determined by its statute, by resolutions of the General
Assembly, and by ECOSOC. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 7-15.
15 In her presentation to the Institute for Global Legal Studies, Erika Feller,
Director of UNHCR's International Protection Division, emphasized that the main
challenges for UNHCR are: protecting refugees in mass influx situations, protecting
refugees in individual asylum processes, and realizing durable solutions based on a
protection framework. "The overarching theme that has to run through the entire
process is responsibility sharing, based on international cooperation and solidarity."
Feller, supra note 10, at 132.
16 "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion." Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 33(1), 189
U.N.T.S. at 176. There is much debate about the parameters of the obligation of non-
refoulement, both as a principle binding a state party to the Refugee Convention, and
as a customary international law source of obligation for both Convention and non-
Convention signatories towards persons fleeing situations not covered by the Refugee
Convention definition, such as persons fleeing armed conflict, widespread violations
of human rights, or other grave emergencies. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at
121-39.
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numerous attempts to codify an obligation to grant political asylum as a
peremptory norm, but states have strenuously resisted that effort, and no
such obligation appears in the Refugee Convention or Refugee Protocol,
or in any other universal human rights instrument. 7 Although it is true
that the international consensus at the time the Refugee Convention was
drafted was toward third country resettlement and an effort to persuade
states to grant asylum, this consensus was primarily a reflection of West-
ern states' attitudes toward the largest group of refugees to which they
felt some obligation: post-World War II European refugees and displaced
persons. 18 The international consensus has, more recently, returned to
the traditional foundation of refugee law-the implementation of refugee
return to place of origin, with integration and resettlement viewed as less
desirable options by the states and international bodies charged with ref-
ugee solutions.' 9
The UNHCR describes three main durable solutions for refugees:
repatriation, host country absorption, and third state resettlement.
20 Vol-
untary repatriation in safety and dignity, based on the fundamental right
to return to one's home and country, is recognized both in principle2' and
17 See U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES
(1993); see also Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 229, 253 (1996); Jon C. Graf, Has El Dorado Crumpled So Soon After its
Cornerstone Was Laid?: The State of International Refugee Law and the Repatriation
of Bosnians in Germany, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 115, 121-24 (1999).
18 These refugees could not return home because their areas of origin suffered
massive destruction, their states of origin no longer recognized them as citizens, or
because the refugees were unable or unwilling to return to the area because it was
now under Communist control or because of the persecution they had suffered there.
See Hathaway, supra note 2, at 129; GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN,
CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO
THE PRESENT 66 (1986); Steinbock, supra note 10, at 810-13; GOODWIN-GILL, supra
note 2, at 7-20.
19 U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: A
HUMANITARIAN AGENDA 143-46, 164 (1997) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN AGENDA];
see also Conclusion on International Protection, U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees,
Exec. Comm., No. 90 (LII), para. (j)-(k) (2001) [hereinafter Conclusion on
International Protection 2001]; Global Consultations on International Protection:
Report of the Meetings within the Framework of the Standing Committee, (Third
Track), UNHCR ExCom. 53d Sess., at 4, 5, 18, U.N. Doc. A/AC/.96/961 (2002)
[hereinafter Global Consultations on International Protection]; see also Global
Consultations on International Protection: Local Integration, 4th Mtg., 18, U.N.
Doc. EC/GC/02/6 (2002).
20 See Conclusion on International Protection 2001, supra note 19, at $ (j)-(k); see
also Conclusions on International Protection, UNHCR ExCom, No. 67 (XLII), (g)
(1991).
21 See Conclusion on Voluntary Repatriation, UNHCR ExCom No. 40 (XXXVI)
(1985); Conclusion on Voluntary Repatriation, UNHCR ExCom No. 18 (XXXI)
(1980).
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in state practice as the most appropriate solution to refugee flows."2 In
the 1990s alone, approximately 12 million refugees returned or were
repatriated around the world, while some 1.3 million refugees and per-
sons of concern to the UNHCR were resettled. 3 In a single year-
1999-over 1.6 million refugees returned to their homes, while 45,000 ref-
ugees resettled in third states.2 4 Moreover, the UNHCR emphasizes that
for refugee solutions to be durable, they must be voluntary. 5 The princi-
ple of voluntariness is incorporated through individual UNHCR-state
agreements,26 through multiparty peace agreements involving refugee
flows,27 and through UNHCR mechanisms for verification of refugee
choice.28 Voluntariness means that states should not take "measures
22 See infra note 25 and accompanying text; see Conclusion on Voluntary
Repatriation, UNHCR ExCom No. 40 (XXXVI) (1985); Conclusion on Voluntary
Repatriation, UNHCR ExCom No. 18 (XXXI) (1980).
23 U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN SELECTED
COUNTRIES TBL. V. 20 (1990-1999); U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, REFUGEES
AND OTHERS OF CONCERN TO THE UNHCR: STATISTICAL OVERVIEW (1999).
24 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. ESCOR,
Substantive Sess., at 6, U.N. Doc. (2000).
25 The voluntary nature of a refugee's choice of solutions is considered by UNHCR
to be "a pragmatic and sensible approach" to implementing durable solutions. See
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation:
International Protection 10-11 (1996) [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON VOLUNTARY
REPATRIATION].
26 See MARJORIE ZIECK, UNHCR AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF
REFUGEES: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 346 (1997). On the Comprehensive Plan of Action
("CPA"), see generally Arthur Helton, The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-
Chinese Refugees: An Experiment in Refugee Protection and Control, in LAWYERS
COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., UNCERTAIN HAVEN: REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE
FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1951 UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE CONVENTION 11-
60 (1991). On voluntary repatriation in Africa, see Robert F. Gorman, Taking Stock
of the Second International conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA
II), 14 J. AFR. . STUD. 4, 4-11 (1987); see also H. ADELMAN & J. SORENSON, AFRICAN
REFUGEES: DEVELOPMENT AID AND REPATRIATION 227 (1994). On repatriation in
the CIREFCA process, see DENNIS GALLAGHER, REVIEW OF THE CIREFCA
PROCESS (1994) (Refworld Information on Refugees and Human Rights CD-ROM,
2003). For the UNHCR perspective on voluntary repatriation, see generally
HANDBOOK ON VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION, supra note 25.
27 See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Global Consultations on International
Protection: Voluntary Repatriation, 4th mtg., U.N. Doc. EC/GC/02/5 (2002);
Declaration and Concerted Plan of Action in Favor of Central American Refugees,
Returnees and Displaced Persons, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item
110(b), at 19, U.N. Doc. A/44/527 (1989); Bosn.-Herz. -Croat.-Yugos.: General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, 35 I.L.M.
75 (1996); U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, International Conference on Indo-Chinese
Refugees, Declaration and Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Plen. Mtg., Annex, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/44/523 (1989).
28 See HANDBOOK ON VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION, supra note 25, at 30-39.
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which push the refugee to repatriate, but also . . . that he or she should
not be prevented from returning.
29
Refugee law has a unique position in the human rights system, in that
its core instruments are more widely ratified and implemented through
domestic law than any other human rights conventions.3 ° The imple-
menting body of the Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol-the
UNHCR-also commands significant influence in creating and enforcing
norms for refugees and, to a lesser extent, internally displaced persons
and others in refugee-like situations."' Non-refoulement is considered a
peremptory norm and is widely respected even by states that are not sig-
natories to the Refugee Convention or Refugee Protocol.32 When states
deviate significantly from the constraints of the Refugee Convention and
Refugee Protocol, there is a high degree of international pressure to con-
form, particularly through the ExCom of the UNHCR.13 A state is obli-
gated under the Refugee Convention regime to provide a process to
determine whether any individual seeking protection as a refugee meets
the Convention definition.34 Meeting the refugee definition automatically
triggers the protection of non-refoulement; it does not entitle the individ-
ual to asylum status. Nevertheless, the Refugee Convention requires
states to extend protection as long as the conditions justifying non-
refoulement continue, thus requiring more permanent status if return
becomes impossible over the longer term-an obligation of non-refoule-
ment through time.35
The Refugee Convention restrictively defines the situations in which a
state may terminate an individual's status as refugee. The cessation
clauses of article 1C(l) specify two kinds of conditions that can operate to
29 Id. at 10.
30 See Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note 12, at 280-81.
31 See Jennifer Moore, Restoring the Humanitarian Character of U.S. Refugee Law:
Lessons from the International Community, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 51, 54 (1997).
32 "States have been prepared to accept that the principle of non-refoulement
should be scrupulously observed. In numerous resolutions of international bodies in
which this principle has appeared in recent years, the principle has been stated
without any qualification." G.J.L. Coles, Temporary Refuge and the Large-Scale Influx
of Refugees, Paper submitted to the UNHCR Meeting of the Expert Group on
Temporary Refuge in Situations of Large-Scale Influx (Geneva Apr. 21-24, 1981) EC/
SCP/16/Add.1 (July 17, 1981); see also Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of U.S. Courts
to Protect Aliens and Refugees Under International Human Rights Law, 100 YALE L.J.
2335, 2343 n. 52 (1991).
33 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 212.
14 James. C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Law Relevant
Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM.
RTs. J. 115, 158-59 (1997).
35 GooiwIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 123; see also Davor Sopf, Temporary Protection
in Europe After 1990: The "Right to Remain" of Genuine Convention Refugees, 6
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 134-35 (2001).
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terminate refugee status: (1) when the refugee herself takes steps that
indicate international protection is no longer necessary;"6 and (2) when
conditions change in the country of origin such that there is no longer a
basis for claimed persecution. 7 The first set of conditions explicitly ter-
minate refugee status of persons who have voluntarily resumed the pro-
tection of their country of nationality;3" those who have voluntarily
reacquired prior nationality;39 those who have acquired a new nationality
and enjoy protection in the new state;a° and those who have voluntarily
re-established themselves in a country they fled or where they refused to
return due to persecution.4' The second set of conditions terminate the
refugee status of persons when conditions in their home states have
changed such that the reasons for claimed persecution no longer exist
(unless there are compelling reasons based on past persecution for such
person to refuse the protection of the home state);42 and the status of
stateless persons when such changed circumstances affect the claim of
persecution from the state of last habitual residence.43
The detailed and specific nature of the cessation clauses indicate they
are to be restrictively interpreted, and the UNHCR Handbook reinforces
a restrictive interpretation.44 The combination of the requirement that
states examine all claims to refugee status made in their territory, the
non-refoulement obligation, and the restrictive cessation clauses, squarely
place the obligation on states not to return individuals when their lives or
safety are at risk, and to maintain that obligation until and unless a cessa-
tion condition is met.
B. Elements of Temporary Protection: Between Asylum and Non-
Refoulement
Although the Refugee Convention was drafted to address the mass dis-
placements caused by World War II in Europe and has provisions for
36 Joan Fitzpatrick, The End of Protection: Legal Standards for Cessation of
Refugee Status and Withdrawal of Temporary Protection, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343,
348-49 (1999); Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1C, 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.
37 U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS para. 164 (2d ed. 1992) (1979)
(quoting Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1C, 189 U.N.T.S. at 154-56)
[hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK].
38 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1C(1), 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.
31 Id. at art. 1C(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.
40 Id. at art. 1C(3), 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.
41 Id. at art. 1C(4), 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.
42 Id. at art. 1C(5), 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.
13 Id. at art. 1C(6), 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.
41 UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at para. 116 ("The cessation clauses are
negative in character and are exhaustively enumerated. They should therefore be
interpreted restrictively, and no other reasons may be adduced by way of analogy to
justify the withdrawal of refugee status.").
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group or category determinations, it has been viewed by states primarily
as an instrument for individualized refugee assessments.45 Because indi-
vidual assessments are considered inappropriate for mass influx, some
states view the Refugee Convention as inapplicable to situations of mass
refugee flows.46 New instruments and policies have been devised to
bridge the gap between states' obligation of non-refoulement and the
need for a durable solution in situations where individualized asylum
claims overwhelm the capacity of state systems, or where the cause of
flight is for non-Convention reasons. It is in this context that temporary
protection has emerged as a regularized status in recent years.
Temporary protection in its more recent, formalized sense47 takes a
number of different forms in the areas of the world where it has been
implemented and covers migrants or putative refugees fleeing various
types of major crises in their home states. It is, however, characterized by
a set of common elements. First, it is a grant of protection of a temporary
45 Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note 12, at 282.
46 See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 34, at 157-69; see generally Fitzpatrick,
Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17; see also Bonaventure
Rutinwa, Temporary Protection and its Expression Under the 'Reformulation of
Refugee Law' Model, in PERSPECTIVES ON REFUGEE PROTECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA,
at 50, 50 (Jeff Handmaker et al. eds., 2001).
One of the matters over which a near total consensus exists is that the traditional
regime of refugee protection, based on the 1951 Convention of Refugees and its
regional complements is in crisis. The system is no longer adequate to deal with
the problem of forced migration in the manner and magnitude it is currently
being experienced. The contemporary forced migration phenomenon is
characterized by mass influx of composite populations, many of whom are not
refugees within the definitions found under existing instruments and therefore,
strictly speaking, do not qualify for international protection.
Id.
47 For a thorough study on the range of practice of temporary protection, see
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS ON ASYLUM, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION
POLICIES IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA (1995) [hereinafter IGC
STUDY]. A review of literature on temporary protection shows contrasting
perspectives: temporary protection/safe haven as a non-formalized, non-specific status
of state tolerance of refugees or "refugee-like" persons for short or long periods of
time in their territories; or, the more specific status of temporary protection with
specified parameters for beneficiaries, duration of status, standards of rights and
criteria for cessation included in domestic legislation. Id. For a comparison of
perspectives, see Yakoob, supra note 1. For views of some of the commentators on
temporary protection, see Joan Fitzpatrick, Flight from Asylum: Trends Toward
Temporary "Refuge" and Local Responses to Forced Migration, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 13
(1994); Morton Kjaerum, Temporary Protection in Europe in the 1990's, 6 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 444 (1994); Kay Hailbronner, Temporary and Local Responses to Forced
Migration: A Comment, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 81 (1994); Susan Martin et al., Temporary
Protection: Towards a New Regional and Domestic Framework, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
543 (1998).
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nature from the receiving state to specific groups or individuals." Second,
it is granted with the expectation that it is an interim solution, and at the
end of the time period of the grant, the individual or group will return
home or, if return is not desirable, either the receiving or a third state will
offer more permanent status.49 Third, temporary protection may afford
fewer rights to the individual receiving the status than she would receive
as a Convention refugee.5" Despite significant variables in these ele-
ments, there is a common understanding of what temporary protection
entails, and states have recently embraced it enthusiastically for a number
of reasons. Common understanding, however, does not mean common
agreement about the desirability or advisability of temporary protection
in many situations in which it has been used. As Joan Fitzpatrick states:
Temporary protection is like a magic gift, assuming the desired form
of its enthusiasts' policy objectives. Simultaneously, it serves as a
magic mirror of its observers' fears. For refugee advocates, TP [tem-
porary protection] expands the protection of forced migrants who
cannot satisfy the criteria under the 1951 Convention and it promises
group-based protection when the determination of an individual's
status proves impossible. At the same time, refugee rights organiza-
tions fear that informal and discretionary TP may dislodge refugee
protection from the realm of enforceable human rights.5 '
From the perspective of the state granting the status, temporary protec-
tion has the following advantages: (1) it is a humanitarian response to
situations of mass influx, whether toward persons who might qualify as
refugees under the Refugee Convention definition, or who would not
qualify, but are fleeing emergency situations in their home countries and
deserve humanitarian treatment in their place of refuge;52 (2) it offers an
alternative to the receiving states' obligation to provide the full asylum
procedures otherwise required for persons seeking refugee status, con-
serving resources in often overstretched adjudication systems;53 (3) it
absolves receiving states from having to grant asylum to large numbers of
putative refugees, palliating divisive domestic political debates; (4) it has
frequently been implemented as part of a consensus of responsibility-
sharing, thus relieving any individual state of having to absorb the entire
refugee flow involved;5" and (5) it demonstrates both to the arriving alien
48 Rutinwa, supra note 46, at para. 1.7.
49 The IGC Study described four common elements of the more formalized
temporary protection: admission, or extension of stay; non-refoulement; basic rights/
humanitarian standards; and eventual return. IGC STUDY, supra note 47, at 11. These
elements have particular implications for Palestinians, which will be addressed below.
50 Rutinwa, supra note 46, at para. 1.7.
51 Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note 12, at 280.
52 See Rutinwa, supra note 46, at para. 1.7.
13 Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note 12, at 280.
54 Feller, supra note 10, at 133.
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and to the world at large that the state is providing protection on only a
temporary basis, with the understanding that this status will be revoked
once repatriation is feasible.55
From the perspective of the putative refugee, temporary protection has
both advantages and disadvantages, depending on a number of variables
determined by domestic legislation. Generally, however, the advantages
include the following: (1) the individual is not required to go through a
protracted and often taxing asylum application procedure; (2) the individ-
ual may be granted many of the protection rights afforded to an asylee,
such as the right to work, the right to freedom of movement, and the right
to obtain certain basic benefits for subsistence;5 6 and (3) the status is
granted for a definite period of time, allowing the individual to make spe-
cific plans for repatriation, or for resettlement in a third state, within a
certain time frame.
57
C. Temporary Protection Measured Under Guarantees of the Refugee
Convention
Many observers criticize temporary protection as having significant dis-
advantages, both from the perspective of the individual refugee and from
the perspective of the refugee/human rights system itself. 8 States are
increasingly substituting informal temporary protection processing for
Refugee Convention status determinations, both in cases of mass influx
and in cases where individuals in a group are perceived not to fit under
the strict Refugee Convention definition.59 In either situation, the
strength and integrity of the Refugee Convention regime-based on con-
crete state obligations incorporated in the widely-accepted international
51 Sopf, supra note 35, at 143.
56 See Rutinwa, supra note 46, at para. 1.7; Sopf, supra note 35 (citing Conclusion
on People Displaced by the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia f[ 4 (1992), available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/legal/bibliographic/papers.4htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2001)
(discussing the meeting of Ministers Responsible for Immigration in London in
December 1992). The Conclusion stated that admitted individuals should be provided
opportunities to benefit from education and social integration, thereby enhancing the
success of future repatriation. Id.
57 In the case of TPS in the United States, the individual has the option of going
forward with an asylum claim while s/he is in TPS status if s/he chooses to do so;
however, low grant rates for certain TPS groups signal that TPS is intended to be
temporary and not a substitute for asylum. See Katherine L. Vaughns, Taming the
Asylum Adjudication Process: An Agenda for the Twenty-First Century, 30 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1, 68-69 (1993); see also Susan Martin & Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Asylum
Practice: Successes, Failures, and the Challenges Ahead, 14 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 589, 613
(2000).
58 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note 12; Sopf,
supra note 35; Kjaerum, supra note 47; Thorburn, supra note 1.
59 Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note 12, at 280-81.
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instruments-are undermined by an ad hoc system that is not grounded
in any international convention.60
As states increasingly use an informal and ad hoc temporary protection
system to replace the highly-codified and regularized refugee regime,
they may be undermining the latter norms.6 This is particularly true in
situations where temporary protection is offered to all individuals within
a certain designated group or category, whether they would qualify as
Refugee Convention refugees or not; but this is also true when temporary
protection is offered in response to mass refugee flows. There is no pro-
vision in the Refugee Convention that permits suspending the obligation
to conduct refugee status determinations under any circumstances, even
under conditions of mass influx.62 Granting temporary protection to indi-
viduals under such circumstances denies the permanent protection they
might deserve under the Refugee Convention.
A related concern to replacing Refugee Convention status with tempo-
rary protection is that when states decide to terminate the grant of tem-
porary protection, they may either forcibly or through negative incentives
return individuals to conditions where safety and dignity cannot be guar-
anteed. As opposed to the Refugee Convention cessation clauses, which
have strict requirements, temporary protection in its various regional
forms can be terminated at any time, and not necessarily in connection
with internationally-monitored mechanisms for safe return.
When states substitute a non-formalized temporary protection system
for the Refugee Convention regime, they may fail to grant basic human
rights that the Refugee Convention guarantees to refugees. Quite aside
from the obligations of non-rejection at the frontier and non-refoulement
through time, states have additional obligations to provide a number of
economic and social rights to recognized refugees and to expand those
rights over time. The rights guaranteed by the Refugee Convention are
employment, housing, public education, property ownership, freedom of
movement, identity papers, travel documents, and social security.63 The
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 The 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, article 3(2), would permit non-
refoulement to be suspended for "overriding reasons of national security or in order to
safeguard the population, as in the case of a mass influx of persons." United Nations
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 81, Art. 3(2), U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
63 Article 17 requires contracting states to grant lawful refugees equally favorable
treatment in employment as is granted to their nationals. Article 21 requires states to
grant lawful refugees housing benefits at least as favorable as granted to aliens.
Article 22 obligates states to give lawful refugees the same elementary education
benefits as their nationals, and to grant other education benefits as favorably as
possible. Articles 13 and 14 require states to give movable, immovable, and
intellectual property ownership and rights on an equal basis as other "aliens generally
in the same circumstances," and in a manner "as favourable as possible." Article 26
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Refugee Convention requires that most of these rights be guaranteed at
the same level as to nationals of the state, and all are guaranteed at least
at the same level as to other aliens.64 Because there is no internationally-
binding standard that guarantees certain human rights for persons
granted temporary protection, a state may deny even basic Refugee Con-
vention rights at its discretion.65 The Refugee Convention is not the only
constraint on states that deny human rights, as they may be bound to such
instruments as the International Convenant on Civil and Political
gives lawful aliens the freedom to choose their place of residence and to move freely
subject to regulations applicable to aliens in the same circumstances. Under articles 27
and 28, states agree to issue identification papers and travel documents to refugees
lawfully staying in their territories. Refugee Convention, supra note 7, arts. 17-28, 189
U.N.T.S. at 164-72.
64 There are three main categories of status recognized in the Refugee Convention,
each of which triggers different levels of rights protections: simple presence, lawful
presence, and lawful residence. Simple presence refers to those rights extended to
refugees simply by the fact that they have been recognized as refugees, regardless of
what other legal status a state does or does not afford them. Id., art. 31, 189 U.N.T.S.
at 174. Articles 2, 3, 4, 27 and 33 are all triggered by the fact that the refugee is in the
state's territory ("the country in which he finds himself," "refugees within their
territories," "any refugee in their territory," and, simply, "refugees"). Id., arts. 2, 3, 4,
27, 33, 189 U.N.T.S. at 156-58, 172, 176. Compare, for example, the language of article
33.1, which specifically applies to illegal presence or entry, "in their territory without
authorization." Lawful presence means admission under the specific domestic
immigration law of the state. It could, however, mean a number of different types of
admission. For example, the kind of temporary admission that is granted for visitor,
student, or medical visas. Id., art. 33.1, 189 U.N.T.S. at . Lawful presence is
different from lawful residence. In the Refugee Convention, lawful presence is
referred to in articles 18, 26, and 32 ("lawfully in"). The lawful presence requirement
does not seem absolute, in that many states place additional restrictions on , or deny,
the right to apply for asylum, to persons who have overstayed their period of lawful
presence. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, INTERNATIONAL
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MIGRATION LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE 46-48, 108-09
(2002). Lawful residence, in contrast, means something more than lawful presence.
Lawful residence requires evidence of permanent, indefinite, unrestricted residence
status. Id. at 55-59. If the state recognizes an individual as a refugee, and grants him or
her a travel document or re-entry document, the state is presumed to have afforded
him or her lawful residence. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 307-09. The
Refugee Convention provides the largest group of rights to those refugees who have
lawful residence in the host country, whether that means having been granted asylum,
permanent residence, or some other permanent type of status. Articles 15, 17(1), 19,
21, 23, 24, and 28 refer to "lawfully staying," which was meant to be an exact
translation of the French resident regulierement, which implies residence. Article 25
refers to those states "in whose territory (the refugee) is residing." See GOODWIN-
GILL, supra note 2, at 307-09.
65 See Fitzpatrick, The End of Protection, supra note 36, at 372.
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Rights; 6 the International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights;67 the Convention on the Rights of the Child;68 the Convention on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination;69 the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women;7" and the Conven-
tion Against Torture. 71 European states' actions toward refugees and
other non-refugee aliens or migrants are further regulated by the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights,7 the 1954 Convention on the Status
of Stateless Persons,73 and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness.
74
III. REVISITING "TEMPORARY PROTECTION" IN THE ARAB WORLD
The Arab world's efforts to create regional standards for the protection
offered to displaced Palestinians predate the formalized temporary pro-
tection programs in the Western world. As the Palestinian exodus began
in large numbers during the 1948-1949 conflict, the neighboring Arab
states provided shelter to the hundreds of thousands of refugees flooding
their territories. The Arab states' five decades of de facto temporary pro-
tection offered to the Palestinians is unprecedented, as it has often been
at great social, economic, and political cost. Although critics frequently
challenge the Arab states' treatment of Palestinians in terms of violations
of rights and failure to offer Palestinians permanent status, they ignore
66 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 ) [hereinafter ICCPR].
67 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter
ICESCR].
68 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990 ).
69 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)
[hereinafter CERD].
70 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3,
1981).
71 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force June 26, 1987 ) [hereinafter CAT].
72 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, as amended by Protocol No. 11, E.T.S. No. 155 (entered into
force Nov. 1, 1998) [hereinafter ECHR].
73 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, opened for signature
Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960 ) [hereinafter 1954
Stateless Convention].
74 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, opened for signature Aug. 30,
1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1975) [hereinafter 1961
Statelessness Convention].
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the fact that Arab states are under no legal obligation to grant permanent
status to Palestinian refugees. In addition, Arab states have actually sup-
ported what the refugees themselves have demanded all along: the right
to return to their original lands and homes.
Defining the area of reference of the "Arab world" for purposes of this
article is both necessary and complicated, as common Western miscon-
ceptions conflate distinct concepts of religion and culture in the Arab and
Muslim worlds. The Arab world comprises the following twenty-two
Arab states that are members of the Arab League: Algeria, Bahrain, the
Comorros Islands, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
75
Although the populations of these states are culturally and linguistically
"Arab," nine are also African states that speak both non-Arabic and
Arabic languages.76 In addition, although persons of these states consider
themselves part of the Muslim world, they are not monolithically Muslim.
Within most of these countries there are native populations of Jews and
Christians making up sizable segments of the populations.77 However, the
states in which the vast majority of Palestinian refugees reside are Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, occupied Palestine, Syria, and in lesser numbers, the
Gulf states. All are members of the Arab League, the core states affected
by a discussion of temporary protection for Palestinians.
The instruments that bind certain states in the region are the Refugee
Convention and Refugee Protocol, ratified by the following nine states:
Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia,
and Yemen.7' The African-Arab countries are also signatories to the 1969
Organization of African Unity ("OAU") Convention, the 1981 African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the major international
human rights instruments.7 9 Most of the Arab states have constitutions
'5 See Khadija Elmadmad, An Arab Convention on Forced Migration: Desirability
and Possibilities, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 461, 466 (1991).
76 See id.
17 For more information on ethnic and religious demographics in Arab countries,
see THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2002, available at http://www.odci/gov/cia/publications/
factbook (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
78 For states parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention, see United Nations Treaty
Collection, Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/ b/treaty2ref.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004). For states parties to the 1967
Protocol, see United Nations Treaty Collection, Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
11 For ratifications of the major international human rights instruments, see Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Human Rights
Instruments, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
For ratifications of the African instruments, see African Centre for Democracy and
Human Rights Studies, at http://www.acdhrs.org/sign.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
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that claim to be based on Islamic law, ° but among these states there are
neither uniform definitions nor understanding of the specific principles
Islamic law establishes.8 ' International human rights instruments also
bind Arab states. The Convention on the Rights of the Child is the most
widely-ratified instrument in the Arab world; only Somalia has not rati-
fied it.8" Nineteen Arab states have ratified the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of Racial Discrimination; fifteen states have ratified the
Convention Against Torture; 84 and thirteen states have ratified each of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 85 the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,8 6 and the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women. 7 Only a handful of states have ratified either of the two state-
lessness conventions.8 8
The single most important regional body in the Arab world is the Arab
League. It was established by the Arab League Pact in March 1945, with
the "purpose of... draw[ing] closer the relations between member States
and co-ordinat[ing] their activities with the aim of realizing a close collab-
oration between them. "89 Through the Arab League, there have been
80 Elmadmad, supra note 75, at 466-67.
81 See generally Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A
Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct? 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307 (1994).
82 For ratifications of the major international human rights instruments, see supra
notes 78-79.
83 Djibouti and Oman are non-signatories. Algeria has recognized the competence
to receive and process individual communications of the CERD under article 14. For
ratifications of the major international human rights instruments, see supra note 78.
84 Djibouti, Iraq, Mauritania, Oman, Syria, and the UAE have not ratified the
CAT. Algeria and Tunisia have recognized the competence to receive and process
individual communications of the Committee against Torture under article 22 of CAT.
Id.
85 Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) have not ratified the ICCPR. Id.
86 Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the
UAE have not ratified the ICESCR. Id.
87 Bahrain, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and the UAE have
not ratified the CEDAW. Id.
88 Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia have ratified the 1965 Convention on the Status of
Stateless Persons. Ratification information available at United Nations Treaty
Collection, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, http://www.unhchr.
ch/html/menu3/b/ treaty3stat.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2002). Libya and Tunisia have
ratified the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Ratification
information available at United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty4_.htm (last
visted Feb. 14, 2002).
89 Pact of the League of Arab States, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1945, 70
U.N.T.S. 248, 252 (entered into force May 10, 1945). The League comprises three
main bodies: the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, and the Permanent
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a number of efforts to create a regional system of human rights: the draft
Arab Charter on Human Rights (1971),9° the Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights (1993), 9' and the draft Arab Convention on Asylum
(1988).92 However, the major draft documents purporting to provide
human rights standards for the Arab/Muslim world have been severely
criticized by Arab and non-Arab, Muslim and non-Muslim commentators
alike as being deficient by international human rights standards and cul-
turally, rather than legally, grounded.93 The 1992 Declaration on the Pro-
tection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab World9"
delineates a broader scope of protection rights than previous instruments,
but has no binding force.
Additionally, the Arab League Council and Council of Arab Ministers
of the Interior have adopted a series of resolutions concerning the status
and treatment of Palestinian refugees in their territories.95 Through these
Committees for each field of cooperation between member states, as set forth in
article 2 of the Arab League Pact. For more on the League of Arab States ("LAS"),
see ROBERT W. McDONALD, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, A STUDY IN THE
DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION (1965).
90 Council of the League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, Sept. 15,
1994, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE: CASES,
TREATIES AND MATERIALS DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT (Francisco Forrest Martin
et al. eds., 1997).
91 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam: World Conference on Human
Rights, Aug. 5, 1990, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.157[PC/62/Add.18 (1993) [hereinafter Cairo Declaration].
92 In addition, the Organization of Islamic Conferences and other Islamic
organizations have drafted various instruments in an attempt to reach a common
framework for human rights. See, e.g., Elmadmad, supra note 75, at 476 (citing Draft
Document on Human Rights in Islam, issued by the Islamic Conference in Dakar
(1983); Islamic Declaration of Human Rights of the Islamic Committee of Europe
(1981); and the draft Charter on Human and People's rights in the Arab World of
Arab Experts in Siracusa (1986)). Elmadmad argues for the creation of an Arab
Convention on Forced Migration to address the problem of "protecting those who are
unprotected, and for ways of assuring respect for human rights in the Moslem World
in general and in the Arab World in particular." Id. at 461.
93 See Mayer, supra note 81, at 307; Bassam Tibi, Islamic Law/Shari'a, Human
Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 277 (1994);
ABDULLAH AHMED AN'NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL
LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990).
9' U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, GROUP OF ARAB EXPERTS: DECLARATION
OF THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE ARAB WORLD,
(Refworld Information on Refugees and Human Rights CD-ROM, 2000). The
Declaration was adopted by the Group of Arab Experts at the Fourth Arab Seminar.
U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES ET AL., ASYLUM AND REFUGEE LAW IN THE
ARAB WORLD (1992).
91 LASC Resolutions are based on proposals and suggestions submitted to the
LAS by the permanent Palestinian representative, the General Administration for
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resolutions, the League aimed to address urgent issues facing Palestinian
refugees in the absence of durable solutions as set forth in United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 194(111), December 11, 1948,
which reaffirmed, inter alia, the right of refugees to return to their
homes.96 The League of Arab States Council ("LASC") Resolution 424
(1952) established that dispersed Palestinian families should be allowed
to be reunited in the current place of residence of the provider or head of
the household.9 7 LASC Resolution 714 (1954) provided for the issuance
of travel documents to refugees.98 The LASC Ministers of the Interior
Palestine Affairs at the General Secretariat, and the Supervisory Conference on
Palestinian Refugee Affairs in Arab host states. The Supervisory Conference on
Palestinian Refugee Affairs comprises representatives of Palestinian refugee affairs
departments in Arab host countries, including the Department for Palestinian
Refugee Affairs in Lebanon, the General Authority for Palestine Refugees in Syria,
and the Department of Palestinian Affairs in Jordan. In most cases, these
departments fall within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, with the exception
of Jordan, where the Department of Palestinian Affairs falls within the jurisdiction of
the Foreign Ministry and the office of the Prime Minister. For a compilation of LASC
Resolutions in English translation, see Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre
(SHAML), The League of Arab States and Palestinian Refugees' Residency Rights
(Abbas Shiblak, compiler, 1998), available at http://www.shaml.org (last visited Mar.
13, 2003).
96 See G.A. Res. 194(111), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 21, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
Under operative paragraph 11, the General Assembly,
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with
their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and
that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to
return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of
international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or
authorities responsible; [and] Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate
the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the
refugees and the payment of compensation....
Id. For an authoritative analysis of the drafting history of the Resolutions, see infra
notes 325-340 and accompanying text. For the LAS's aims in addressing durable solu-
tions, see generally Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note
95.
97 Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95, at 16.
98 Id. at 17-18 (citing LASC Resolution 714, Jan. 27, 1954, reprinted in English).
The bearer of the travel document is subject to the immigration law of LAS member
states. The document is valid for a period of five years and renewable on an annual
basis. If the document expires while the bearer is outside the country, it is renewed by
the country of issuance. The Resolution also provides details on the format and
content of the travel document. The bearer of the travel document does not derive a
right of residence in the country of issue. Id. at 18 (citing LASC Resolution 715, which
exempts Palestinian refugees from fees for the renewal of visas and travel
documents). Takkenberg notes that Resolution 715 was never properly implemented
by Arab states. LEX TAKKENBERG, THE STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 140 (1998). LASC Resolution 1705, Sept. 7, 1960, lengthened
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("LASCMI") Resolution 8 (1982) resolved that bearers of travel docu-
ments receive equal treatment, including freedom of residency, employ-
ment, and mobility, as citizens of the issuing state.99
The Protocol on the Treatment of Palestinians, 00 adopted by the
Council of Ministers in 1965 in Casablanca ("Casablanca Protocol"), is
the most important instrument for temporary protection of Palestinian
refugees in Arab host states. The Casablanca Protocol was a major effort
to regularize the status of Palestinians in the states where they had prima-
rily fled in 1948, and which continued to host them. In its five articles, the
Casablanca Protocol requires that Palestinians receive the same treat-
ment as nationals of Arab host states with regard to employment,1 ' the
right to leave and return to the territory of the state in which they
reside, 02 freedom of movement between Arab states, 0 3 issuance and
the renewal period for travel documents from one year to two years. Palestinian
Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95, at 19. According to LASC
Resolution 2019, Sept. 3, 1964, bearers of travel documents have the right to return to
the country of issue without being required to obtain a return visa. Saudi Arabia,
Lebanon, and Libya expressed reservations about the Resolution. TAKKENBERG,
supra, at 140 n.47.
99 Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95, at 66. The
Resolution also resolves that crimes committed by Palestinians residing in an Arab
state will be prosecuted according to the prevailing laws of that Arab state. Id. at 52.
100 Id. at 23-24 [citing Protocol on the Treatment of Palestinians (Casablanca
Protocol), Sept. 11, 1965]. For further discussion of the Casablanca Protocol, see
TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 141-44. The Protocol refers to the treatment of
Palestinians generally in Arab states. Takkenberg notes that "[t]he change is
apparently initiated by the realization that the legal position of non-refugee
Palestinians is much the same as that of those who had become refugees in 1948-49."
Id. at 141.
'o "Whilst retaining their Palestinian nationality, Palestinians currently residing in
the land of [an Arab host state] have the right of employment on par with its citizens."
Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95, at 23.
102 "Palestinians residing at the moment in [an Arab host state] in accordance with
the dictates of their interests, have the right to leave and return to this state." Id. at
23-24.
103 "Palestinians residing in other Arab states have the right to enter the land of
(an Arab host state] and to depart from it, in accordance with their interests. Their
right of entry only gives them the right to stay for the permitted period and for the
purpose they entered for, so long as the authorities do not agree to the contrary." Id.
at 24.
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renewal of travel documents, 10 4 and freedom of residence, work, and
movement. 105
While the Casablanca Protocol is limited in scope, its provisions relat-
ing to employment and freedom of movement are more generous than
the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Casablanca Protocol calls upon Arab
states to accord Palestinian refugees the right to employment on par with
nationals. 0 6 The Refugee Convention only provides for "treatment as
favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that
accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances" with regard to
self-employment and liberal professions and the "most favorable treat-
ment accorded to nationals of a foreign country" with regard to wage-
earning employment. 107 The Casablanca Protocol provides for freedom of
movement between Arab states, although this right "loses much of its
meaning"' 0' due to the fact that entry is subject to the respective immi-
gration policies of member states. The Refugee Convention only provides
for freedom of movement within the host country. 10 9 Finally, the Casa-
blanca Protocol provides for national treatment regarding visa and resi-
dency applications." 0  Under the Refugee Convention, matters
concerning visas and residency are left to the discretion of Contracting
states.1" Unlike the Refugee Convention, which provides for transfer of
responsibility concerning the issue and extension of travel documents
when a refugee has lawfully taken up residence in another contracting
state, the Casablanca Protocol stipulates that the country of first refuge is
primarily responsible for the issue and extension of travel documents to
Palestinian refugees." 2
Together, the standards set forth in the League of Arab States
("LAS"), resolutions and in the 1965 Casablanca Protocol have afforded
Palestinian refugees, in theory if not always in practice, a type of tempo-
rary protection in LAS member states with the expectation that refugees
104 "Palestinians who are at the moment in [an Arab host state] as well as those
who were residing and left to the Diaspora, are given, upon request, valid travel
documents. The concerned authorities must, wherever they be, issue these documents
or renew them without delay." Id.
105 "Bearers of these travel documents residing in LAS states receive the same
treatment as all other LAS state citizens, regarding visa and residency applications."
Id.
106 See Id. at 23.
107 See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, arts. 17(1), 18, and 19(1), 189 U.N.T.S.
at 164, 166.
108 TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 142.
109 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 26, 189 U.N.T.S. at 172.
110 See TAKKENBERO, supra note 98, at 143.
"' Id. at 143-44.
112 See Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95 and
accompanying text; see also TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 143.
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will return to their homes of origin.113 Provisions relating to employment
allowed refugees to enter the labor market in host states. Many of those
Arab states hosting the majority of Palestinian refugees incorporated
LAS standards into domestic law." 4 Cancellation of visa requirements
during the 1950s and issuance of travel documents facilitated the move-
ment of refugees to fill vacancies in the labor market, particularly in the
Gulf states." 5 Generally, Palestinian refugees in Jordan and Syria have
accrued the widest range of benefits in law and practice." 6 In Jordan,
refugees have the added protection of Jordanian nationality, while retain-
ing their status as refugees and their right to return to their homes of
origin.
117
113 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
114 Syria, for example, adopted legislation which exempted Palestinian refugees
from provisions of the Civil Service Act that required civil servants to hold Syrian
nationality for at least five years prior to government service. See TAKKENBERG,
supra note 98, at 168 (citing Decree No. 37, 1949); see also Annual Report of the
Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East, 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 13, U.N.
Doc. A/2171 (1952) (citing legislation "aim[ed] at facilitating the means of work to
Palestinians, including: Petition Writers Law No. 119, July 9, 1951; Legislative Decree
No. 162, Mar. 10, 1952 (regulating the profession of sworn translators); Legislative
Decree No. 250, 162, Mar. 10, 1952 (allowing Palestine public cars to be registered as
Syrian public cars); Cooperative Societies Law No. 65, Feb. 28, 1950 (allowing
Palestinians to be members of cooperative societies under article 24)). Palestinian
refugees in Egypt were accorded the right to practice liberal professions including
medicine through Law No. 415, Law No. 416, and Law No. 481, and to practice
dentistry through Law No. 37, as well as the right to state employment through
Presidential Decree Number 66 of 1962. LAURIE BRAND, PALESTINIANS IN THE ARAB
WORLD: INSTITUTION BUILDING AND THE SEARCH FOR STATE 52 (1988). Holders of
Egyptian travel documents endorsed with a visa other than for a tourist visit are
formally exempt from the requirement that native workers be given priority for
employment pursuant to Decree No. 657, Article 110), 1954. TAKKENBERG, supra
note 98, at 52.
115 During the 1950s, a series of reciprocal agreements were concluded between
Kuwait and other Arab states that cancelled the need for visas. The first was with
Lebanon in 1951-1952, followed by Egypt and Jordan in 1958-1959. BRAND, supra
note 114, at 111.
116 Unlike in Jordan, in Syria Palestinian refugees do not have full political rights.
In both countries, Palestinian refugees are the subject of close monitoring by state
authorities. See ELlA ZUREIK, PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE PEACE PROCESS 32,
34 (1996).
117 In 1970, the Supervisory Conference on Palestinian Affairs, established by the
Arab League in 1964 (LASC Resolution 1946, Mar. 31, 1964), adopted Resolution
2600, Mar. 11, 1970, which allowed Palestinians to acquire dual citizenship. The
Resolution exempts Palestinians from provisions of LASC Resolution 776, Apr. 5,
1954 ("Agreement on Citizenship"), which prohibits citizens of Arab states from
acquiring two nationalities. Resolutions are reprinted in English translation in
Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95, at 43, 38-40. It
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Despite attempts by the Arab League to create normative standards of
treatment and status grants for Palestinians in the Arab world, there has
been little standardization in practice. De facto temporary protection
under LASC resolutions and the Casablanca Protocol have not had the
desired uniform effect of improving the civil and human rights of the ref-
ugees pending the implementation of durable solutions to their plight.
Due to their unique historical and legal situation and the "protection
gap" discussed below, Palestinians receive differing treatment in the vari-
ous areas of the world where they are located. Moreover, Palestinian ref-
ugees in Arab host states are, in fact, accorded fewer rights than provided
for under the Refugee Convention.
Temporary protection has generated both intense interest and contro-
versy. Its proponents claim that temporary protection has expanded the
possibilities of international protection beyond the constraints of the Ref-
ugee Convention regime.118 In contrast, its critics claim that temporary
protection has unduly narrowed the availability of international protec-
tion both to Refugee Convention refugees and to others to whom an
expanded definition of "refugee" might apply under a truly humanitarian
approach to the refugee definition. 19 This debate, although relevant to
the Palestinian refugee situation, does not detract from the particular
importance of temporary protection in the search for durable solutions
for this refugee and stateless population.
A review of the historical, legal and political background to the Pales-
tinian refugee problem, an overview of temporary protection regimes as
applied in Europe, the United States, and Africa, and a review of the
current legal status and conditions of Palestinian refugees is necessary
before discussing what changes would be brought about by implementing
a harmonized temporary protection regime for this population.
III. HISTORICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
More than half a century of persecution inside Palestinians' historic
homeland has produced a chronic pattern of forced displacement that can
be characterized as a form of forced population transfer or ethnic cleans-
ing.12° It is estimated that three-quarters of the Palestinian people are
MOHAMMAD KHALIL, THE ARAB STATES AND THE ARAB LEAGUE: A
DOCUMENTARY RECORD 127-29 (1962). The exemption addressed political concerns
that the acquisition of Jordanian citizenship by a large number of Palestinian refugees
would be used as a pretext for cessation of refugee status and cancellation of
international assistance. Id.
118 Susan Martin et al., Temporary Protection: Towards a New Regional and
Domestic Framework, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 543, 559-60 (1998).
119 Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note 12, at 280.
120 See, e.g., The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Human
Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer, including the Implantation of Settlers,
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refugees and displaced persons. 121 The Palestinian people constitute one
of the largest and longest standing unresolved cases of displacement in
the world today. Approximately one in three refugees worldwide is Pales-
tinian.122 More than seven million Palestinians, as of December 2002, are
refugees or displaced persons, including: 5.3 million refugees and their
descendents who were displaced in 1948-four million of whom are regis-
tered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess., para. 15, 17, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17 (1993) (defining population transfer as "the systematic, coercive
and deliberate . . . movement of population into or out of an area"). Population
transfer methods include military action, but also legislation or other judicial action,
planning, recruitment of settlers, public information, and financial subsidies. On
ethnic cleansing, see, for example, Chaloka Beyani, A Political and Legal Analysis of
the Problem of the Return of Forcibly Transferred Population, 16 REFUGEE SURV. Q.
1, 1-3 (1997) (defining ethnic cleansing as "the political drive for acquisition and
control of targeted territory to the exclusion of other ethnic groups" or as "rendering
an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of
given groups from the area"); see also Drazon Petrovic, Ethnic Cleansing-An
Attempt at Methodology, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 342 (1994). For a discussion of transfer
and ethnic cleansing in the Palestinian case see Alfred de Zayas, The Illegality of
Population Transfers and the Application of Emerging International Norms in the
Palestinian Case, 6 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 17-55 (1990/91); NUR MASALHA,
ExPULSION OF THE PALESTINIANS: THE CONCEPT OF 'TRANSFER' IN ZIONIST
POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1882-1948 (1992); and, Gabriel Piterberg, Erasure, 10 NEW
LEFT REVIEW 31-46 (2001).
121 The total Palestinian population worldwide as of December 2002 was estimated
at 9.3 million. PALESTINIAN CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, PALESTINIANS AT THE
END OF THE YEAR 2002 15 (2002), available at http://www.pcbs.org (last visited Jan.
10, 2003). See infra notes 129-33 for the total estimated Palestinian refugee
population.
122 The figure is based on the total number of 'Convention Refugees' as of the end
of 2001, estimated at 12 million. See Refugee population by region of origin, 1992-
2001 (thousands), in UNHCR STATISTICIAL YEARBOOK 2001, REFUGEES, ASYLUM-
SEEKERS AND OTHER PERSONS OF CONCERN-TRENDS IN DISPLACEMENT,
PROTECTION AND SOLUTIONS annex A.5 at 88 (2000). For the total estimated
Palestinian refugee population see infra notes 129-33. Data on the Palestinian refugee
population is characterized by uneven quality and uncertainty primarily due to the
absence of a comprehensive registration system, frequent forced migration, and the
lack of a uniform definition of a Palestinian refugee. The U.N. Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East ("UNRWA") administers the only
registration system for Palestinian refugees. UNRWA registration includes only those
refugees displaced in 1948 (and their descendents) in need of assistance-
approximately 55% of the total refugee population. Additionally, it should be noted
that there is some variance in UNRWA records due to the fact that reporting is
voluntary. LENA C. ENDRESEN & GEIR OVENSEN, THE POTENTIAL OF UNRWA
DATA FOR RESEARCH ON PALESTINIAN REFUGEES: A STUDY OF UNRWA
ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 16-17 (1994).
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Refugees ("UNRWA") for assistance;" 3 approximately 750,000 refugees
from the West Bank-including eastern Jerusalem-and the Gaza Strip
displaced for the first time in 1967;..4 an estimated 350,000 Palestinians
internally displaced inside Israel; 25 another 150,000 Palestinians inter-
nally displaced in 1967-occupied Palestine; 26 and approximately 735,000
123 The figure for 1948 registered refugees, as of December 2002, is from UNRWA
in Figures: Figures as of 31 December 2002, at http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/
pdf/uif-dec02.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2003). The 1948 non-registered refugee
population is derived from The Distribution of Palestinians in 1998 (minimum
estimate), in SALMAN ABU SIrrA, THE PALESTINIAN NAKBA 1948: THE REGISTER OF
DEPOPULATED LOCALITIES IN PALESTINE tbl. 7 at 27 (1998) (updated based on an
average growth rate of the Palestinian refugee population of 3.5% per annum).
124 The 1967 first-time displaced refugee population is derived from Report of the
Secretary General under General Assembly Resolution 2252 (EX-V) and Security
Council Resolution 237 (1967), U.N. GAOR, 5th Emergency Spec. Sess., at para. 159
,U.N. Doc. A/6797 (1967) (updated based on an average growth rate of the
Palestinian refugee population of 3.5% per annum) [hereinafter Report of the
Secretary General under General Assembly Resolution 2252]. The figure does not
include 1948 refugees displaced for a second time in 1967.
125 The 1948 internally displaced population is derived from initial registration
figures from UNRWA. Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 16,
at 43, U.N. Doc. A/1905 (1951) (updated based on an average growth rate of the
Palestinian population inside Israel of 4.2% per annum). The figure also includes
Palestinians displaced inside Israel after 1948, the majority of whom are Bedouin
residing in so-called unrecognized villages and in seven townships constructed by the
government to concentrate displaced Bedouin in restricted settlement zones. See
Arab Ass'n for Hum. Rts., The Unrecognized Villages, at http://www.arabhra.org/
article26/factsheet4.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2003); Arab Ass'n for Hum. Rts., The
Arab Bedouin of the Negev, at http://www.arabhra.org/article26/ factsheet3.htm (last
visited Mar. 6, 2003); see also Wakim Wakim, laji'oun fi watan, 'al-haadiroun al-
ghaa'iboun fi Isra'iil' [Refugees in their Homeland, Present Absentees in Israel],
MAJALLAT AL-DIRASAT AL-FILASTINIYAH, Winter 2001, at 90; Norwegian Refugee
Council/Global IDP Project, Profile of Internal Displacement: Israel (2002), at http://
www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/ wCountries/Israel (last visited Mar. 6,
2003); HILLEL COHEN, HANIFKADIM HANOKHAHIM, HAPLITIM HAFALESTINIM
BEISRAEL ME'AZ 1948 [THE PRESENT ABSENTEES: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN
ISRAEL SINCE 1948] (2000).
126 The figure includes Palestinians internally displaced during 1967 due to
expulsion and demolition of homes, and persons displaced after 1967 due to ongoing
land confiscation, house demolition, and revocation of residency rights in eastern
Jerusalem. Terry Rempel, Internally Displaced Palestinians, International Protection,
and Durable Sohtions (2002), http://www.badil.org/Publications/Briefs/brief9.pdf (last
visited Mar.15, 2003). In addition an estimated 56,000 Palestinians were forced to
change residence during the first seven months of the second intifada due to the
proximity of their homes to Israeli military checkpoints and colonies. Press Release,
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Impact of the Israeli Measures on the Well-
being of Palestinian Children, Women and Household (2001), available at http://www.
2004] TEMPORARY PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 27
Palestinian refugees and other displaced persons from the 1967-occupied
territories who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion, are outside 1967-occupied Palestine and are unable to
return (due to revocation of residency status, deportation, denial of fam-
ily reunification, etc.) or, owing to such fear, are unwilling to return.'27
A. Root Causes of Palestinian Displacement
Root causes of Palestinian displacement include: denial of the right to
self-determination, armed conflict, colonization, foreign occupation,
racial discrimination, and practices of ethnic/religious separation akin to
internationally recognized forms of apartheid. The absence of temporal
and geographical constraints on displacement of the indigenous Arab
population of Palestine, the displacement's ethno/religious character, sys-
tematic nature, and lack of effective remedies gives special significance to
international protection for this refugee and stateless population. As of
2002, it was estimated that three-quarters of the Palestinian people were
displaced. Less than one percent of the total number of displaced Pales-
tinians has been able to return to their homes and villages of origin either
inside Israel or in 1967-occupied Palestine.'
28
Denial of the right of the indigenous peoples of Palestine to self-deter-
mination is both a cause and condition of the Palestinian refugee question
pcbs.org/english/press-r/chld-prs.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2001). As of the end of
2002 some 80,000 Palestinians had been rendered homeless due to the destruction of
their homes. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
Humanitarian Action Plan for Occupied Palestinian 2003 (Dec. 10, 2002), http://www.
reliefweb.int/appeals/03appeals.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003); see also Norwegian
Refugee Council/Global IDP Project, Profile of Internal Displacement: Palestinian
Territories (Aug. 29, 2003), at http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/ IdpProjectDb/idp
Survey.nsf/wCountries/Palestinian+Territories.
127 For further definition of this category of Palestinian refugees see U.N. High
Comm'r for Refugees, Note on the applicability of Article iD of the 1951 Convention
relating to the status of Refugees to Palestinian Refugees (2002), available at http://
www.badil.org/Protection/Documents/Refugee-Law/UNHCR-Note-lD-2002.pdf (last
visited Mar. 15, 2003). The figure is derived from GEORGE F. KOSSAIFI, THE
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN 8 (1996). The figure does not
include displaced Palestinians who were able to return to the their places of origin in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in
1994. Estimates of returnees through 1997 range from 50,000 to 60,000. Nick Vanhear
et al., Reintegration of the Palestinian Returnees (1997), available at http://www.shaml.
org/publications/mono6.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
128 For a more detailed analysis see Terry Rempel, Housing and Property
Restitution: The Palestinian Refugee Case, in HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 275 (Scott Leckie ed. 2003).
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and related problem of statelessness. 129 Early promises of indepen-
dence.3 ° by the international community-"Great Powers"-to the indig-
enous peoples of Palestine following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire,
gave way to a considered policy that aimed to bring about the establish-
ment of a "Jewish national home" in Palestine against the expressed
wishes of the majority of the indigenous inhabitants of the country.
1 3 1
According to the 1922 Mandate for Palestine, 3 2 the Jewish minority in
the country and non-resident Jews residing elsewhere were granted full
129 For a discussion on the right of the Palestinian peoples to self-determination
see Sally V. Mallison & W. Thomas Mallison Jr., The Juridical Bases for Palestinian
Self-Determination, 1 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 36 (1984). For an opposing view see id,
note 28, at 42. For further discussion see, for example, Proceedings of the 65th Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1971);
and, Proceedings of the 82nd Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 334 (1988).
130 See, e.g., THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE
14-15 (1979) (citing correspondence from Sir Henry McMahon to Sherif Hussein
stating, ".... Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support independence of the
Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca"). 1
DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, FROM THE PRE-OTTIOMAN/OTTOMAN PERIOD TO THE
PRELUDE TO THE MADRID MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE 17-19 (Madhi F.
Abdul Hadi, ed. 1997) [hereinafter 1 DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE]. The principle that
the future government of Palestine should be based upon the consent of the governed
was further affirmed in British and joint Anglo-French declarations. Id.
131 See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF PALESTINE STUDIES, 1 SURVEY OF PALESTINE 19-20
(1991) (quoting a February 21, 1922 statement of Arab leaders to the British
Secretary of State for Colonies declaring that people of Palestine demand their
national independence and cannot accept the 1917 Balfour Declaration and British
Mandate of Palestine). The Arab delegation further requested that the constitution of
an independent Palestine should: "(1) Safeguard the civil, political, and economic
interests of the people; (2) Provide for the creation of a national independent
Government in accordance with the spirit of paragraph 4, article 12, of the 1922
Covenant; (3) Safeguard the legal rights of all foreigners; (4) Guarantee religious
equality to all peoples; (5) Guarantee the rights of minorities; and, (6) Guarantee the
rights of the Assisting Power." Id. For further discussion of early Palestinian demands
for independence see RASHID KHALIDI, PALESTINIAN IDENTITY: THE CONSTRUCTION
OF MODERN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS (1997).
132 During the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the Allied Powers decided to
establish international transition regimes-i.e., Mandates-in those territories
formerly under the control of the Ottoman Empire. Palestine was considered a "Class
A" Mandate or closest to independence. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art.
22. Article 22 states:
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a
stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be
provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and
assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The
wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of
the Mandatory.
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political rights in Palestine.1 33 The majority indigenous Palestinian Arab
community was only granted civil and religious rights. 3 4 Palestinians
sought refuge in neighboring Arab states largely as a result of the insta-
bility and political repression that followed a series of indigenous upris-
ings against British administration and Zionist colonization. The initial
outflow of the indigenous Arab population was small, primarily consist-
ing of the political elite, individuals and members of groups actively
opposed to British rule in Palestine, and segments of the upper and
emerging middle class. 35 The United Nations subsequently recom-
mended partition of Palestine into two states-Arab and Jewish 13-as a
Id. The temporary administration of Palestine was entrusted to Great Britain. 8
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1007 (1922). 1 SURVEY OF PALESTINE , supra note 131, at 4-
5.
133 See 8 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1007, at pmbl. (1922), stating:
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should
be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on
November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted
by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people.
The Preamble essentially incorporated the 1917 Balfour Declaration, in which the
British government affirmed Zionist aspirations for a Jewish state in Palestine. The
text of the Balfour Declaration is reprinted in 1 SURVEY OF PALESTINE, supra note
131, at 1. For more on the Balfour Declaration see, for example, LEONARD STEIN,
THE BALFOUR DECLARATION (1983). For more on the Zionist movement see infra
note 143.
131 See 8 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1007, at pmbl. (1922) (stating, "nothing should
be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine"). The Mandate violated the intent and terms of the
Mandate system set forth in article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, which was
to facilitate the transition of non-self-governing territories to independent states. The
Mandate for Palestine also violated basic rules of due process set forth in the
Covenant requiring that actions of the Mandatory power be guided by the wishes of
the indigenous population. Id.
135 During the 1936-39 uprising, for example, some 40,000 Palestinian Arabs fled
the country. RONY GABBAY, A POLITICAL STUDY OF THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT 66
(1959). For a chronological overview of Palestinian uprisings during the period of the
British Mandate see 1 SURVEY OF PALESTINE, supra note 131, at 15-102.
136 U.N. Special Committee on Palestine Report to the General Assembly, U.N.
GAOR, 2d Sess., Supp. No. 11, at 102, U.N. Doc. A/364 (1947) (effectively
recommending the creation of one binational state-referred to as a "Jewish state"-
with a population of 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Palestinian Arabs, 90,000 of whom
were Bedouins; and one "Arab state" with a population of 725,000 Palestinian Arabs
and 10,000 Jews. The city of Jerusalem, which was to have international status, had a
population of 105,000 Palestinian Arabs and 100,000 Jews). The "Jewish state" was
allotted 56% of the territory of Palestine, including most of the fertile land.
Palestinian Arabs owned nearly 90% of the land in the proposed "Jewish state."
Resolution 181 was based on the conclusions of a special U.N. committee established
to formulate recommendations concerning the future status of Palestine. See Report
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politically palatable means to reconcile self-determination claims of the
indigenous population with the "Great Powers" political commitment to
the Zionist movement.' 3 7 The departure of middle and upper class Pales-
tinians that followed.3 rapidly evolved into a mass exodus. By the time
war broke out between the newly established state of Israel and the Arab
states in mid-May 1948, some 400,000 Palestinian Arabs, comprising one-
third of the indigenous Palestinian Arab community, had already been
displaced/expelled from their homes and villages of origin.' 3 9 The crea-
tion of a Jewish state on seventy-eight percent of the territory of Mandate
Palestine in 1948, and Israel's military occupation of the remaining
twenty-two percent of Palestine in 1967,140 complicated and effectively
to the General Assembly, U.N. Special Committee on Palestine, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/364 (1947). The committee was established after a majority of the General
Assembly rejected established procedures set forth in article 77(1)(a) of U.N. Charter
chapter 12 concerning the termination of mandate regimes set up under the League of
Nations. The General Assembly also rejected member requests to obtain an advisory
opinion from the International Court of Justice ("IC"). For the text of the proposed
questions to be submitted to the ICJ see 1947-48 U.N.Y.B. 1949.1.13 (including
proposals from Iraq, U.N. Doc. A/AC.14.21, from Syria, U.N. Doc. A/AC.14/25, and
from Egypt, U.N. Doc. A/AC.14/24).
137 Political Zionism is a movement founded in the nineteenth century in response
to anti-Jewish persecution in Europe. Influenced by nineteenth-century nationalism
and colonialism, the Zionist movement aimed to establish a 'Jewish state' in Palestine
through mass Jewish immigration and settlement (i.e. colonization). One of the
earliest formulations of this idea is set forth in a pamphlet written by Theodore Herzl
in 1896, which states, "The idea which I have developed in this pamphlet is an ancient
one: It is the restoration of the Jewish State. The world resounds with clamor against
the Jews, and this has revived the dormant idea". THEODORE HERZL, THE JEWISH
STATE (1896), excerpts reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 130, at
11; see also The Basel Program, Aug. 31st, 1897, excerpts reprinted in id. at 14 ("The
aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by
public law").
138 It is estimated that some 30,000 Palestinians left the country in the weeks
immediately following the adoption of the partition plan. Erskine B. Childers, The
Wordless Wish: From Citizens to Refugees, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE
181 (Ibrahim Abu Lughod ed., 1971).
139 For a detailed account of displacement during the 1948 conflict and war in
Palestine see BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM
1947-49 (1987). For a series of maps illustrating patterns of Palestinian displacement
and loss of land according to Zionist/Israeli military operations see SALMAN ABU
SITTA, THE END OF THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT, FROM REFUGEES TO
CITIZENS AT HOME 6-12 (2001).
140 S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 1382d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (1967) (calling
upon Israel to withdraw from territories occupied during the war, but not referring to
the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination). The Palestine Liberation
Organization ("PLO") initially rejected the resolution for this reason. See Statement
Issued by the Palestine Liberation Organization Rejecting U.N. Resolution 242, Cairo,
23 Nov. 1967, reprinted in I DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 130, at 212. The
2004] TEMPORARY PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 31
blocked Palestinian self-determination claims in any part of their historic
homeland. As Bell observes:
The 1967 war and subsequent international rooting of the Palestinian
self-determination claim in a prohibition on use of force and ongoing
occupation rather than within a colonial-racist domination frame-
work has enmeshed self-determination arguments with debate about
the applicable humanitarian law regime and standards.' 4 '
Faced with two massive refugee flows from Palestine, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2535 B(XXIV), 10
December 1969,42 recognizing that "the problem of the Palestine Arab
refugees [had] arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights." The 1993 Declaration of Principles ("Oslo I"),143 the 1994 Gaza-
Jericho Agreement ("Cairo agreement")' and the 1995 Interim Agree-
ment ("Oslo II"), 45 (hereinafter referred to as the "Oslo agreements")
"provide[d] a change of status of territory"' 46 but do not recognize the
right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. While the establish-
PLO was subsequently forced to accept Resolution 242 as a quid pro quo for the
opening of a political dialogue with the United States. WILLIAM QUANDT, PEACE
PROCESS: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967
367-75 (2001).
141 CHRISTINE BELL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE AGREEMENTS 75 (2000).
142 G.A. Res. 2535 B(XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 25-6, U.N.
Doc. A/7630 (1970); see also G.A. Res. 3236 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR., 29th Sess., Supp.
No. 30, at 78 (1974) (reaffirming the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination and the right of refugees to return to their homes). Since this period,
the U. N. has reaffirmed annually the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination and to return to their homes of origin. For a compilation of resolutions
concerning Palestine see Institute of Palestine Studies, 1 U.N. Resolutions on
Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1974 (George J. Tomeh ed., 1975); 2
U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1975-1981
(Regina S. Sherif ed., 1988); 3 U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1982-1986 (Michael Simpson ed., 1988); 4 U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON
PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1987-1991 (Jody Boudrealt ed., 1993);
and, 5 U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1992-
1998 (Katherine LaRiviere & Ida Audeh eds., 1999).
143 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Authority, Washington,
Sept. 13th, 1993, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1525 (1993). II DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE,
FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS IN MADRID TO THE POST-HEBRON AGREEMENT PERIOD
145-159 (Madhi F. Abdul Hadi, ed. 1997) [hereinafter II DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE].
144 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, Cairo, May 4th, 1994,
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 622 (1994). II DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 143, at
175-205.
145 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept.
28th, 1995, Palest.-Israel, 36 I.L.M. 551, reprinted in 8 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 353
(1994/95); II DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 143, at 246-256.
146 BELL, supra note 141, at 190. Bell further observes that,
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ment of a self-governing Palestinian Authority in 1967-occupied territo-
ries, excluding eastern Jerusalem, enabled some Palestinians to return to
parts of their historic homeland, the collapse of the political process in
2000-2001 and the impossibility of realizing Palestinian self-determination
in the near future, has resulted in new outflows.
The majority of Palestinian refugees were displaced during periods of
armed conflict in Palestine. Israeli military forces (including pre-state
Zionist militia groups) used a combination of tactics, in contravention of
international humanitarian and human rights law that led to widespread
displacement of the indigenous Arab population.' 47 Approximately
eighty percent of refugees displaced in 1948148 and sixty percent of refu-
gees displaced in 1967' were either expelled or fled under military
assault by Zionist/Israeli military forces. Specific tactics included:
targeted military attacks against civilians;' "shoot to kill" policies at the
[The Oslo agreements] devolve power and remove some Israeli forces but do not
end occupation. Or they end Israeli occupation but do not create a Palestinian
state. They are interim and transitional but may become permanent if
negotiations do not succeed. Paradoxically, if negotiations do succeed,
substantially the same arrangements may be asserted to comprise a Palestinian
state, even while the ability of political elites, and even more so ordinary
Palestinians, to self-determine their future is limited.
Id. See also Richard Falk, Some International Law Implications of the Oslo/Cairo
Framework for the PLO/Israeli Peace Process, 8 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 28 (1994-95)
("Throughout the agreements, there is no acknowledgement whatsoever of Palestin-
ian sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza, or Jerusalem areas, and no implication that
the Palestinian Authority is a vehicle for emerging Palestinian statehood."). For a
concise legal analysis of the Oslo agreements see RAJA SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPA-
TION TO INTERIM ACCORDS: ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (1997).
147 For general historical accounts of the 1948 and 1967 wars and Israeli military
practices see, for example, PETER DODD & HALIM BARAKAT, RIVER WITHOUT
BRIDGES: A STUDY OF THE EXODUS OF THE 1967 PALESTINIAN ARAB REFUGEES
(1969); SIMHA FLAPAN, THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL: MYTHS AND REALITIES (1987); NUR
MASALHA, A LAND WITHOUT A PEOPLE, ISRAEL, TRANSFER AND THE PALESTINIANS
(1997); BENNY MORRIS, ISRAEL's BORDER WARS, 1949-56 (1993); MORRIS, THE
BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, supra note 139; DONALD NEFF,
WARRIORS FOR JERUSALEM: SIX DAYS THAT CHANGED THE MIDDLE EAST (1984);
MICHAEL PALUMBO, THE 1948 EXPULSION OF A PEOPLE FROM THEIR HOMELAND
(1987); ILAN PAPPE, BRITAIN AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1948-1951 (1988);
TOM SEGEV, 1949: THE FIRST ISRAELIS (1986); and INSTITUTE OF PALESTINE
STUDIES, ALL THAT REMAINS: THE PALESTINIAN VILLAGES OCCUPIED AND
DEPOPULATED BY ISRAEL IN 1948 (Walid Khalidi ed., 1992).
148 See ABU SITIA, supra note 123, at 11.
149 DODD & BARAKAT, supra note 147, at 46.
150 Incidents occurred in all major cities throughout Palestine as well as in
hundreds of villages. For a description of specific incidents see MORRIS, ISRAEL'S
BORDER WARS, supra note 147, at 41, 102, 107, 117-118, 121, 200, 213, 214, and 220.
For a description of the general policy see SHARIF KANA'ANA, STILL ON VACATION
(1992). During the 1967 war Israeli warplanes strafed refugee camps in the Jordan
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front lines to prevent the return of refugees to their homes; 51 more than
two dozen reported massacres and other atrocities; 52 deliberate expul-
sion of the civilian population; 53 and looting and destruction of property
without military necessity.154 Armed conflict between Zionist militias/
Israeli forces, irregular Palestinian and Arab forces, and Arab armies
between May 1948 and the signing of armistice agreements in 1949 led to
a mass exodus of close to one-half million Palestinians.1 55 During the sec-
ond Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 some 400,000 Palestinians were dis-
valley and in other parts of the West Bank. See, e.g., Nur Masalha, The 1967 Exodus,
in THE PALESTINIAN ExODUS 1948-67 63, 94 (Ghada Karmi and Eugene Cotran eds.,
2000) (citing reports in The Guardian, June 14th, 1967, and The London Times, June
22, 1967); NEFF, supra note 147, at 228-29; and DODD & BARAKAT, supra note 147, at
40-42.
151 It is estimated that between 1948 and 1956 Israeli forces killed some 5,000
Palestinian refugees attempting to return to their homes. MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, supra note 139, at 147. Testimonies of Israeli
soldiers reveal similar practices in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 war. See, e.g.,
D. McDOWALL, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: THE UPRISING AND BEYOND 197 (1989).
152 For a list of reported massacres by Zionist/Israeli forces during the 1948 conflict
see ABU SITTA, supra note 123, at 16. For details of individual massacres based on
documents from Zionist and state rchives see MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, supra note 139, at 72-3, 113-15, 120, 156, 206-7,
213-14, 222-23, 228-30, and 350. For details from U.N. archives see PALUMBO, supra
note 147, at 47-55, 81, 126-30, 136-37, 171-72, and 168.
153 For details of expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 based on documents in Zionist
and state archives see MORRIS, ISRAEL'S BORDER WARS, supra note 147, at 54-6, 64,
105, 107, 115, 118-9, 121, 127, 201, 209-10, 212, 215, 227, 239, and 242. For details of
expulsions during the 1967 war see Masalha, supra note 150, at 81, 85, 87 and 91-4.
154 For details on looting and destruction of Palestinian refugee property during
and after the 1948 war see MORRIS, ISRAEL'S BORDER WARS, supra note 147, at 32,
50, 52, 54, 62-3, 88, 101-2, 106, 112-3, 116, 119, 125, 128, 215, 221, and 230. For
descriptions of the destruction of property during the 1967 war see Masalha, supra
note 150, at 81, 87, 89-90.
155 In total it is estimated that some 750,00 to 900,000 Palestinians became refugees
between December 1947 and early 1949. U.N. CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR
PALESTINE, FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SURVEY MISSION FOR THE
MIDDLE EAST: PART I. THE FINAL REPORT AND APPENDICES, U.N. Doc. A/AC.25/6
(1949). See also demographic calculations in Janet Abu Lughod, The Demographic
Transformation of Palestine, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE 139-163
(Ibrahim Abu Lughod ed., 1971). If the number of persons who lost their livelihoods
but not their homes is added (approximately 100 'border' villages where the 1949
armistice line separated villagers from their lands) the total number of refugees
reaches around 900,000. Over 50% of the indigenous Palestinian Arab population was
displaced during the conflict. Within the territory that became the state of Israel, 85%
of the Palestinian Arab population was displaced. For Israeli and British estimates see
MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, supra note 139, at
297-98. For American estimates see ZUREIK, supra note 116, at 17. For estimates by
village and city of origin see ABU SITTA, supra note 123.
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placed-half of those for a second time. 5' Palestinian refugees outside
their historic homeland in neighboring Arab states have suffered multiple
displacements as a result of subsequent periods of armed conflict in Jor-
dan, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Iraq.
157
Root causes of Palestinian displacement also include foreign occupa-
tion and colonization.' During the first half of the twentieth century,
Zionist colonization of strategic areas of the country created a pattern of
internal displacement and urban migration affecting tens of thousands of
Palestinian peasant farmers (fellaheen). Zionist officials assembled
detailed records of Palestinian Arab landholdings, often using aerial pho-
tographs of Palestine, to identify lands for acquisition-including expro-
156 Report of the Secretary General under General Assembly Resolution 2252, supra
note 124. THE TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE 162 (Ibrahim Abu Lughod ed., 1971).
Displacement affected approximately 35% to 40% of the Palestinian population of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For Israeli estimates see KOSSAIFI, supra note 127, at 6
(citing MOSHE EFRAT, THE PALESTINIAN DISPLACED POPULATION FROM THE WEST
BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP TO THE EAST BANK OF JORDAN (1993)). For Jordanian
estimates see ZUREIK, supra note 116, at 23 (citing ABDEL TAYSEER JABER, THE
SITUATION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN JORDAN (1996)). For Palestinian estimates
see Tayseer Amro, Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee
Rights, Displaced Persons: Categories and Numbers Used by the Palestinian Delegation
[to the Quadripartite Committee (December 1995), at http://www.badil.org/
Publications/ Article74/1995/artl4j.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
157 In the 1970s, Palestinian refugees were displaced when the Hashemite regime
in Jordan expelled the PLO from its bases of operation in the camps from where it
staged cross-border attacks on Israel. BRAND, supra note 114, at 168-172. In the 1980s,
during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the civil war in the country, refugees were
displaced internally while PLO fighters and political cadres were forced to leave the
country and relocate in Tunis. REX BRYNEN, SANCTUARY AND SURVIVAL, THE PLO
IN LEBANON 180-181 (1990). During the 1991 Gulf War, an estimated 350,000
Palestinians living in Kuwait were forced to leave the country on the basis of alleged
sympathies with the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. In some cases refugees were
pressured by harassment and intimidation to leave; in other cases Kuwaiti authorities
refused to renew residency permits. TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 160-62. More
recently, thousands of Palestinian refugees were displaced, many forced out of the
homes in which they had been living, following the United States-United Kingdom-
led war on Iraq. See, e.g., U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Iraq Emergency, http://
www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/iraq (last visited June 20, 2003).
158 For a discussion of Israel's military occupation and colonization under
international law see INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES (Emma Playfair ed., 1992). See also YEHEZKEL LEIN, LAND GRAB:
ISRAEL'S SETIILEMENT POLICY IN THE WEST BANK (2002); PALESTINIAN CENTRE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF ISRAELI SETrLEMENTS IN THE
GAZA STRIP (1996). For an opposing view see Meir Shamgar, The Observance of
International Law in the Administered Territories, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. (1971).
For ongoing sources of displacement as a result of Israel's protracted military
occupation see infra notes 198-244.
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priation-and Jewish colonization.' 59 According to Avraham Granott,
chairman of the Jewish National Fund ("JNF"), "Land was bought in
those parts [of Palestine] where there was a danger of a political change
in favor of the Arabs, or of their being wrenched from the body of the
imminent state."16 Palestinian peasant farmers, especially in areas of the
country targeted by the Zionist movement for intensive colonization, lost
a disproportionate amount of medium to good quality land. By the early
1940s the average peasant family had less than half the agricultural land
required for their subsistence.' 61 Colonization of border areas and land
inside Israel deemed valuable for present or future Jewish settlement
intensified 62 after 1948. The establishment of new Jewish colonies in and
around Palestinian cities and villages inside Israel attempted to address
the "special problem" stemming from the fact that in certain areas of the
country "the Jewish population [was] out-numbered by the non-Jewish
population."' 63 Between 1948 and 1967 the number of Jewish settlements
inside Israel more than doubled.66 Tens of thousands of Palestinians
were displaced by land expropriation, transferred to other parts of the
state, or expelled. 165 Since 1967, Israel has established 140 Jewish colonies
in 1967-occupied Palestine (including eastern Jerusalem).' 66 Similar to
159 MERON BENVENISTI, SACRED LANDSCAPE: THE BURIED HISTORY OF THE
HOLY LAND 70 (2000).
160 AVRAHAM GRANOTT, AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE RECORD OF ISRAEL 37
(1956).
161 TOWARD THE DE-ARABIZATION OF PALESTINE/ISRAEL 1945-1977 10 (Basheer
K. Nijim ed., 1984) (citing ARAB OFFICE, THE PROBLEM IN PALESTINE 277.
Submitted for the Consideration of the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry,
Memo C-29, titled The Land Question: Arab Land Hunger, Vol. II, 9-10). The loss of
land to Zionist colonization was exacerbated by economic crisis, a severe housing
shortage in Palestine, drought, and rural debt.
162 A. KELLERMAN, SOCIETY AND SETTLEMENT: JEWISH LAND OF ISRAEL IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 21 (1993).
163 MASALHA, supra note 147, at 4 (citing YOSEF WEITZ, YOSEF NAHMANI: ISH
HAGALIL [YOSEF NAHMANI: MAN OF THE GALILEE] 118-119 (1969)).
164 In 1948 there were 286 Jewish settlements. By 1967 Israel had constructed an
additional 346 Jewish settlements inside Israel. IBRAHIM MATAR, JEWISH
SETrLEMENTS, PALESTINIAN RIGHTS, AND PEACE 1-2 (1996).
165 For details on expulsion of Palestinians from inside Israel after 1948 see
MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, supra note 139, at
152, 154, and 157-58; MASALHA, supra note 147, at 12-13, 33; and SEGEV, supra note
147, at 33, 61 and 97, See also Gershon Safir, Zionism and Colonialism: A
Comparative Approach, in ISRAEL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, CHALLENGING
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 238 (Michael N. Barnett ed., 1996) (stating that with
the acquisition of land through war and subsequent expropriation "the earlier
differences between the ungodly, i.e., explicitly colonial, powers and Israel had all but
disappeared").
166 For updated figures and analysis see Foundation for Middle East Peace,
REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, http://www.fmep.
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colonization inside Israel, the construction of outposts and transfer of the
civilian Jewish population into the territories occupied by Israel in 1967
aimed to "blur the unequivocally Palestinian character of the area'
16 7
and isolate Palestinian population centers into non-contiguous zones.'68
Likewise, prominent leaders of the Zionist movement viewed the pres-
ence of such a large number of Palestinians as a threat, which could
"cause the destruction of the foundations of [the] state."' 69 While there
are no authoritative figures, the estimated number of Palestinians
affected is likely to exceed several tens of thousands of individuals.
Ongoing displacement is also related to racial discrimination and an
institutionalized system of separation akin to internationally recognized
forms of apartheid. 17 Reviewing Israel's compliance with international
human rights law, U.N. treaty committees, including the Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, have concluded that, "excessive
emphasis upon the State as a 'Jewish State' encourages discrimination
and accords a second-class status to its non-Jewish citizens.'' Israel's
org (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). Satellite imagery, however, reveals more than 300
built-up areas. GIS database, Applied Research Center in Jerusalem (2000), http://
www.arij.org (last visited May 15, 2002). For more details on Israeli colonization of
1967-occupied Palestine see GEOFF ARONSON, ISRAEL, PALESTINIANS AND THE
INTIFADA: CREATING FACTS ON THE WEST BANK (1990). See also MERON
BENVENISTI, THE WEST BANK DATA PROJECT, A SURVEY OF ISRAEL'S POLICIES
(1984).
167 Uzi BENZIMAN, SHARON: AN ISRAELI CAESAR 119 (1987).
168 See, e.g., Matitiyahu Drobless, The Settlement in Judea and Samaria: Strategy,
Policy and Program (1980) [Hebrew], reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE,
supra note 130, at 254-259 ("The disposition of the settlements must be carried out
not only around the settlements of the minorities [Palestinians] but also in between
them, this in accordance with the settlement policy adopted in the Galilee and in
other parts of the country."). See also WILLIAM WILSON HARRIS, TAKING ROOT:
ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAzA-SINAI,1967-1980 (1980).
169 WALTER LEHN, THE JEWISH NATIONAL FUND 357 (1988) (quoting Josef Weitz,
deputy chairman of the Jewish National Fund).
170 For a discussion of racial discrimination inside Israel and international law see,
for example, DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL
(1990). For opposing views see id. For a discussion of racial discrimination in 1967-
occupied Palestine see LEIN, supra note 158. For a discussion of apartheid and the
Palestinian case see, for example, URI DAVIS, ISRAEL, AN APARTHEID STATE (1987);
MARWAN BISHARA, PALESTINE/ISRAEL: PEACE OR APARTHEID, PROSPECTS FOR
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT (2001).
171 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Israel, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.27 (1998), para. 10 [hereinafter CESCR 1998].
Israel responded to the Committee's concern stating, "The Government of Israel
regards itself as obligated to act to grant equal and fair conditions to Israeli Arabs in
the socio-economic sphere, in particular in areas of education, housing and
employment." Additional Information Submitted by States parties to the Covenant
following the Consideration of their reports by the Committee on Economic, Social and
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military occupation and "undeclared annexation" of Jewish colonies in
the West Bank, including eastern Jerusalem, and in the Gaza Strip has
resulted in "the application of different legal systems, and different pro-
tections, to the Jewish and Palestinian populations living in the same ter-
ritory." '172 Discriminatory citizenship/nationality, 7 ' residency laws, 74 and
Cultural Rights, Addendum, Israel, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/1989/5/Add.14 (2001),
para. 33 [hereinafter Additional Information, Israel]. See also Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93
(1998), para. 12 [hereinafter CCPR 1998]. According to Israel's High Court, the
Jewish character of the state is defined by three inter-related components: (1) Jews
form the majority of the state; (2) Jews are entitled to preferential treatment such as
the Law of Return; and (3) a reciprocal relationship exists between the state and the
Jews outside of Israel. Ben Shalom v. Central Election Committee, 43(4) P.D. 221
(1988); ADALAH, LEGAL VIOLATIONS OF ARAB MINORITY RIGHTS IN ISRAEL 44-45
(1998) (citing the English translation of Ben Shalom in 25 ISRAEL L. REV. 219 (1991)).
Israeli political geographer Oren Yiftachel classifies Israel as an 'ethnocratic settler
state.' Ethnocratic settler states aim to alter the geographic and ethnic structure of a
state through migration and settlement. Oren Yiftachel, Israeli Society and Jewish-
Palestinian Reconciliation: 'Ethnocracy' and its Territorial Contradictions, 51 MID.
EAST J. 505 (1997).
172 LEIN, supra note 158, at 42.
113 For a detailed analysis of Israel's citizenship and nationality laws see, for
example, Gail J. Boling, The 1948 Palestinian Refugees and the Individual Right of
Return: An International Law Analysis (2001), available at http://www.badil.org/
Publications/LegalPapers/ RoR48.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003) . Boling cites the
Law of Return, 1950, 4 L.S.I. 114, (1950), which grants all Jews, regardless of their
national origin or citizenship, the right to citizenship and residency in Israel as the
Jewish national homeland; and Nationality Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50, (1952), which
requires the indigenous Palestinian Arab population to prove, among a list of five
conditions for those born before the establishment of the state of Israel and three
conditions for those born after, that they were in the state of Israel on or after July 14,
1952, or that they are the offspring of a Palestinian who meets this condition. Id. Due
to the fact that most Palestinian refugees were displaced outside the borders of the
state of Israel on or after July 14, 1952, they are unable to satisfy these conditions and
to resume domicile in their homeland. See also CESCR 1998, supra note 171, at para.
13 and 36. For Israel's response to the Committee's concerns see Additional
Information, Israel, supra note 171, at paras. 45-48. See also Concluding Observations
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination: Israel, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/
304/Add.45 (1998), para. 18 [hereinafter CERD 1998]. Israeli law is applied to all
Jewish settlers residing in the occupied territories. LEIN, supra note 158, at 66 n.183
(citing Amendment and Extension of the Validity of the Emergency Regulations
(Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, Sinai, and South Sinai-Jurisdiction and Legal
Assistance) Law, 5744-1984, sect. 6B(a)).
174 Law and Administrative Ordinance (Amendment No. 11), 1967, 21 L.S.I. 75,
(1966-67) (extending the law, jurisdiction, and administration of the state to occupied
eastern Jerusalem). Entry to Israel Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 159, (1952) (granting
permanent residency to those Palestinians recorded in the 1967 census). Only those
Palestinian inhabitants present in eastern Jerusalem and included in Israel's 1967
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military orders' 75 in effect denationalize millions of Palestinian refugees
on ethnic, national and religious grounds, and prevent them from
returning to their places of origin inside Israel. Discriminatory property
law 7 6 and military orders177 have enabled Israel to acquire control of
census are considered residents. The status of resident alien does not provide a
guarantee of residence and may be revoked at any time. Id. For further discussion of
discriminatory residency policies in eastern Jerusalem see infra notes 200-203.
175 NOGA KADMAN, FAMILIES TORN APART: SEPARATION OF PALESTINIAN
FAMILIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 17 (1999) (citing 1968 Order Relating to
Identity Cards and Population Registry and 1969 Order Relating to Identity Cards
and Population Registry). Similar orders were issued in the Gaza Strip. For a
comprehensive list of Israeli military orders see JERUSALEM MEDIA AND
COMMUNICATION CENTER, MILITARY ORDERS IN THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK: 1967-
1992 (1995).
176 For a detailed analysis of Israel's property laws see Gail J. Boling, 'Absentees'
Property' Laws and Israel's Confiscation of Palestinian Property: A Violation of UN
General Assembly Resolution 194 and International Law, 11 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L.
73 (2000-2001) (citing, inter alia, the 1943 Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes)
Ordinance, the 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations, the 1948 Abandoned Areas
Ordinance, the 1948 Emergency Regulations Concerning Absentee Property, the
1949 Emergency Regulations (Security Zones), the 1949 Emergency Regulations for
(Cultivation of Waste [Uncultivated] Lands), the 1950 Absentees' Property Law, the
1950 Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law, the 1956 Absentees'
Property (Amendment) Law, the 1951 State Property Law, the 1958 Prescription Law
(No. 38), the 1965 Absentees' Property (Amendment No. 3) (Release and Use of
Endowment Property) Law the 1976 Absentees' Property (Compensation)
(Amendment) Law and the 1980 Negev Land Acquisition (Peace Treaty with Egypt)
Law). See also CESCR 1998, supra note 171, at paras. 11, 25, 36; CERD 1998, supra
note 173, at para. 18; CCPR 1998, supra note 171, at para. 25.
177 For a detailed analysis of Israeli military orders concerning property see RAJA
SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW, ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK (1985); LEIN, supra note
158 (citing 1967 Military Order No. 25, Order Concerning Transactions in Real
Property; 1967 Military Order No. 58, Concerning Abandoned Property (Private
Property); 1967 Military Order No. 59, Concerning Government Properties; 1967
Military Order No. 150, Abandoned Property of Private Individuals [in the West
Bank] (Additional Provisions); 1969 Military Order No. 321, Regarding the Lands
Law (Acquisition for Public Needs) (amending the 1953 Jordanian land law
Acquisition for Public Needs, Law No. 2 for 1953); 1969 Military Order No. 364,
Concerning Government Properties (Amendment No. 4); 1974 Military Order 569,
Order Concerning the Registration of Special Transactions in Land; 1981 Military
Order No. 949, Regarding the Lands Law (Acquisition for Public Needs); 1983
Military Order 1060, Order Concerning Law on Registration of Unregistered
Immovable Property (Amendment No. 2)). In addition, Israeli military commanders
have issued orders for the requisition of privately-owned Palestinian land for military
needs. See, e.g., LEIN, supra note 158, at 32. In 1979 the Israeli military administration
was forced to adopt new methods of acquiring Palestinian land in the West Bank for
colonization after the High Court ruled private property could not be seized under
the pretext of military necessity for the establishment and expansion of Jewish
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vast quantities of Palestinian owned property, including refugee property.
It is estimated that Israel has expropriated and/or controls more than
20,000 square kilometers of private and communal Palestinian land.
1 78
Property held by the state and the JNF 179 may not be transferred by sale
or in any other manner.180 The government of Israel also delegates cer-
settlements. Id. at 49 (citing H.C. 390/79, Dweikat et al. v. Government of Israel et al.,
34(1) P.D. 1, (1979)). See also CESCR 1998, supra note 171, at paras. 12, 22-24, 41-42;
CERD 1998, supra note 173, at para. 11; CCPR 1998, supra note 171, at paras. 13-14.
178 This includes approximately 17,178 square kilometers of individual and
communal Palestinian land inside Israel expropriated from 1948 Palestinian refugees,
approximately 1,548 square kilometers expropriated from internally displaced and
other Palestinian citizens of Israel, and around 3,209 square kilometers of land
expropriated or controlled by Israel in 1967-occupied Palestine. For estimates on
Palestinian and Jewish land ownership in Palestine and Israel see, for example, PLO
RESEARCH CENTRE, VILLAGE STATISTICS 1945 (1970); ABU SITTA, supra note 123;
Palestine Land Society, Map of the Beer Sheba Northern Sub-District and Western
Gaza Sub-District 1948 (2002); SAMI HADAWI, PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND LOSSES IN
1948 (1988); Progress Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for
Palestine, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/1985 (1951); GRANOTT,
supra note 160; 1 A SURVEY OF PALESTINE, supra note 131; SABRI JIRYIS, THE ARABS
IN ISRAEL (1976); Bakir Abu Kishk, Arab Land and Israeli Policy, J. PALESTINE
STUD., Autumn 1981, at 124; HUSSEIN ABU HUSSEIN & FIONA MCKAY, ACCESS
DENIED: PALESTINIAN ACCESS TO LAND IN ISRAEL (2003); IAN LUSTICK, ARABS IN
THE JEWISH STATE (1976); DON PERETZ, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINE ARABS (1958);
George E. Bisharat, Land, Law and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories,
43 AM. U L.REV. 467 (1994); BENVENISTI, supra note 166; KHADER ABUSWAY ET AL.,
SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED: ISRAELI SETTLEMENT AND THE PEACE PROCESS
(1997).
179 The Jewish National Fund ("JNF") was established by decision of the 5th
Zionist Congress (1901) to purchase land in Palestine and Syria for Jewish
colonization. The JNF was incorporated as an Israeli company in 1953. According to
its Memorandum of Association, the JNF is forbidden to sell national land to non-
Jews. Leases to non-Jews, moreover, are exceptional and relatively few in number.
LEHN, supra note 169, at 116. See also KRETZMER, supra note 170, at 62. Hemnutah, a
subsidiary of the JNF, however, is authorized to sell land to and act as an agent for
other purchasers. The subsidiary enables the JNF to purchase land that the Fund itself
may hesitate to acquire due to the quality and location of the land, and then to sell or
exchange the land for other plots considered to be more desirable. For a more
detailed description see LEHN, supra note 169, at 64-68.
180 Palestinian property held by the Israeli Custodian of Absentees' Property has
been sold to the Development Authority established under the 1950 Development
Authority (Transfer of Property) Law. The Development Authority is forbidden from
transferring lands it has obtained from the Custodian to any party but the state, the
JNF, or a local authority, on condition that the JNF has prior right to buy such land.
Rural property, which comprises the bulk of land expropriated from Palestinian
refugees, may not be sold to local authorities. All land classified as 'Israel Lands'
under the 1960 Basic Law: Israel Lands (Section 1) may not be transferred by sale or
in any other manner. A proposal to call 'Israel lands' 'people's lands' was rejected, as
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tain essential public services, including immigration and absorption assis-
tance and development of new communities, to Zionist institutions such
as the World Zionist Organization ("WZO"), the Jewish Agency ("JA"),
and JNF, which are mandated to serve the Jewish people.' 8 The govern-
ment is therefore able to channel resources to Jewish citizens of the state
and avoid charges of overt discrimination while the rights and needs of
the Palestinian community in areas delegated to the W.Z.O., J.A., and
J.N.F. are systematically ignored. The system of separation between Pal-
estinian Arabs and Jews has been consolidated by the imposition of mili-
tary government inside Israel between 1948 and 1966182 and in 1967-
occupied Palestine from 1967 until the present.183 Planning and building
laws' effectively contain the remaining indigenous Palestinian popula-
it would necessarily include all the residents of the state including non-Jews. LEHN,
supra note 169, at 107 (citing Z. Wahrhaftig, Minister of Religious Affairs, address to
the Knesset). Israel has claimed a total of 15,025 square kilometers of land inside
Israel as 'state' land. Sabri Jiryis, Settlers Law: Seizure of Palestinian Lands, II
PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 17, 21 (1985) (citing ISRAEL GOVERNMENT YEARBOOK
1962-63, at 107). LEHN, supra note 169, at 114. While there are no legal impediments
on the lease of 'Israel Lands' to Palestinians (excluding land held by the JNF), leases
to Palestinians are limited and primarily located in urban areas. KRETZMER, supra
note 170, at 66. See also Alexandre Kedar, The Jewish State and the Arab Possessor:
1948-67, in THE HISTORY OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY: ISRAEL, 1917-1967
(Ron Harris et al. eds., 2002). Expropriated Palestinian property in 1967-occupied
Palestine held by the state is not considered inalienable, however, the use of land
acquired under military orders (i.e., construction of Jewish colonies, including related
infrastructure such as "bypass roads"), has resulted in de facto permanent acquisition.
Bisharat, supra note 178, at 535.
'"' World Zionist Organization-Jewish Agency (Status) Law, 1952, 7 L.S.I. 3,
(1952) (governing the relationship between the state and the World Zionist
Organization-Jewish Agency). KRETZMER, supra note 170, at 92, 95. For more on
these organizations see, for example, W.T. MALLISON JR., THE LEGAL PROBLEMS
CONCERNING THE JURIDICAL STATUS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE ZIONIST
ORGANIZATION/JEWISH AGENCY: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. LAW
(1968).
182 For a discussion of military government inside Israel between 1948 and 1966
see JIRYIS, supra note 178.
183 For a discussion of Israeli military government in 1967-occupied Palestine
(excluding eastern Jerusalem) see SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW, supra note 177.
Under the Oslo agreements Israel's military government in 1967-occupied Palestine
was withdrawn but not abolished. SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO INTERIM
ACCORDS, supra note 146, at 39.
184 For law applying inside Israel, see Planning and Building Law, 1965, 19 L.S.I.
330, (1965). For law applying in 1967-occupied Palestine, see SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S
LAW, supra note 177; LEIN, supra note 158 (citing the 1966 City, Village and Building
Planning Law No. 79, as amended by the 1971 Military Order No. 418 Concerning the
City, Village and Building Planning Law; 1970 Military Order 393; 1971 Military
Order 418; 1979 Military Order 783).
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tion by maintaining "public" (i.e., Jewish) control over vast areas of land,
limiting the expansion of existing Palestinian Arab population centers,
and settling Jews in border regions and "internal frontiers" (i.e., areas of
dense Palestinian population).1 8 5 Indigenous Palestinian communities are
thus forced to grow inward and upward, or to emigrate. 8 6 The Oslo
agreements further segregated 1967-occupied Palestine into Areas A, B,
and C'87 (H1 and H2 in Hebron), s8 as well as eastern Jerusalem. 8 9 Since
the beginning of the second intifada, Israel has divided the West Bank
185 For a discussion of Israel's planning system inside Israel and its impact on the
Palestinian population see, for example, MCKAY & ABU HUSSEIN, supra note 178;
OREN YIFTACHEL, PLANNING AS CONTROL: POLICY AND RESISTANCE IN A DEEPLY
DIVIDED SOCIETY (1995). For a similar discussion of the planning system in 1967-
occupied Palestine see SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW, supra note 177; Abdul-Ilah
Abu-Ayyash, Israeli Regional Planning Policy in the Occupied Territories, J.
PALESTINE STUD., Spring-Summer 1976, at 82; Rami S. Abdulhadi, Land Use
Planning in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, J. PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1990, at
46.
186 Inside Israel, for example, one million Palestinians have access to around 300
square kilometers of land, while five million Jews have access to around 20,000 square
kilometers of land. At the outset of the Oslo peace process, an Israeli Civil [Military]
Administration report revealed that one million Palestinians in the West Bank had
access to 273 square kilometers. At the same time 114,600 Jewish settlers had access
to 3,850 square kilometers. 3 REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES (Jan. 1993), at http://www.fmep.org/reports/v3nl.html (last visited June
10, 2002). In the Gaza Strip 4,800 Jewish settlers had access to 148 square kilometers
while 717,000 Palestinians had access to 222 square kilometers. Rempel, supra note
128, at 288 n.70.
187 The division of the West Bank into three types of zones is based on the division
of administrative and security powers under Oslo II. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-P.L.O., 36
I.L.M. 551 [hereinafter Oslo II]. Under the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian
Authority was accorded full control over administrative matters in Areas A and B and
over security matters in Area 'A.' Israel retains full control over security in Areas B
and C. Israel is also responsible for administrative matters in Area A. See Annex I
Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements, Oslo II, supra, art.
V, 36 I.L.M. at 560. On the division of the Gaza Strip see id. at art. VI. The division
roughly follows the location of Jewish colonies. As of March 2000, Area A comprised
18.2% of the West Bank, Area B 21.8%, and Area C 60.0%. Applied Research
Institute Jerusalem & Arab Studies Society Land Research Center, An Overview of
Israel's Colonization Policy and the Discontents with the Peace Process, at http://www.
poica.org/casestudies/colonization/index.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2002) [hereinafter
Overview of Israel's Policy]. Similarly, the 1947 'Partition Plan' roughly followed the
location of Jewish colonies already established in Palestine. Report of the UN Special
Committee on Palestine, The Question of Palestine, supra note 136. See also Fawzi
Asadi, Some Geographic Elements in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, J. PALESTINE STUD.,
Autumn 1976, at 79.
188 Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Jan. 17, 1997, Isr.-P.L.O.,
36 I.L.M. 650, reprinted in II DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 143, at 317-320.
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into sixty-four non-contiguous Palestinian zones surrounded by forty-six
permanent Israeli checkpoints and 126 roadblocks. 90 The system of eth-
nic/religious separation is being entrenched in the form of a new "secur-
ity" fence to run the length of the 1949 armistice line ("Green Line")
inside the West Bank, separating Palestinians fenced in those areas from
Israel while maintaining links between Jewish colonies and Israel
proper.'
91
B. Factors Forcing New Refugee Flows
Throughout the post-1967 period, Palestinians remaining in areas of
their historic homeland (i.e., Israel, the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem,
and the Gaza Strip) have been subject to continued displacement through
a process of "low-intensity transfer."' 92 Palestinians living in 1967-occu-
pied Palestine have been affected most severely. Estimates for the years
1967-1986, for example, indicate that some 21,000 Palestinians per year
were displaced from the 1967-occupied Palestine. 9 ' Sources of direct and
189 The Oslo agreements defer discussion on the future status of Jerusalem for final
status negotiations between the PLO and Israel. See Agreement on the Gaza Strip
and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-P.L.O., art. V(3), 33 I.L.M. 622.
190 For more details, including maps, see Applied Research Institute Jerusalem,
http://www.arij.org. (last visited Mar. 30, 2002). As of May 2002 Palestinian residents
require special permits issued by the Israeli Civil Administration, Israel's military
government, for travel between Palestinian cities and between various zones. Neither
Israelis nor Jewish settlers require permits for movement within Israel or through the
West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli military, however, prevents Israeli citizens from
entering Palestinian-controlled cities and villages for security reasons. Marwan
Bishara, Israel's Pass Laws will Wreck Peace Hopes: Apartheid in the Territories,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, May 22, 2002, at 6; Press Release, LAW-The
Palestinian Society for Human Rights and the Environment, Israel Strengthens
Apartheid Policies (May 23, 2002), available at http://www.iap.org/newsmay232.htm;
Amira Hass, Israel Forces Internal Movement Permits on Palestinians, HA'ARETZ, May
19, 2002. See also Thomas O'Dwyer, Parts and Apartheid, HA'ARETZ, May 24, 2002.
191 The Israeli government authorized construction of the wall on June 23, 2002. It
is estimated that approximately ten percent of the West Bank and more than 350,000
Palestinians will be effectively annexed to Israel. Palestinians unlawfully transferred
to the direct control of Israel will not be granted residency or citizenship. LAW-The
Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, Israel's
Apartheid Wall: We are Here and They are There, http://www.lawsociety.org/wall/wall.
html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). See also Yehezkel Lein, Behind the Barrier: Human
Rights Violations as a Result of Israel's Separation Barrier (2003), http://www.btselem.
org/Download/ 2003_BehindTheBarrierEng.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
192 See The Human Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer, supra note 120, at
32 ("The causes of population transfer can be dramatic, or subtle and insidious.
Transfer can be carried out en masse, or as 'low-intensity transfers' affecting a
population gradually or incrementally.").
193 KOSSAIFI, supra note 127, at 8. A more recent study estimates the annual net
migration out of the West Bank and Gaza Strip at as much as two percent per annum
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indirect low-intensity transfer include revocation of residency rights,
expulsion, house demolition, land confiscation, as well as mass detention,
torture, military closure and curfews, and other human rights violations.
The scope of displacement in 1967-occupied Palestine has been amplified
since the beginning of the second Palestinian intifada that began in Sep-
tember 2000.
Revocation of residency has been one of the primary sources of ongo-
ing displacement of the indigenous Palestinian population from 1967-
occupied Palestine. Residency status has been revoked due to extended
stay abroad and acquisition of residency or citizenship in a second coun-
try, and based on age and gender restrictions.' It is estimated that more
than one hundred thousand Palestinians have been affected since 1967.195
Under the Oslo agreements, Israel ceded the authority to revoke resi-
dency rights of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
excluding eastern Jerusalem.' 96 However, Israel retained the authority to
make the final determination on requests for permanent residency and
family reunification, rendering the authority transferred to the Palestin-
ian Authority "largely meaningless."' 97 Palestinians wishing to regain
(approximately 60,000 persons). FAFO-INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE,
GROWING FAST: THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA
STRIP 153 (Jon Pederson et al. eds., 2001).
194 For a more detailed description of Israel's residency policies towards
Palestinians see, for exampl., YAEL STEIN, THE QUIET DEPORTATION: REVOCATION
OF RESIDENCY OF EAST JERUSALEM PALESTINIANS (1997); LEA TSEMEL & INGRID
JARADAT GASSNER, THE TRAP IS CLOSING ON PALESTINIAN JERUSALEMITES:
ISRAEL'S DEMOGRAPHIC POLICIES IN EAST JERUSALEM FROM THE 1967 ANNEXATION
TO THE EVE OF FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS (1996). For U.N. human rights treaty
body committee concerns see CESCR 1998, supra note 171, at paras. 20, 40. For
Israel's response to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights see
Additional Information, Israel, supra note 171, at paras. 83-88. See also CCPR 1998,
supra note 171, at para. 20.
195 KADMAN, supra note 175, at 18 n.8. Between 1967 and 1999, Israel revoked the
residency rights of 6,185 Palestinians living in Jerusalem, affecting some 25,000
people. BADIL RESOURCE CENTER FOR PALESTINIAN RESIDENCY AND REFUGEE
RIGHTS, EVICTION FROM JERUSALEM, RESTITUTION AND THE PROTECTION OF
PALESTINIAN RIGHTS 19 (1999). The table is updated through the end of 1999 with
available statistics from the Israeli Interior Ministry. See also 5 AL-MAJDAL 24 (2000),
available at http://www.badil.org/Publications/ Majdal/2000/majdal5.pdf (last visited
Mar. 15, 2003).
196 KADMAN, supra note 175, at 95. At the same time, however, Israel introduced
an amendment to the 1951 Entry into Israel Law to facilitate expulsion of those
Palestinians who had entered 1967-occupied Palestine 'illegally' or without a permit.
SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO INTERIM ACCORDS, supra note 146, at 142.
19' KADMAN, supra note 175, at 77. The agreements also established a special joint
committee to handle claims from Palestinians whose residency status had been
revoked prior to the Oslo process. See Annex III Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs,
Oslo II, supra note 187, app. 1, art. 28(3), 36 I.L.M. at 617. For a discussion of
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their residency status and non-resident spouses of Palestinian inhabitants
of the territories generally must apply for family reunification. However,
the family reunification process is limited by quotas, lack of procedural
transparency, non-compliance with agreements, violation of due process,
and other arbitrary restrictions. 198 Israel has approved only a fraction of
applications for family reunification.'99 The Israeli human rights organi-
zation B'tselem observes:
Statements of Israeli officials indicate that the objective in rejecting
requests for family reunification is purely demographic: to prevent
an increase in Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, by prohibiting
spouses from immigrating to the Occupied Territories, and encourag-
ing separated families to leave the Occupied Territories."°°
All family reunification programs for 1967-occupied Palestine ceased
after the beginning of the second intifada. Israel also halted family
reunification programs for Palestinian citizens seeking unification with
Palestinian spouses from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.2"'
problems related to implementation of clauses concerning residency status in 1967-
occupied Palestine, excluding eastern Jerusalem see KADMAN, supra note 175. See
also MANAL JAMAL & BUTHAINA DARWISH, BADIL-ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION
CENTER, MEMORANDOM No. 4/97, EXPOSED REALITIES: PALESTINIAN RESIDENCY
RIGHTS IN THE "SELF RULE AREAS" THREE YEARS AFTER PARTIAL ISRAELI
REDEPLOYMENT (1997).
198 For a more detailed discussion of Israel's family reunification policy in 1967-
occupied Palestine see, for example, KADMAN, supra note 175; CANDY WHITTOME,
The Right To Unite: The Family Reunification Question In The Occupied Palestinian
Territories: Law And Practice (1990).
199 It is estimated that between 1967 and the early 1990s Israel approved ten
percent or fewer applications for family reunification. The estimate is based on figures
cited in John Quigley, Family Reunion and the Right to Return to Occupied Territory, 6
GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 223, 240-241 (1992). See also MERON BENVENISTI, LEXICON OF
JUDEA AND SAMARIA, SETTLEMENTS, ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY 21 (1987)
(stating that Israel approved between 900 and 1,200 requests per year from 1973 to
1983. The annual rate of approval fell significantly in 1983, however, following a
decision to reduce the number of approvals as much as possible.). See also B'tselem,
Family Separation in the Occupied Territories, at http://www.btselem.org (last visited
Mar. 15, 2003) (stating that as of 1999 Israel had approved 3,000 family reunification
applications out of 24,000 applications submitted to the Palestinian Authority).
200 KADMAN, supra note 175, at 23. For discussion of demographic fear in eastern
Jerusalem see EITAN FELNER, A POLICY OF DISCRIMINATION, LAND
EXPROPRIATION, PLANNING AND BUILDING IN EAST JERUSALEM 45 (2d ed. 1997)
(citing the Interministerial Committee to Examine the Rate of Development for
Jerusalem. Recommendation for a Coordinated and Consolidated Rate of
Development, Aug. 1973, at 3).
21 Cabinet Communique, May 12, 2002, New Alien Policy Communicated by the
Cabinet Secretariat (on file with the authors). See also Press Release, Adalah,
Supreme Court Orders State to Respond to Adalah's Petition Challenging the
Legality of the Government's Decision to Prevent Family Unification for Non-Citizen
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Expulsion is another source of ongoing displacement. Israel has
expelled elected leaders, political activists, Palestinians not holding resi-
dency permits for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and "militants" and
their family members.2 °2 Thousands of Palestinians have been affected
over the past three decades.20 3 Expulsion of Palestinians from the West
Bank and Gaza Strip came to a halt with the beginning of the Oslo pro-
cess; however, an amendment to the 1952 Entry into Israel Law author-
ized the expulsion of those Palestinians who entered 1967-occupied
Palestine "illegally" or without a permit.20 4 In April 2002, Israel resumed
expulsion of Palestinians with the forced departure of thirteen alleged
(i.e., not one of the expellees was brought to trial) Palestinian "militants"
from Bethlehem.20 5 In July 2002, the Israeli authorities announced their
intention to forcibly transfer from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip rela-
tives of people known or suspected of having organized or participated in
attacks against Israelis.20 6 On August first, 2002, Israel's military com-
mander in the West Bank signed an amendment to Military Order 378
Palestinian Spouses of Israeli Citizens (June 2, 2002); Press Release, Adalah, Adalah
Submits 12 New Petitions to the Supreme Court Challenging Family Unification
Policy (Aug. 29, 2002). For more details see Adalah, Center for Arab Minority Rights
in Israel, at http://www.adalah.org; Arab Human Rights Association, at http://www.
arabhra.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
202 For a more detailed discussion of expulsion see, for example, TAMI BASH ET
AL., DEPORTATION OF PALESTINIANS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE
MASS DEPORTATION OF DECEMBER 1992 (1993); ANGELA GAFF, AN ILLUSION OF
LEGALITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ISRAEL'S MASS DEPORTATION OF PALESTINIANS
ON 17 DECEMBER 1992 (1993); Information Sheet, B'tselem, Renewal of Deportation
of Women and Children from the West Bank on Account of "Illegal Residency"
(Sept.-Oct. 1991); JOOST HILTERMANN, ISRAEL'S DEPORTATION POLICY IN THE
OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA (1986); Ann M. Lesch, Israeli Deportation of
Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 1967-1978, J. PALESTINE STUD.,
Spring 1979, at 101.
203 According to official Palestinian statistics, 6,660 Palestinians were expelled
between 1967 and 1991 (including 4,000 to Egypt in 1967). ZUREIK, supra note 116, at
21. The figure roughly coincides with Israeli figures of Palestinians deported to Egypt
during the 1967 war, which are not included.
204 Supra note 203.
205 Robert Fisk, Red Cross Attacks Exile of Palestinians, THE INDEPENDENT, May
23, 2002, avaliable at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle-east/story.jsp?story
=297948. Press Release, LAW-Palestinian Society for Human Rights and the
Environment, LAW Condemns Deportation of Palestinians (May 10, 2002).
206 Press Release, B'tselem, B'Tselem's response to the threatened deportation of
families of suspects from the West Bank to Gaza (July 19, 2002); Marius Schattner,
Israel pledges 12 hours notice for Palestinians facing Gaza expulsion, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESS, July 21, 2002; Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Excerpt: U.S. to raise
issue of Palestinian expulsions with Israel (July 19, 2002); Press Release, Amnesty
International, Forcibly transferring relatives of suspected Palestinian suicide bombers
would violate international law (July 19, 2002); Press Release, LAW-Palestinian
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(1970) allowing for the forcible transfer of Palestinians from the occupied
West Bank to the Gaza Strip."°7 The first transfer under the amended
order took place on September third, 2002.208
Tens of thousands of Palestinians have been displaced by punitive and
administrative house demolition.2" 9 It is estimated that Israel has demol-
Society for Human Rights and the Environment, Israel arrests family members of
suspects, demolished their homes and threatened to deport them (July 19, 2002).
207 Press Release, Amnesty International, Forcible Transfers of Palestinians to
Gaza Constitutes a War Crime (Sept. 3, 2002); Press Release, LAW-Palestinian
Society for Human Rights and the Environment, Israel's High Court Allows
Deportation (Sept. 3, 2002).
208 On September 3, 2002, the Israeli High Court issued a ruling allowing the
forcible transfer of two Palestinians from the West Bank town of Nablus to the Gaza
Strip on the grounds that they allegedly assisted their brother to commit attacks
against Israelis. The two Palestinians were never charged and no proceedings have
been initiated to bring them to trial. The Israeli government claims that it cannot try
them because this would expose the source of the evidence against them. Press
Release, Amnesty International, supra note 206; Press Release, Palestinian Centre for
Human Rights, By Accepting the Deportation of two Palestinians from the West
Bank to the Gaza Strip, the Israeli High Court Legalizes War Crimes (Sept. 3, 2002).
209 Administrative house demolition includes homes built without permits. Permits
are difficult and often impossible to obtain. For more details see YAEL STEIN & ZvI
SHULMAN, B'TSELEM, POLICY OF DESTRUCTION: HOUSE DEMOLITION AND
DESTRUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND IN THE GAZA STRIP (2002); YUVAL GINBAR
& ZvI SHULMAN, B'TSELEM, DEMOLISHING PEACE: ISRAEL'S POLICY OF MASS
DEMOLITION OF PALESTINIAN HOUSES IN THE WEST BANK (1997); PARASTOU
HOUSSARI, LAW, BULLDOZED INTO CANTONS: ISRAEL'S HOUSE DEMOLITION POLICY
IN THE WEST BANK SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE OSLO AGREEMENTS, SEPTEMBER
1993 TO NOVEMBER 1997 (1997). For U.N. human rights treaty body committee
concerns see CESCR 1998, supra note 171, para. 22; CCPR 1998, supra note 171, para.
24; CERD 1998, supra note 173, para. 11. For U.N. human rights reports about house
demolition in the context of the second Palestinian intifada, see Report of the High
Commissioner on Her Visit of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Israel, Egypt and
Jordan (8-16 Nov. 2000), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/114 (2000), para. 39 and infra
[hereinafter High Commissioner Report, 2000]; Mission Report on Israel's Violations
of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967, submitted by Mr.
Giorgio Giacaomelli, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/S-5/3 (2000), para. 24
and infra [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report, 2000]; Question of the Violation of
Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine, Report of the
Human Rights Inquiry Commission established pursuant to Commission Resolution 3-
5/1, of 19 Oct. 2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/121 (2001), para. 88 infra [hereinafter
Commission Inquiry Report, 2000]; Report of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights submitted pursuant to decision 2002/103, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/184 (2002),
para. 13 infra [hereinafter High Commissioner Report, 2002]; Report of the Special
Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights, Mr. John Dugard, on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied by Israel since 1967, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2002/32 (2002), para. 29 infra [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report, 2002];
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to
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ished more than 20,000 Palestinian homes in the West Bank, including
eastern Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip since 1967.210 Demolition of Pales-
tinian homes largely continued after the signing of the Oslo agreements,
with the exception of homes in Area A and Area B, and large parts of the
Gaza Strip, all of which came under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian
Authority. Between 1993 and 2000 Israel demolished around 1,000 Pales-
tinian homes across the occupied West Bank, including eastern Jerusa-
lem.2 1 1 The number of Palestinian families affected by house demolition
has skyrocketed during the second intifada. Between September 2000 and
September 2002 the Israeli military demolished over 1,000 Palestinian
homes leaving some 8,000 people homeless.212 Palestinian refugees have
been particularly vulnerable. In the occupied Gaza Strip, as of the end of
October 2002, 639 shelters accommodating 888 families (4,954 persons)
had been destroyed or damaged beyond repair as a result of Israeli mili-
an Adequate Standard of Living, Mr. Miloon Kothari, Addendum, Report of Visit to
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 5-10 Jan. 2002, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/5/Add.1
(2002), para. 18 and infra [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report, Housing].
210 The figure includes homes demolished for administrative and punitive reasons
as well as thousands of refugee shelters demolished in the Gaza Strip for alleged
security considerations. See Al-Haq, House Demolitions as Human Rights Violations,
at http://www.alhaq.org/issues/hrdemolitions.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2002) (stating
that since 1967 Israel has demolished more than 6,000 Palestinian homes in the
occupied Palestinian territories); B'tselem, The Israeli Center for Human Rights in
the Occupied Territories, Demolition of Houses Built without Permits 1987-2002, at
http://www.btselem.org/English/Planning-&-Building/Statistics.asp (last visited May
20, 2002) (stating that between 1987 and mid-May 2002, Israel demolished, including
some partial demolitions, more than 2,500 Palestinian homes); NORMA M. HAZBOUN,
ISRAELI RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN THE WEST BANK
AND GAZA STRIP SINCE 1967 32 (1996) (citing the UNRWA Accommodation Office,
July 1991, stating that during the 1970s and 1980s the Israeli military demolished over
10,000 refugee shelters in several large refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, affecting
more than 62,000 refugees).
211 Punitive demolition of Palestinian homes decreased after 1993 until the begin-
ning of the second Palestinian intifada in September 2000. See B'tselem, House Demo-
lition-Statistics, at http://www.btselem.orgenglish/House-Demolitions/Statistics.asp
(last visited Feb. 2, 2003) (stating that Israel demolished 17 homes for punitive rea-
sons in the years 1994-2000). Administrative demolition of homes, however, pro-
ceeded apace. See B'tselem, Demolition of Houses Built without Permits-1987-2002
Statistics, at http://www.btselem.org/english/ Planning_&-Building/Statistics.asp (last
visited Feb. 2, 2003) (stating that Israel demolished 951 Palestinian homes for so-
called administrative reasons in the years 1994-2000).
212 Press Release, LAW-The Palestinian Society for Human Rights and the
Environment, Israeli Forces Demolish Three Homes, Leaving 36 Palestinians
Homeless (Sept. 26, 2002). See also Ben Lynfield, Demolitions not Simply Revenge,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 15, 2002, available at http://www.csmonitor
services.com/csmonitor/archivesearch.jhtml.
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tary activity.213 In April 2002 alone, Israeli military forces demolished 430
refugee shelters in Jenin refugee camp.214 On August sixth, 2002 the
Israeli High Court of Justice ruled that Palestinian homes belonging to
families of persons who are believed to have carried out attacks against
Israelis could be demolished, without the right to judicial review. 215 As of
December thirty-first, 2002, Israeli military forces had demolished 139
homes belonging to families of persons believed to have carried out
attacks against Israelis during the second intifada.
2 16
Palestinians continue to be displaced by Israel's ongoing practice of
land confiscation.217 By the 1990s, when the PLO and Israel entered into
official political negotiations, Israel either had expropriated or controlled
the majority of private and communal Palestinian Arab property in the
occupied West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. 218 The Oslo
agreements effectively entrenched the status quo concerning property in
213 U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, UNRWA Emergency
Appeal 11 (Jan.-June 2003), http://www.un.org/unrwa/emergency/appeals/5th-appeal.
pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). During 2002, Israeli military forces demolished an
average of 38 refugee shelters per month on the Gaza Strip. Id. at 12.
214 Id. at 12. During Israeli military assaults on Palestinian refugee camps in March
and April 2002 approximately 4,000 refugee shelters were damaged. Report of the
Commissioner General of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East, 1 July 2001-30 June 2002, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 12,
U.N. Doc. A/57/13 (2002).
215 In its decision, the Israeli High Court relied on article 119 of the 1945 Defense
(Emergency) Regulations. 1945 Defense (Emergency) Regulations, reprinted in 2 THE
PALESTINE GAZETTE 1058 (1945). Article 119 authorizes the government to
expropriate property where the inhabitants are considered to have aided or abetted
attacks. JIRYIS, supra note 178, at 17. Press Release, Amnesty International, High
Court Decision Gives Green Light for Collective Punishment (Aug. 6, 2002); Press
Release, LAW-The Palestinian Society for Human Rights and the Environment,
Israel's High Court: No Prior Hearing Before Home Demolitions (Aug. 6, 2002);
World Jurists Criticize Israeli Moves to Expel Families of Suicide Bombers, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 7, 2002.
216 The demolitions affected 228 families or more than 1,500 persons. THE
PALESTINIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOLITION OF PALESTINIAN HOUSES
BY ISRAELI OCCUPYING FORCES AS A MEANS OF PUNISHMENT AND DETERMENT 4
(2003), at http://www.pchrgaza.org/ files/Reports/English/pdf.spec/demolishion%20
house-2.pdf.
217 See supra notes 182-184.
218 See also ABUSWAY ET AL., supra note 178, at 1; Israeli Settlement and its
Consequences-1991, FROM THE FIELD (Palestinian Human Rights Information
Center), June 1991; Special Rapporteur Report, Housing, supra note 209, at paras. 10-
15 ("Estimates place the proportion of Palestinian land confiscated by Israel at more
than 70 percent of the West Bank and 33 percent of Palestinian land in East Jerusalem
has been confiscated, and all but 7-8 percent of the area has been closed to Palestinian
construction."). For U.N. human rights treaty committee concerns see CESCR 1998,
supra note 171, para. 24.
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all areas of historic Palestine (i.e., Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza
Strip). While Palestinian cities, towns, villages and most refugee camps
were transferred to the Palestinian Authority, the majority of the sur-
rounding land (sixty percent in the West Bank and forty percent in the
Gaza Strip) remained under full Israeli administrative and military con-
trol.219 In addition, Oslo II obligated the Palestinian Authority to
"respect the legal rights of Israelis (including corporations owned by
Israelis) related to government and absentee land located in areas under
the territorial jurisdiction of the council."22 Between September 1993
and September 2002 Israel expropriated more than 240 square kilometers
of Palestinian land in 1967-occupied Palestine.22' Israeli forces have also
uprooted hundreds of thousands of trees and cleared tens of thousands of
dunums (one dunum equals one square kilometer) of agricultural land
under so-called security measures known as "sweeping.)1
222
219 Annex III Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs, Oslo II, supra note 187, app. 1,
art. 16, 36 I.L.M. at 611.
220 Id. See also SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO INTERIM ACCORDS, supra note
146, at 43 (stating that "most of these 'legal rights' were obtained after the Israeli
occupation in accordance with military orders and changes in the local law made by
the Israeli military government"). The agreement also removed the issue of land
claims from the courts and transferred jurisdiction to a joint committee. Id.
221 For the period between September 1993 and the end of 2001, see Overview of
Israel's Policy, supra note 187. For land confiscation during 2002, see Press Release,
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Israeli Army Seizes Tract of Land in North of
Gaza Strip for Israeli Settlement (May 2, 2002); Applied Research Institute
Jerusalem, More Land Confiscated to Build By-Pass Road in Za'tara (June 3, 2002), at
http://www.poica.org/casestudies/Za'tara06-03-02/index.htm (last visited Mar. 15,
2003); Press Release, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, The Israeli Occupying
Forces Commander in Gaza Strip Issues a Military Order to Seize Land to Building a
New Settlement Road (July 20, 2002); Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, Israeli
Military Order Seizes 10 Dunums of Land from Al-Bireh Town, Sept. 11, 2002, at
http://www.poica.org/casestudies/AI-Bireh%2011-9-02/index.htm (last visited Mar. 15,
2003). It is further estimated that more than 15,000 dunums of land will be
expropriated to build Israel's new separation fence along the "Green line" (i.e., 1949
armistice line). See also LEIN, supra note 158.
222 It is estimated that between September 2000 and June 2002 Israel has cleared
more than 15,000 dunums of agricultural land in the Gaza Strip comprising over nine
percent of the total agricultural land in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian Centre for Human
Rights, Uprooting Palestinian Trees And Leveling Agricultural Land (2002), at http://
www.pchrgaza.org/ files/ReportsEnglish/pdfsweeping/sweeping % 201and %208.pdf
(last visited May 1, 2004). In total it is estimated that more than 32,000 dunums of
agricultural land were cleared from the beginning of the second Palestinian intifada
until February 2002. In addition, Israel uprooted some 485,000 trees including olives,
citrus, stone fruits, forest, dates, bananas, vines, and others. Applied Research
Institute Jerusalem, An Assessment of the Israeli Practices on the Palestinian
Agricultural Sector, September 29, 2000-February 28, 2002, at http://www.poica.org/
casestudies/agr-losses-feb02/index.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
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Other sources of persecution leading to new refugee outflows from
1967-occupied Palestine include mass arrests and administrative deten-
223 224tions,223 torture, excessive use of force against Palestinian civilian dem-
onstrators,2 25 extrajudicial killings of Palestinian political activists and
"militants, 2 26 use of Palestinian civilians as human shields during Israeli
223 Since the beginning of the second intifada, Israel has arrested more than 15,000
Palestinians. As of the end of March 2003, 1,108 Palestinians were being held in
administrative military detention, including 137 minors (age 18 and below). B'tselem,
The Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, Administrative
Detention-Statistics, at http://www.btselem.org/english/AdministrativeDetention/
Statistics.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2003). At the beginning of the Oslo process, Israel
held 277 Palestinians in administrative detention. Between 1993 and 1997, an
estimated 800 Palestinians were detained administratively for periods ranging from
two months to four years. Administrative detention is detention without charge or
trial, authorized by administrative order rather than by judicial decree.
Administrative detention is used as a substitute for formal trial and punishment, and
eliminates the due process requirements. For more details on administration
detention see JESSICA MONTELL, B'TSELEM, PRISONERS OF PEACE: ADMINISTRATIVE
DETENTION DURING THE OSLO PROCESS (1997); EMMA PLAYFAIR, ADMINISTRATIVE
DETENTION IN THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA (1985). For U.N. human
rights treaty committee concerns see CCPR 1998, supra note 171, at para. 21. See also
High Commissioner Report, 2002, supra note 209, at 17.
224 For more details on torture see, for example, B'TSELEM, TORTURE OF
PALESTINIAN MINORS AT THE GUSH ETZION POLICE STATION (2001); YUVAL
GINBAR, ROUTINE TORTURE: INTERROGATION METHODS OF THE GENERAL
SECURITY SERVICE (1998). See also Press Release, LAW-Palestinian Society for
Human Rights and the Environment, Israeli Interrogators Torture Palestinians at
Asqalan Prison (Jan. 22, 2001); Press Release, LAW- Palestinian Society for Human
Rights and the Environment, Israeli Interrogators Torture Palestinian Detainee (Apr.
24, 2001); Press Release, Amnesty International, Israel Fails to Address Increase Use
of Torture (Nov. 20, 2001); Press Release, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Fear
of Torture and Ill-Treatment of Thousands of Palestinian Detainees by Israeli
Occupying Forces (Apr. 9, 2002); Civil and Political Rights including Questions of
Torture and Detention, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Sir Nigel Rodley, submitted
pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/43, Israel, U.N. Doc., E/
CN.4/2001/66 (2001) (noting allegations that "torture and other ill-treatment is still
being carried out by the Israeli security forces and police during interrogation, despite
the September 1999 ruling of the Israeli High Court which determined that the
systematic use of various interrogation techniques by the authorities was illegal");
High Commissioner Report, 2002, supra note 209, 20.
225 See, e.g., High Commissioner Report, 2000, supra note 209, 26 ("A wide range
of observers, including United Nations representatives, expressed the strong view that
the very high number of casualties, combined with the nature of the injuries being
sustained, including by young people, could only be consistent with a military
response which was both excessive and inappropriate.").
226 It is estimated that Israel has assassinated 143 Palestinian political activists and
resistance fighters since the beginning of the second Palestinian intifada in September
2000. An additional 76 Palestinian bystanders, of whom 28 were children, were killed
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military operations,227 and military closure and curfews imposed on the
general Palestinian civilian population.22 The combined effect of these
practices, which include serious violations and grave breaches of interna-
during the assassination operations as of March 2003. Palestinian Centre for Human
Rights, Assasination of Palestinians: An Israeli Official Policy (2003), at http://www.
pchrgaza. org/files/Reports/English/pdf__killing/killing%20report5.pdf (last visited
Mar. 30, 2003). See also Yael Stein, Israel's Assasination Policy: Extra-judicial
Executions (Jan. 2001), http://www.btselem.org/Download/Extrajudicial-Killings-Eng.
doc (last visited Feb. 15, 2003); Statement of the UN Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. CHR/2000/05/10 (2000); Commission Inquiry Report, 2000,
supra note 209, 53 and infra.
227 The Israeli High Court issued an injunction on August 8, 2002 against the use of
Palestinian civilians as human shields by the Israeli military. According to human
rights organizations, however, the practice, which the Israeli military refers to as the
'neighbor practice,' continues to be used during military operations in 1967-occupied
Palestine. See B'tselem, Investigation: IDF Used Palestinian Civilians in Beit Jala as
'Human Shields,' (2001); B'tselem, Use of Palestinian Civilians as Human Shields in
Violation of Court Order (2002); High Commissioner Report, 2002, supra note 209,
22.
228 Military closure was first imposed by Israel in March 1993 allegedly in response
to attacks by Palestinians in Israel. There are two types of closure: 'external' and
'internal.' Under external closure, which has been in place since 1993, Palestinians
must obtain a permit from Israel to enter Jerusalem and Israel proper and for travel
abroad. Under internal closure Palestinians are forbidden to travel on main roads and
on roads near Israeli colonies. During periods of comprehensive closure Palestinians
are forbidden from traveling from 1967-occupied Palestine to Jerusalem and Israel,
from traveling abroad, and from traveling on roads between cities, towns and villages
in 1967-occupied Palestine. One week into the second intifada Israel imposed a
comprehensive closure, which remains in effect. Permits to enter Israel and use of the
safe passage established under the Oslo agreements to facilitate freedom of
movement between the West Bank and Gaza Strip were revoked. During military
curfew movement of people is banned and civilians are confined to their residences.
Curfews are lifted periodically during the daytime for three to six hours, depending
on the severity of the regime. Between June and December 2002, an average of 169
Palestinian localities, with a total average population of more than one million, has
been under Israeli military curfew. Figures derived from U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Information Centre for the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/
documents/2002/undp-eue-eth-20dec.pdf (last visited May 18, 2004). For U.N. human
rights treaty committee concerns see CESCR 1998, supra note 171, 17-19, 39. See also
High Commissioner Report, 2000, supra note 209, para. 49 and infra; Special
Rapporteur Report, 2000, supra note 209, para. 22 and infra; Commission Inquiry
Report, 2000, supra note 209, para. 80 and infra; High Commissioner Report, 2002,
supra note 209, para. 28; Special Rapporteur Report, 2002, supra note 209, at paras. 33-
34 and infra.
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tional human rights and humanitarian law,2 9 has created a humanitarian
catastrophe through which "the Palestinian civilian population is scram-
bling to survive."23 As of the end of March 2003, more than 2,200 Pales-
tinians have been killed and over 22,000 injured.23' More than 50 percent
of the civilian Palestinian population is now unemployed.232 According to
U.N. officials:
[The Palestinian economy] can no longer 'bounce back,' even if clo-
sures were lifted and conditions returned to pre-intifada levels. Total
economic breakdown is prevented only with continued injections of
budgetary support from international donors, the release of a small
percentage of PA [Palestinian Authority] revenues held by Israel,
and humanitarian aid.233
229 See High Commissioner Report, 2000, supra note 209, 19, 20, 25; Special
Rapporteur Report, 2000, supra note 209, paras. 6, 7, 29, 35; Commission Inquiry
Report, 2000, supra note 209, 35-43, 93-95, 113-115; High Commissioner Report, 2002,
supra note 209, 59-60; Special Rapporteur Report, 2002, supra note 209, para. 8-9. For
grave breaches rising to the level of crimes against humanity and war crimes see
PETER BOUCKAERT ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JENIN: IDF MILITARY
OPERATIONS (2002); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES-SHIELDED FROM SCRUTINY: IDF VIOLATIONS IN JENIN AND NABLUS
(2002).
230 Press Release, U.N. Special Coordinator of the Occupied Territories, UN: New
Economic Figures for the West Bank and Gaza Show Rapid Deterioration Leading to
Human Catastrophe (Aug. 29, 2002) (quoting Terje Roed-Larsen, U.N. Special
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process). See also Press Release, U.N. Relief
and Works Agency, UNRWA Launches $94 million Appeal for West Bank and Gaza
(Dec. 10, 2002) (quoting the Commissioner General of UNRWA stating that "[sjo
rapid has been the humanitarian collapse that it will take an emergency programme of
the scale we present today to prevent complete breakdown in Palestinian society").
231 Palestine Red Crescent Society, Total Daily Numbers of Deaths & Injuries-
West Bank & Gaza, at http://www.palestinercs.org/crisistables/table-ofjfigures.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2003). In addition, more than 475 Israeli civilians and over 220
members of the Israeli security forces have been killed during the same period.
B'tselem, Fatalities in the al-Aqsa Intifada, at http://www.btselem.org/English/
Statistics/AI-AqsaFatalities.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2003).
232 The World Bank, Two Years of Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic
Crisis, An Assessment 1 (Mar. 5, 2003), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/
documents/2003/ wb-opt-05mar.pdf (last visited May 10, 2003) [hereinafter Two Years
of Intifada]. See also U.N. Special Coordinator of the Occupied Territories, The
Impact of Closure and Other Mobility Restrictions on Palestinian Productive Activities,
1 January 2002 - 30 June 2002 (2002), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/
documents/2002/unsco-opt-20sep.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2003) [hereinafter The
Impact of Closure]; Press Release, U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., Report on the
Palestinian Economy Reasserts Interdependence of Development and Peace (Oct. 4,
2002); Press Release, U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., Report on Palestinian Economy
Reasserts Interdependence of Development and Peace (Oct. 5, 2001).
233 The Impact of Closure, supra note 232, at 5.
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Since the beginning of the second intifada, poverty in 1967-occupied Pal-
estine has tripled to 60 percent with rates even higher in the Gaza
Strip.23 4 Real per capita food consumption has declined by up to 30 per-
cent.235 The crisis is having a particularly harsh impact on public health,
with particularly high reported increases in instances of malnutrition and
anemia."' Children, women, the elderly, the poor, and refugees are par-
ticularly vulnerable. 237 As the situation continues to deteriorate, an
increasing number of Palestinians are seeking personal and economic
security abroad.2 38
C. Palestinian Refugees and International Refugee Protection
In addition to historic and ongoing persecution for over half a century,
the other defining feature of the Palestinian refugee condition is the lack
of both national and international protection. Most host states where the
majority of Palestinian refugees reside do not recognize or do not apply
the full panoply of basic rights afforded to refugees under relevant inter-
national and regional instruments. As discussed below, the legal status of
Palestinian refugees in these states is most often shaped by domestic
political and security considerations. The lack of national protection is
compounded by the lack of international protection (often referred to as
234 Two Years of Intifada, supra note 232, at 2.
235 Id.
236 See U.N. Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, Comparative
Assessment of the Health Impact Following the Current Crisis (July 12, 2001), available
at http://www.reliefweb.int; World Health Organization, Vulnerability and the
International Health Response in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, (Nov. 30, 2001),
available at http://www.reliefweb.int; Press Release, CARE, Rapid Nutritional
Assessment for West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oct. 16, 2002); Press Release, CARE,
World Food Day: Care International Assessment Finds High Levels of Malnutrition,
Anemia, and Micronutrient Deficiencies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oct. 16,
2002).
237 Press Release, UNICEF, UNICEF Concerned About Impact of Violence on
Palestinian and Israeli Children (Nov. 15, 2001); Press Release, Save the Children,
Education of Children At Risk (Dec. 5, 2001); Press Release, UNICEF, Thousands of
Palestinian Children Denied Access to Schools (Oct. 2, 2002). See also High
Commissioner Report, 2000, supra note 209, 34-35; Special Rapporteur Report, 2000,
supra note 209, 27 and infra; and, Special Rapporteur Report, 2002, supra note 209,
40 and infra. According to a study by the Graduate Institute of Development Studies
at the University of Geneva, "the mainstream poverty profile would be a young
resident from the Gaza Strip and, in particular, from the Gaza refugee camps,
unemployed with a low skill/education level who would be a member of a large size
family." RICCARDO Bocco, ET AL., THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL AID
DURING THE SECOND INTIFADA, REPORT V 14 (2002).
238 There are no reliable figures for total out-migration since the beginning of the
second intifada. One report notes that 80,000 Palestinians left 1967-occupied Palestine
in the first 8 months of 2002. Khalid Abu Toameh, 80,000 Palestinians Emigrated from
Territories Since Beginning of Year, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 27, 2002, at 4.
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the "protection gap").239 No international agency is currently recognized
by the international community as having an explicit mandate to system-
atically work for the realization of the basic human rights of Palestinian
refugees and to search for and implement durable solutions consistent
with international law as reaffirmed in U.N. General Assembly Resolu-
tion 194(III).40 Practically, this anomaly means that most of the over five
million Palestinian refugees-nearly one third of the world's total refugee
population-do not have meaningful access to international protection
that is legally required or available to other refugee populations.24'
To fully understand the reasons and consequences of the protection
gap, it is necessary to compare certain aspects of the special Palestinian
refugee regime with the international regime established for all other
refugees.
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention sets out the universally-
accepted definition of "refugee" as:
[A]ny person who. . ., as a result of events occurring before 1 Janu-
ary 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nation-
ality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
239 United Nations bodies have been commenting on, and raising concerns about
the protection gap affecting Palestinians. In 1982, the U.N. Joint Inspection Unit
recommended "region wide consideration" of the protection gap in order to find
"innovative and acceptable measures that could be applied wherever and whenever
warranted." TAKKENBERO, supra note 98, at 283-84. Between 1982 and 1993, the
U.N. General Assembly called upon the U.N. Secretary General in consultation with
the UNRWA "to undertake effective measures to guarantee the safety and security
and the legal and human rights of the Palestine refugees in all the territories under
Israeli occupation in 1967 and thereafter." G.A. Res. 39/99, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
at I(1), U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/99 (1984). During the same period, the UNHCR ExCom
issued numerous conclusions that "[e]xpressed concern about the lack of adequate
international protection for various groups of refugees in different parts of the world,
including a large number of Palestinians, and hoped that efforts would be undertaken
within the United Nations system to address their protection needs." 4 JODY A.
BOUDREAULT, UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-
ISRAELI CONFLICT (1993) (citing Executive Committee Conclusion No. 46
(XXXVIII), 1987, Expressing Concern about the Lack of Adequate International
Protection for Palestinians). See infra note 554 (emphasis added). See also Special
Rapporteur Report, 2000, supra note 209, at 35; Commission Inquiry Report, 2000,
supra note 209, at 114-115, 134; High Commissioner Report, 2002, supra note 209, at
61; and Special Rapporteur Report, 2002, supra note 209, at 54.
240 See supra note 96.
241 For discussion of international protection available to other refugees, see supra
notes 63-74 and accompanying text. For discussion of ramifications of the 'protection
gap' for Palestinians, see supra notes 192-238 and infra notes 526-96.
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and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.
242
This individualized definition of refugee, however, was not intended to
apply to Palestinian refugees. Their situation was specifically designated
for different treatment than that of other refugees falling within the Refu-
gee Convention regime.243 Palestinians as a group or category of refu-
gees are covered by the Refugee Convention in article 1D-a provision
that the drafting history makes absolutely clear is applicable solely to
Palestinians and no other group of refugees.244 Article 1D provides:
This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiv-
ing from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assis-
tance. When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason,
without the position of such persons being definitively settled in
accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be
entitled to the benefits of this Convention.245
When this provision was drafted, Palestinians were afforded a special
protection regime consisting of the United Nations Conciliation Commis-
sion on Palestine ("UNCCP"), which had a protection mandate,2 46 and
242 See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1A(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152-54.
243 For a detailed discussion of the instruments and agencies comprising the special
regime established for Palestinian refugees, the various interpretations of the
provisions that apply, and the consequences of the interpretations, see Susan M.
Akram & Terry Rempel, Recommendations for Durable Solutions for Palestinian
Refugees: A Challenge to the Oslo Framework, 11 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (2000-
2001). For a somewhat different interpretation, see TAKKENBERG, supra note 98; see
also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 91-93, 241-46. For a more general discussion of
the legal and political issues affecting Palestinian refugees addressed in this author's
interpretation, see Susan M. Akram, Palestinian refugees and their Legal Status;
Rights, Politics, and Implications for a Just Solution, J. PALESTINE STUD., Spring 2002,
at 36. For a collection of critical writing on the history, politics and legal situation of
Palestinian refugees, see NASEER ARURI , PALESTINIAN REFUGEES: THE RIGHT OF
RETURN (2001).
244 For a detailed treaty analysis of article 1D and its related provisions in light of
the travaux preparatoires, and a comparison of various interpretations, see
TAKKENBERG, supra note 98; see also Susan M. Akram & Guy Goodwin-Gill, Brief
Amicus Curaie, Board of Immigration Appeals, Falls Church, Va., reprinted in 11
PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (2000-2001).
245 See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1D, 189 U.N.T.S. at 156.
246 See Terry Rempel, The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine:
Protection and a Durable Solution for Palestinian Refugees, Badil Brief No. 5,
available at http://www.badil.org/Publications/Brief/Brief-No.5.htm (last visited June
11, 2003). On December 11, 1948, the General Assembly passed Resolution 194(111),
establishing the U.N. Conciliation Commission on Palestine ("UNNCP") and setting
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the UNWRA, which had an assistance mandate. 47 The delegates to the
committee drafting the Refugee Convention considered that it was both
unnecessary and inadvisable to include Palestinians in the Refugee Con-
vention regime as long as two other agencies were providing them with
both protection and assistance. 48 Moreover, for reasons that made the
Palestinian case unique, the drafters believed that Palestinians would get
less protection than they deserved if they were subsumed with other refu-
gees in the general protection system of the Refugee Convention. 49
out its mandate and terms of reference. G.A. Res. 194(111), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
186th Plen. Mtg., at 21, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UNCCP Mandate].
Three State Members were to comprise the UNNCP and were to continue the
conciliation efforts of Count Folke Bernadotte, the U.N. Mediator on Palestine, who
had been killed by Zionist terrorists just three months earlier. The UNCCP was to
"take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final
settlement of all questions outstanding between them." Id. at 6. The UNCCP had a
multilevel mandate: to protect the refugees and further the consensus concerning the
durable solution for them, as well as to mediate all outstanding issues between the
parties.
247 UNRWA was established by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 302(IV) on
December 8, 1949, and was explicitly established as an interim agency to provide for
the refugees basic subsistence needs until the durable solution required by the
relevant U.N. Resolutions could be implemented. UNRWA was given only a three-
year mandate. G.A. Res. 302(IV), U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., 273d Plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc.
A11251 (1949). UNRWA's mandate was clearly limited by the definition of persons
who were eligible for UNRWA relief. UNRWA regulations initially adopted the
definition of "Palestine refugee" from the United Nations Relief for Palestine
Refugees ("UNRPR"), which had been providing the refugees assistance until
UNRWA was established. UNRWA's early working definition was finalized in what
are now called "Consolidated Registration Instructions," and by 1993, the provision
defined persons eligible for the UNRWA benefits as those: (1) whose normal
residence was Palestine during the period June 1, 1946 to May 15, 1948; (2) who lost
both their homes and means of livelihood as result of the 1948 conflict; (3) who took
direct refuge in one of the countries or areas where UNRWA provides relief; and (4)
who are the direct descendants through the male line of persons fulfilling 1-3 above.
See TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 70-77. According to U.N. Secretary General
Hammarskjold, "this definition is not contained in any resolution of the General
Assembly but has been stated in Annual Reports of the Director and tacitly approved
by the Assembly. Id. at 75.
248 See U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 5th Sess., 328th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.328
(1950). The reason for the proposed amendment to the UNHCR Statute, the
Refugee Convention, and the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons, which was to set
up the special regime for Palestinian refugees, was, according to the delegates
proposing it, that Palestine refugees were "the direct result of a decision taken by the
United Nations," and thus, "a direct responsibility on the part of the United Nations."
Id. at para. 52, 55.
249 The proponents of the special regime further believed that "if the Palestine
refugees [were included] in a general definition of refugees, they would become
submerged and would be relegated to a position of minor importance" and thus, they
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For a number of historical and political reasons, however, Palestinian
refugees have been considered excluded from the coverage of the Refu-
gee Convention for most purposes. 250 At the same time, the special refu-
gee regime has long since failed to provide the international protection
they were to receive as long as their refugee situation remained
unresolved.2 5' The implications of this protection gap for Palestinians are
should "continue to be granted a separate and special status." Id. at para. 52, 55. The
Arab State representatives were also concerned that if the other relevant U.N.
agencies ceased functioning, the Palestine refugees should be protected by the
UNHCR. U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 5th Sess., 344th mtg., para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/
SR.344 (1950).
250 The "protection gap" applying to Palestinian refugees and stateless persons is
due to a series of instruments and provisions that are interpreted as excluding
Palestinians from their coverage. These Palestinian "exclusion clauses" are in the
UNHCR Statute, paragraph 7(c); the Refugee Convention, article 1D; and the 1954
Stateless Convention, article 1(2)(1). UNHCR originally took the position that
because of paragraph 7(c) of its Statute, it was precluded from any international
protection mandate over Palestinians. Gradually, however, UNHCR has increasingly
intervened in various states outside the UNRWA area on behalf of Palestinian
refugees' claims to refugee status and in protecting their rights within those states.
See TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 307. These actions have, until now, been a de
facto recognition of UNHCR responsibility for protecting Palestinians, rather than
any policy statement under its mandate. Recently, however, UNHCR has proposed a
redefinition of article ID of the Refugee Convention that would provide some
Palestinians outside UNRWA areas with protection under the Refugee Convention,
and permit UNHCR's protection mandate to extend to them. See U.N. HIGH
COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, NOTE ON THE APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 1D OF THE 1951
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES TO PALESTINIAN REFUGEES
(2002), available at http://www.badil.org/Protection/ Documents/RefugeeLaw/
UNHCR-Note-ID-2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2003) [hereinafter NOTE ON
ARTICLE 1D].
251 The distinction in the mandates of the two separate agencies that comprise the
special regime for Palestinian refugees - i.e., UNCCP, which had the mandate of
providing international protection to the refugees; and, UNRWA, which had a much
narrower mandate of providing assistance - although they can overlap in actual
practice, is quite marked as a legal matter. The concept of international protection has
two main aspects: day-to-day protection of the legal and human rights, interests and
physical integrity of the refugee under all applicable international and domestic laws;
and the most critical aspect for refugees, which is the obligation to promote and
implement durable refugee solutions under international legal principles. The
UNHCR has defined the main aspects as direct protection and promotional activities.
See UNHCR, Report of the Meeting of the Expert Group on Temporary Refuge in
Situations of Large-Scale Influx (1981), Opening Statement by the High
Commissioner, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/16/Add.1. Assistance, on the other hand, means
the provision of basic welfare: food, clothing and shelter for the subsistence needs of
refugees. Responding to the massive post World-War II refugee crisis, the United
Nations began the task of drafting a series of international instruments that were to
create international obligations towards refugees, stateless persons and displaced
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persons. During that process, which lasted from 1950-1954, three instruments were
drafted: the Statute of the UNHCR; the 1951 Refugee Convention; and the 1954
Convention on Stateless Persons. At the three main drafting stages (the Third
Committee of the U.N.General Assembly; the Conference of Plenipotentiaries; and
the Conference on the Convention Relating to Stateless Persons), Palestinian
refugees were extensively discussed, and a consensus emerged that Palestinians as an
entire category should be excluded for the time being from the instruments under
discussion for a number of critical reasons. First, the delegates agreed that
Palestinians were the special responsibility of the UN, because it was as a result of
U.N. Resolution 181 that Palestinians lost their homeland and gave the pretext for the
Zionists to expel them from their homes. The responsibility of the international
community towards them was completely different from other refugees whose
problem did not stem from U.N. action. Thus, the Arab delegates were concerned
that if Palestinians were included in the Refugee Convention, their issues and claims
would be "submerged and would be relegated to a position of minor importance"
Second, there was agreement that Palestinians as an entire category would meet the
refugee definition under discussion because of their expulsion and wholesale
persecution. Thus, there was no perceived need for a special definition of 'Palestine
refugee' for international protection purposes. Third, because the U.N. had already
established two agencies-UNCCP and UNRWA-providing, respectively,
protection and assistance, it appeared unnecessary to give the newly-created agency
that would have both protection and assistance mandates (UNHCR), responsibility
for them. U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 5th Sess., 328th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.328
(1950). Fourth, there was already an international consensus that the solution to the
Palestinian refugee problem was, in accordance with the demands and legal rights of
the refugees, repatriation to their homes, as embodied in G.A. Res. 194(111). Since the
primary aim of the Refugee Convention was to create new international obligations
on third states to absorb or resettle refugees, the delegates feared that such an
emphasis would dilute the legal rights and demands of the refugees to return home.
The critical aspect of the separate and special regime for Palestinian refugees was the
UNCCP's protection mandate, particularly its authority to seek and implement
durable solutions for them. However, it soon became clear that the UNCCP would be
unable to implement the required durable solution based on the refugees' demands to
return to their homes because of Israeli intransigence. Thereafter, the UN, in a series
of measures, gradually reduced the UNCCP's mandate and defunded its major
protection role towards the refugees. See G.A. Res. 394(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,
325th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/AC.25/W.82/Rev.1 (1950). On the change of the UNCCP's
mandate, see DAVID P. FORSYTHE, UNITED NATIONS PEACEMAKING: THE
CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE 56 (1972). In light of Res. 394, the
UNCCP took the position that it was no longer entrusted with major protection
functions towards the refugees. See Akram & Rempel, supra note 243, at 18; see also
U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 24(a), at 1, U.N. Doc. A/2072 (1952)
(further reducing the UNCCP's functions and budget). With the international
protection mandate towards the refugees essentially defunct, the Palestinian refugees
were left solely with what UNRWA could provide in the way of assistance. Left out of
the major international refugee and stateless instruments by the 'exclusion clauses',
they were deprived both of the benefits of the special protection regime and of any
alternative regime that would have provided them the necessary protection and
implemented mechanisms for a durable solution to their prolonged exile. For full
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evident in both aspects of refugee protection: in day-to day security and
human rights protection and in the search for durable solutions. Most
countries in which Palestinians seek protection outside their place of ori-
gin interpret the relevant provisions in a manner that fails to grant Pales-
tinian refugees adequate protection-although the precise interpretations
differ from state to state.25 2 Palestinians, for the most part, have diffi-
discussion and sources for each of these conclusions, see Akram & Rempel, supra
note 243; Akram & Goodwin-Gill, supra note 244. See also TAKKENBERG, supra note
98.
252 There are two main categories of interpretation of article 1D of the Refugee
Convention: one category is of those states that do not recognize or incorporate
article 1D in their asylum law at all; and the second is those states that do incorporate
1D. The first category of states, which includes the United States, Canada, Austria
and Switzerland, ignore 1D and determine Palestinian claims under the normal
criteria of article 1A(2). The consequences of this are examined below. The second
group of states does apply 1D, but interprets it in a variety of inconsistent ways, even
within their domestic courts. There are at least five distinct interpretations of 1D
among and within these states. One interpretation is that 1D excludes Palestinians
from within UNRWA areas, but for Palestinians elsewhere, these states apply the
normal 1A(2) assessment. This is the interpretation offered by the UNHCR
Handbook, and applied in cases in New Zealand and Australia. UNHCR HANDBOOK,
supra note 37, at 34 para. 143. See, e.g., Refugee Appeal No. 1/92, (Refugee Status
Appeals Authority, New Zealand, Apr. 30, 1991), http://www.refugee.org.nz/rsaa/text/
docs/1-92.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001); see also BV96/04744 (Refugee Review
Tribunal, Australia, Feb. 12, 1997); N94/04981 and N94/04982 (Refugee Review
Tribunal, Australia, Nov. 27, 1996); V95/03840 (Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia,
Sept. 20, 1996); Minister of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Quaiader, F.C.R.
1458 (Oct. 16, 2001) (all decisions and summaries on file with author). A second
interpretation is that Palestinians everywhere-within UNRWA areas or outside-are
excluded from refugee status under the Refugee Convention. Some Australian
decisions have taken this approach. See, e.g., N96/11506 (Refugee Review Tribunal,
Australia, Jan. 14, 1997); see also N01/36893 (Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia,
Mar. 19, 2001); BN94/06049 (Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia, June 25, 1996). A
third interpretation is that article 1D gives Palestinians automatic refugee recognition
and protection when UNRWA ceases or when Palestinians are outside UNRWA areas
and cannot return there. This was the conclusion of at least one German court, and
the interpretation of the U.N. High Commissioner's Branch Officer in Germany. See
VG 10 A 4.88, InfAusIR 3/90 at 81 (Nov. 3, 1989); see also U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR
REFUGEES BRANCH OFFICE IN GERMANY, REVISED OPINION ABOUT THE LEGAL
STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES UNDER UNRWA MANDATE AND COMMENTS ON
UNRWA REGISTRATION (2000) (on file with authors). A fourth interpretation is that
1D provides for automatic refugee recognition and protection to Palestinians if
UNRWA ceases or Palestinians are outside an UNRWA area, but not if they can
return or leave with knowledge they would be unable to return. More recent German
decisions have followed this reasoning. See 1991 BVerwGE 1 C 42.88; see also 1992
BVerwGE 1 C 21.87. Finally, one court has found that any Palestinian outside an
UNRWA area for whatever reason is automatically entitled to refugee status under
the Refugee Convention. See El-Issa v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
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culty when they find themselves in third (non-Arab) states and apply for
political asylum,"'3 residence based on family reunification,. 54 or other
CC/21836/2000; Y78985 (4 Feb. 2002). But see Amer Mohammed El-Ali v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department, UKIAToo159 (2002) (decision and pleadings on
file with author). For a detailed discussion of the jurisprudence of 11 states on
Palestinian refugee/asylum claims, see Akram & Goodwin-Gill, supra note 244, at 47-
52.
253 The consequences of either failing to apply 1D at all, or interpreting 1D to
revert to a 1A(2) analysis, is that because of Palestinians' unique situation, their
refugee/asylum claims are overwhelmingly assessed as those of stateless persons with
last habitual residence in one or more of the Arab states. Thus, they must prove a
well-founded fear of persecution from the last Arab state of habitual residence-a
claim which in the majority of cases presents insurmountable barriers. For example,
the severe discrimination Palestinians suffer in many Arab states, including the
inability to ever have permanent status or security, is rarely determined to be
persecution. Some states refuse to recognize persecution by non-state actors, which
precludes a Palestinian in Lebanon, for example, from claiming persecution from one
of the militias. Some states presume that if there is no recognized persecution, a
Palestinian is entitled to return (or can be removed) to the Arab state of last
residence, whether or not the state itself recognizes any right of a Palestinian refugee
to return there. The majority of Palestinian refugees holding temporary laissez-passer,
carte de identite, or carte de sojours are not permitted to return to the Arab state
issuing such documents, even if the refugee has been a long-term resident there. For a
sample of cases supporting these conclusions, see Mousa v. INS, 223 F.3d 425 (7th Cir.
2000); El Ghussein v. INS, No. 98-70921, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8868 (9th Cir. May 1,
2000); Alshiabat v. INS, No. 96-70590, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 27125 (9th Cir. Sept. 18,
1997); Maloukh v. INS, No. 96-9524, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 23129 (9th Cir. Sept. 3,
1997); Bader v. INS, CA No. 94-70449, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 7661 (9th Cir. Mar. 29,
1996); Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 1994); Aliyan v. INS, No. 92-70588, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 2411 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 1994); Suradi v. INS, No. 90-70217, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2596 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 1992); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.
1981). For cases in the United Kingdom, see Alsawaf v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't. [1988] Imm AR 410; NSH v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. [1988] Imm
AR 410; Kelzani v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. [1978] Imm AR 193 (C.A. Apr.
26, 1988); EI-Ali and Daraz v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't. [2002] EWCA Civ.
1103 (C.A.). For cases arising in Canada, see E1-Bekai v. Minister of Citizenship &
Immigr., [2000] No. IMM-5452-99, 2000 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 52715 (Fed. Ct.); Youssef
v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigr., [1999] No. IMM-990-98, 1999 A.C.W.S.J.
LEXIS 46767 (Fed. Ct.); Elastal v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigr., [1999] No.
IMM-3425-97, 1999 Fed. Ct. Trial LEXIS 218 (Fed. Ct.); Daghmash v. Minister of
Citizenship & Immigr., [1998] No. IMM-4302-97, 1998 Fed. Ct. LEXIS 688 (Fed. Ct.).
For a case arising in New Zealand, see In re SA, Refugee Appeal No. 1/92, (Apr. 30,
1992), available at www.refugee.org.nz/rsaa/text/docs/1-92.htm (last visited May 18,
2004). For cases arising in Australia, see Minister of Immigr. & Multicultural Affairs
v. Quiader, [2001] F.C.A. 1458 (16 Oct. 2001); BV96/04744 (Refugee Review
Tribunal, Australia, Feb. 12, 1997); N94/04981 and N94/04982 (Refugee Review
Tribunal, Australia, Nov. 27, 1996); V95/03840 (Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia,
Sept. 20, 1996); N94/04641 (Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia, Aug. 27, 1996); V95/
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related protections that are available to other refugees in the world.
Many remain in Western states without recognized legal status, without
work permits or the basic essentials to live in freedom and dignity.
2 55
03021 (Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia, June 6, 1996); V95/03257 (Refugee
Review Tribunal, Australia, Nov. 28, 1995); V93/01139 (Refugee Review Tribunal,
Australia, Aug. 9, 1994); BN93/01741 (Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia, Mar. 23,
1994); Sahtout v. Minister for Immigr. & Multicultural Affairs, W324 of 2001
BC200200 (Fed. Ct. Feb. 20, 2002) (decisions and summaries on file with author). For
a detailed discussion of the jurisprudence of eleven states on Palestinian refugee/
asylum claims, see Akram and Goodwin-Gill, supra note 244, at 47-52.
254 Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights has not been extended
to protect the right of a stateless Palestinian last residing in a refugee camp in
Lebanon to be reunited with his fiancd lawfully residing in Sweden. See L. and S. v.
Sweden, European Court of Human Rights, No. 18288/91 (May 13, 1992), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudoc2doc/hedec/sift/1591.txt.
255 Some examples from United States cases reflect the confusion over the legal
status of Palestinians as refugees and stateless persons, combined with
institutionalized political bias against the Palestinian struggle for independence and
self-determination. Although an extreme example, the case of Mazen Al-Najjar is by
no means unusual in the treatment of Palestinian refugees by many states. See Al-
Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001). For other decisions in the lengthy
case, see Al-Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001); A1-Najjar v. Reno, 97
F. Supp. 2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2000). Al-Najjar was held in INS detention for over 4
years on allegations of association with terrorism. Al-Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d
1330, 1336 (2001). AI-Najjar was held in custody for 3 years, seven months before
being released in December 2000. He was rearrested in November 2001 and
remained in custody until his deportation in August 2002. Id. at 1338. See also Mitch
Stacy, Lebanon Kicks Out Deported Professor, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Sept. 21,
2002, 2002 WL 100407564. No terrorism charges were ever brought, but he was
detained and removal sought on the basis of visa violations and evidence the INS
refused to disclose. See Al-Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1274. He was finally deported in
August 2002, ostensibly to Bahrain, after 11 countries refused to accept him. See
Stacy, supra; Keith Epstein & Michael Fechter, Controversy Follows Al-Najjar to
Lebanon, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Aug. 28, 2002, at 1. While his plane was en route, Bahrain
refused his admission. Id. His plane sat on the tarmac in Rome for 25 hours while the
U.S. sought another country that would accept him. Id. The U.S. landed him in
Lebanon, apparently on the promise of a visitor visa, but Lebanon deported him a
day later to an unknown country. See Stacy, supra. Al-Najjar's situation is typical of
thousands of Palestinians everywhere in the world. Al-Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1270. He
was born in Gaza in 1957, lived in Saudi Arabia with his family for thirteen years,
then moved to Egypt for high school and university. Al-Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1276.
From 1979 until 1981, he lived in the UAE with a temporary work visa. Id. He had a
Palestinian refugee travel document issued by Egypt on which he obtained a student
visa to the US. Id. at 1270-71. He remained in the U.S. on various statuses from 1981
until 1996, when INS moved to deport him on the basis of violating his student visa in
1986. Id. at 1272. Mazen's wife Fedaa, also Palestinian, was born in Saudi Arabia,
where she lived with her family until 1988. Id. Both Mazen and Fedaa were ineligible
for permanent status or citizenship in the Arab states where they had lived-Egypt,
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In the Arab states, due to the long-standing consensus that the solution
to the Palestinian problem is repatriation to their homes and lands, a
series of agreements and resolutions, as mentioned above, bind the host
countries to give Palestinian refugees the right to remain in their territo-
ries in temporary status.25 At the same time, most Arab states are not
signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and are thus not bound by
either article 1A(2) or article 1D of that Convention.257 They are, how-
ever, bound by the customary international law principle of non-refoule-
ment, obliging them not to expel Palestinian refugees to a place where
their "lives or freedom would be threatened." ' 8 Due to the Arab states'
failure to recognize Palestinians as refugees under the Refugee Conven-
tion-recognition that would guarantee them the minimal rights of that
Convention-and the failure of these states to guarantee Palestinian refu-
gees legal protection, they deny Palestinian refugees many basic human
rights, despite the requirements of the Casablanca Protocol. Thus, Pales-
tinians are routinely denied the right to work, to travel freely either inside
or outside of their territories, to unite with family members, to own pri-
Saudi Arabia, or the U.A.E-although they may have been eligible for re-entry visas
to one or more of those countries had they regularly returned there. Id. The U.S.
government sought to deport Mazen to Egypt or the UAE, and Fedaa to Saudi
Arabia, but none of those countries would accept them. Ultimately, Mazen was
deported alone; the fate of Fedaa and the couple's three U.S. citizen children remains
to be determined. See Epstein & Fechter, supra, at 1. For discussion of developments
in the Al-Najjar case, including the use of secret evidence to detain and deport him,
see Al-Najjar Released Following Attorney General's Review, 77 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1746 (2000); BIA Stays Ordering Dr. Al Najjar's Release; Federal Court
Review Sought, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1712 (2000); Public Record Evidence
Insufficient to Support Al Najjar's Detention, IJ Rules, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1566 (2000); Detention Based on Secret Evidence Violates Due Process Absent
Safeguards, District Court Rules, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 937 (2000). For press
reports on AI-Najjar's post-deportation ordeal, see Graham et al., Al-Najjar Deported
Again-Maybe, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at lB. See also Stacy, supra;
Epstein & Fechter, supra, at 1. On evidence of institutionalized political bias or racism
against Arabs, particularly Palestinians in the secret evidence cases, see Susan M.
Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion,
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51 (1999); David Cole, Guilt By Association: It's Alive and Well
at INS, NATION, Feb. 15, 1993, at 198-99. See generally DAVID COLE & JAMES X.
DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (1999) (discussing the use of ideological
exclusion and other grounds in immigration laws to target Arab, particularly
Palestinian, noncitizens for their political beliefs and associations).
256 See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
257 See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, 189 U.N.T.S. at 137. On Arab state
signatory status to the 1951 Refugee Convention and Protocol, see supra note 78.
258 The obligation of non-refoulement is widely regarded as a peremptory norm,
and is respected by most states regardless of whether those states are parties to the
Refugee Convention. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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vate property, or to benefit from a wide spectrum of international human
rights guarantees.
25 9
Aside from the implications of the protection gap for the day-to-day
protection of Palestinian refugees and stateless persons, the consequences
of this gap may be even more profound in the search for durable solu-
tions. Palestinian refugees have been denied an international body to
represent them in furthering their search for a durable solution, which
significantly affects them in at least three major contexts: (1) interna-
tional representation to assert their rights as refugees to return, and to
obtain restitution and compensation; (2) access to international mecha-
nisms to claim and promote these rights; and (3) an internationally-man-
dated entity to preserve and promote their individual and collective
claims in the context of a negotiated peace plan.260 Due to its Statute's
article 7(c) exclusion clause, the UNHCR has never interceded to protect
Palestinian refugees in any of these three aspects in the search for a dura-
ble solution, despite its clear mandate to do so 26 ' and rich practice in
these aspects concerning all other refugee populations.262
D. Palestinians as Refugees or Stateless Persons
If the refugee definition incorporated into article 1A(2) of the Refugee
Convention was not intended to cover the Palestinian refugees as such,
which definition were the drafters of the various relevant instruments
259 See infra notes 538-66 and accompanying text.
260 For a more detailed discussion of the implications of the protection gap in the
search for a durable solution, see Akram, supra note 4, at 165.
261 The UNHCR's protection functions include:
(a) Promoting the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for the
protection of refugees, supervising their application and proposing amendments
thereto; (b) Promoting through special agreements with Governments the
execution of any measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to
reduce the number requiring protection; (c) Assisting governmental and private
efforts to promote voluntary repatriation or assimilation within new national
communities; (e) Endeavouring to obtain permission for refugees to transfer
their assets and especially those necessary for their resettlement.
Statute of the Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428(V), U.N.
GAOR, 5th Sess., 325th mtg. (1950).
262 In the last 20 years, the principles on refugee return, restitution and
compensation have been greatly strengthened by provisions in numerous negotiated
settlements, such as the Comprehensive Plan of Action in the Indochinese refugee
situation. See Paris Conference on Cambodia: Agreements Elaborating the Framework
for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflic, U.N. Doc. A/46/
608-S/23177 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 174 (1992) [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
See also Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: Central Framework Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at annex 7, art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/1995/1999 (1995),
reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996) [hereinafter Dayton Peace Accord]. See Declaration
and Concerted Plan of Action in Favor of Central American Refugees, Returnees and
Displaced Persons, U.N. Doc. CIREFCA/89/14 (1989) [hereinafter CIREFCA].
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applying to the Palestinians? The only definition of "Palestine refugee" at
the time of the Convention's drafting was that adopted first by the United
Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees ("UNRPR"), and later by its suc-
cessor organization, UNRWA, both entrusted with providing assistance
to the refugees.2 6 3 It is important to note that the UNRWA definition
relates directly to its mandate of providing material assistance (i.e., food,
clothing, and shelter) to the refugees. Although the U.N. bodies con-
cerned with the Palestine refugee problem referred to "Palestinian" or
"Palestine" refugees, invoking the relief definition, no formal definition
of "Palestinian refugee" was adopted for purposes of international pro-
tection.2 64 Thus, the basic components of the de facto definition of "Pal-
estinian refugee" intended by the U.N. drafters were: a Palestinian
national or individual having his or her permanent residence in Palestine
who lost home, lands, or livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.
Because this definition referred to approximately two-thirds of the Pales-
tinian population, it would have been illogical to apply an individualized
definition such as the one under consideration for the Refugee
Convention.265
263 UNRWA's first working definition for 'Palestine refugee' was: "Any person
who had permanent residence and principal occupation in Palestine from which as a
result of the Palestine conflict he has been deprived and who is without sufficient
resources for basic maintenance shall be considered a refugee eligible for UNRPR
relief." LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES, REPORT OF THE RELIEF OPERATION ON
BEHALF OF THE PALESTINE REFUGEES CONDUCTED BY THE MIDDLE EAST
COMMISSION OF THE LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
UNITED NATIONS RELIEF FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES, 1949-1950 42 (1950). The
working definition of "Palestine refugee" which operated from 1952 until 1993 was:
"A Palestine refugee is a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a
minimum period of two years preceding the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 and who,
as a result of this conflict, has lost both his home and his means of livelihood ... and
who is in need." TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 72 (citing Operational Instruction
No. 104, Feb. 18, 1952) In 1993, this definition was amended: "[Palestine refugee] shall
mean any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1
June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result
of the 1948 conflict." Id. at 77 (citing Consolidated Registration Instructions, Jan. 1,
1993, $ 2.13).
264 The legal advisor to the UNCCP secretariat prepared a draft definition of a
Palestine refugee for protection purposes. However, by the time the draft was
completed, the international community had already begun to dismantle its authority.
Addendum to Definition of a 'Refugee' Under paragraph 11 of the General Assembly
Resolution of 11 December 1948, U.N. Doc. W/61/Add.1, 29 (1951).
26.5 Palestinians are considered to have been given a status similar to that of
statutory refugees, similar to those described in article 1A(1) of the Refugee
Convention. See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 2, at 140-2; see also GOODWIN-GILL,
supra note 2, at 93. See also Akram & Goodwin-Gill, supra note 244, at 70-72.
2004] TEMPORARY PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 65
The 1951 Refugee Convention covers stateless persons who are refu-
gees. 266 However, an additional regime provides for protection under
international law for stateless persons who are not refugees, or for state-
less persons who are excluded from coverage in the Refugee Convention.
Two other international law instruments affect the status of such per-
sons-the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
("1954 Stateless Convention"),26 7 and the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness ("1961 Statelessness Convention").
268
Although these conventions are significant in terms of the legal rights
they afford stateless persons and the obligations required of state signato-
ries, they have limited reach as they have been ratified by very few
states.269 In order to obtain the benefits of these conventions, a person
must be determined to be "stateless"-defined as "a person who is not
considered a national by any State under the operation of its law., 27" The
1961 Statelessness Convention adopts the same definition of stateless per-
sons, but also recommends that "persons who are stateless de facto
should as far as possible be treated as stateless de jure to enable them to
acquire an effective nationality., 271' Despite the limited accessions to
these two conventions, their basic definition of stateless person is now
considered customary international law, and is therefore binding even on
states that are not a party to either of these conventions.272
The focus of the 1954 Stateless Convention is to improve the status of
stateless persons and to grant them the widest possible guarantees of fun-
damental human rights.273 The 1961 Statelessness Convention was
266 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1A, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152-54. See 1954
Stateless Convention, supra note 73, pmbl., 360 U.N.T.S. at 130 ("[t]hose stateless
persons who are also refugees are covered by the Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees of 28 July 1951.").
267 1954 Stateless Convention, supra note 73, 360 U.N.T.S. at 117.
268 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 74, 989 U.N.T.S. at 175.
269 For the status of ratifications, declarations and reservations of the 1954
Stateless Convention, see UNHCR, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty3stat.
htm. (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) (showing 22 signatories and 54 state parties, as of
February 2002). For the status of ratifications, declarations and reservations of the
1961 Statelessness Convention, see UNHCR, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
treaty4 .htm. (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) (showing 5 signatories and 26 state parties, as
of February 2002).
270 1954 Stateless Convention, supra note 73, art. 1, 360 U.N.T.S. at 136.
271 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 74, 989 U.N.T.S. at 175.
272 See Arthur C. Helton, State Building, Citizenship and Statelessness, Forced
Migration Project Special Reports (1997), http://www2.soros.org/fmp2/html/build-
intro.html. (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
273 The 1954 Stateless Convention provides benefits similar to those guaranteed
under the Refugee Convention. It also requires states to grant travel documents to
stateless persons. Compare Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 24, 189 U.N.T.S. at
168-70, with 1954 Stateless Convention, supra note 73, arts. 24, 26, 27, 28, 360
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drafted to address the gaps left by the 1954 Stateless Convention and to
reduce or eliminate the phenomenon of statelessness. 74 The 1961 State-
lessness Convention requires states to grant nationality to persons born in
their territories who would otherwise be stateless.27 It also prohibits,
with some exceptions, depriving someone of his or her nationality.16 It
categorically prohibits denial of nationality on grounds of race, religion,
or political opinion.277 By far the most important aspects of the 1961
Statelessness Convention for Palestinians are the recommendations for
an expanded stateless definition, and article 11, which provides for the
establishment of an agency with a mandate to protect and assist stateless
persons claiming the benefit of that Convention. In 1974, the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly entrusted the UNHCR with the mandate to protect and
assist stateless persons as required by article 11.278 The UNHCR has
never exercised this mandate under the 1961 Statelessness Convention. 79
Interpretations of the status of Palestinians as stateless persons have
varied among and even within those states that are signatories to one of
the two statelessness conventions. 280 For example, Germany, which has
significant jurisprudence on Palestinian refugee and stateless persons'
claims, has a decision from the highest federal court finding that Pales-
tinians are stateless and thus entitled to all the benefits of the two con-
ventions.2 81 Despite this decision, the German Federal Ministry of
Interior policy is that Palestinians "originating" from Lebanon are not
stateless, but have "indeterminate," or "unsettled" status, and therefore
are not eligible for the guarantees of the 1961 Statelessness Conven-
U.N.T.S. at 150, 152 (regarding freedom of movement, identity papers and travel
documents, respectively). The 1954 Stateless Convention does not establish an
international body to protect stateless persons or to monitor compliance with its
terms. See 1954 Stateless Convention, supra note 73, 360 U.N.T.S. at 117.
274 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 74, pmbl., 989 U.N.T.S. at 176.
275 See id., art. 1, 989 U.N.T.S. at 176-77.
276 Id., art. 8, 989 U.N.T.S. at 179.
277 Id., art. 9, 989 U.N.T.S. at 179.
278 G.A. Res. 3274 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess. (1974). This mandate was
extended indefinitely by G.A. Res. 31/36, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/
31/36 (1976).
279 See Carol A. Batchelor, Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International
Protection, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 232, 254 (1995).
280 See TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 92-123; see also Akram & Goodwin-Gill,
supra note 244.
281 See TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 189-90 (describing in English the Federal
Administrative Court, Feb. 23, 2003 [Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Urteil vom 23.2. 1993
BVerwGE 1 C 45.90] InfAusiR 7-9/93, regarding Germany's obligations toward
Palestinians under the 1954 Stateless Convention and the 1961 Statelessness
Convention) (translation on file with author).
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tion.282 The German cantons of Switzerland also categorize Palestinians
as having "unknown state or continent of origin., 28 3 However, the vast
majority of Palestinians coming from many of the Arab states are de
facto stateless. By not recognizing them as such, Germany, Switzerland,
and other European states deny them rights guaranteed under the 1961
Statelessness Convention, such as obtaining travel documents, employ-
ment authorization, and granting nationality to their children born in
those countries.284 Aside from being denied such benefits as travel docu-
ments, access to appropriate asylum or residence processing, obtaining
authorization to work, and other fundamental rights guarantees, Pales-
tinians have also not received the benefit of UNHCR's protection man-
date under article 11 of the 1961 Statelessness Convention.
E. Palestinian Refugees and the Right of Return Under International
Law
The right of return is a critical component of the special protection
regime and of the recommendation that Palestinian refugees be granted
temporary protection. Thus, a brief analysis of the right of return under
international legal principles is necessary.285
The legal underpinnings of the right of refugee return are found in
three main bodies of law: the law of nationality and state succession;
286
human rights law;287 and humanitarian law.288 In each of these bodies of
282 The German Ministry of Interior identifies Palestinians as persons of
"uncertain nationality" or Staatsangehoerigkeit ungelart. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note
2, at 245 n.207. See also TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 190.
283 Copy of travel document issued to Palestinian asylum-seeker in Bern,
Switzerland, stamped under "Nationality:" Staat und Kontinent unbekannt ["State
and continent unknown"] (on file with author).
284 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 243-46; TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at
190.
285 For an authoritative review of the Palestinian right of return under
international law see Boling, supra note 173; see also W. Thomas Mallison & Sally
Mallison, An International Law Analysis of the Major United Nations Resolutions
Concerning the Palestine Question, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/4, at 28-38 (1979).
286 See generally P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 47 (Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1979) (1956); see also CLYDE EAGLETON, THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 182 (1928); RICHARD PLENDER,
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 71 (Kluwer Academic 1988) (1972); Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
287 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. No. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UNDHR] ("Everyone has the
right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country"); ICCPR,
supra note 66, art. 12, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
the right to enter his own country"); CERD, supra note 69, art. 5(d)(ii), 660 U.N.T.S.
at 220 (recognizing "the right ... to return to one's country").
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law, the right of return is found both as a rule of customary law and codi-
fied in international treaties. The state responsible for recognizing and
implementing the right of return in the Palestinian refugee case is, of
course, Israel, which is the state responsible for creating the refugees and
has bound itself to the right of return principle through numerous treaty
ratifications.
It is important to note that during the British Mandate period, Palestin-
ian nationals had distinct Palestinian citizenship, with recognized British-
issue passports stamped "Palestinian citizen under Article One or Three
of the Palestinian Citizenship Order, 1925-41.',289 The 1952 Israeli
Nationality Law repealed, with retroactive effect, the Palestine Citizen-
ship Orders, provided that every Jewish immigrant was automatically
entitled to Israeli nationality (under the "Law of Return"), and estab-
lished that former Palestinians of Arab origin were eligible for Israeli
nationality only under a series of restrictive conditions that effectively
disqualified the vast majority of Palestinian Arabs from Israeli citizenship
and stripped them of their Palestinian nationality.
2 90
Under classic international law principles of nationality and state suc-
cession, a state has great discretion in the matter of conferring or denying
nationality. 291 However, this discretion has limits. Both customary and
treaty law impose limitations on how a successor state may treat the pop-
ulation found on its territory. Customary international law requires that
"the population follow the change of sovereignty in matters of national-
ity."' 92 This principle has at least three aspects: that all habitual residents
288 See generally Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
289 Palestinian Citizenship Order in Council, 1925, S.R. & 0., no. 25. See Anis
Kassim, Legal Systems and Developments in Palestine, 1 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 19
(1984) (concerning laws under British occupation of Palestine). See also G.A. Res.
181 (III), U.N. GAOR, 128th Plen. Mtg., 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/64 (1947) (noting the
limited trusteeship of the Mandate under the League of Nations).
290 Nationality Law, 1952, 6 L.S.I. 50 (1952).
291 The law of nationality and state succession requires states to readmit their own
nationals (or grant them 'the right of return'), and requires that when a territory
undergoes change of sovereignty, inhabitants of that territory must be offered the
nationality of the successor state. See PLENDER, supra note 286, at 71 (stating "[t]he
proposition that every State must admit its own nationals to its territory is so widely
accepted that it may be described as a commonplace of international law."); see also
WEIS, supra note 286, at 53 ("The State of nationality is also under an obligation to
admit a national born abroad who never resided on its territory if his admission
should be demanded by the State of residence.").
292 Ian Brownlie, The Relations of Nationality in Public International Law, 39
BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 284, 320 (1963). For principles of state succession, see 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, INT'L LAW 503 (7th ed., 1948); F.A. Mann, The Effect of Changes of
Sovereignty Upon Nationality, 5 MOD. L. REV. 218-24 (1941).
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found on the territory of the successor state must be granted the national-
ity of the new state; that a successor state may not arbitrarily denational-
ize, or expel, persons found on its territory; and that residents of the
territory expelled during conflict are absolutely entitled to return to their
places of habitual residence.293
The obligation of a successor state to grant nationality to all residents
of that territory is a well-established customary international law rule. 94
More recently, it has been incorporated in the authoritative International
Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Succession, and adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly as a principle states are to apply in matters of
nationality and state succession.295 Article 5 of the ILC Articles on State
Succession provides: "Subject to the provisions of the present draft arti-
cles, persons concerned having their habitual residence in the territory
affected by the succession of States are presumed to acquire the national-
ity of the successor State on the date of such succession.
296
The principle against arbitrary denationalization is also firmly settled
under customary law .297 Article 15 of the ILC Articles on State Succes-
sion codifies this principle: "States concerned shall not deny persons con-
cerned the right to retain or acquire a nationality or the right of option
upon the succession of States by discriminating on any ground. 29 8 Arti-
cle 16 further states: "Persons concerned shall not be arbitrarily deprived
of the nationality of the predecessor State, or arbitrarily denied the right
to acquire the nationality of the successor State or any right of option to
which they are entitled in relation to the succession of States." '299 Moreo-
ver, when denationalization is based on race or ethnic origin, it is a viola-
tion of the general principles of non-discrimination in customary
international law, as well as articles 2 and 26 of the International Conven-
tion on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), °° and article 5(d)(ii) of the
293 Brownlie, supra note 292, at 235-238.
294 See L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 292, at 503 (noting inhabitants attain the
nationality of the state that acquires the territory); see also, Brownlie, supra note 292,
at 320.
295 Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States, G.A. Res.
55/153, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/153 (2000) [hereinafter Articles
on Nationality].
296 Id. at art. 5.
297 See WEIS, supra note 286, at 248.
298 Articles on Nationality, supra note 295, at art. 15.
299 Id. at art. 16.
300 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires:
Each state party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 2, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173. Article 26 states:
70 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22:1
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination ("CERD"), 30 1 both of which are binding on Israel.3°2 Arbi-
trary denationalization-that is, denationalization on discriminatory
grounds or for discriminatory or prohibited purposes-is strongly pro-
scribed in conventions, 0 3 resolutions, 0 4 and declarations.0 5 Closely
related to a successor state's obligation not to expel persons habitually
residing on its territory is its obligation not to expel such persons to
another state's territory. This principle is firmly grounded in nationality
law, °3 6 as well as in humanitarian and human rights law, discussed below.
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, politi-
cal or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Id., art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
301 Article 5(d)(ii) obligates State Parties to prohibit and work to eliminate racial
discrimination, and to guarantee the right of everyone to "[tihe right to leave any
country, including one's own and to return to one's country..." CERD, supra note
69, 660 U.N.T.S. at 195.
302 Israel ratified the ICCPR on October 3, 1991, with reservations to article 23,
but not to articles 2, 12 or 26. Israel ratified the CERD on January 3, 1979, with
reservation to article 22 but not to article 5. The status of ratifications and
reservations are available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm (last visited Feb.
24, 2003).
303 See, e.g., Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, The Law of
Nationality, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 13, 16 (1929). Article 20 provides:
A state may not refuse to receive into its territory a person, upon his expulsion
by or exclusion from the territory of another State, if such person is a national of
the first State or if such person was formerly its national and lost its nationality
without having or acquiring the nationality of any other State.
Id. at 24.
304 See Draft Principles on Freedom and Non-Discrimination in Respect of
Everyone to Leave any Country, Including his Own, and to Return to His Country,
U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Res. 2B(XV), at 44, 46 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/846 (1963) [hereinafter Draft Principles on
Freedom] ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality... as a means of
divesting him of the right to return to his country."); see also Articles on Nationality,
supra note 295.
305 See UDHR, supra note 287; HURST HANNUM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND
RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 156 (1987) (citing Strasbourg
Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return, art. 6, (b), Nov. 26, 1986, for the
proposition that "[n]o person shall be deprived of nationality or citizenship in order to
exile or to prevent that person from exercising the right to enter his or her country").
306 See John Fischer Williams, Denationalization, 9 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 45, 61
(1927) (stating "a state cannot, whether by banishment or by putting an end to the
status of nationality, compel any other state to receive one of its own nationals whom
it wishes to expel from its own territory."); see also PLENDER, supra note 286, at 87
("[a] state may not justify its expulsion or non-admission of its own former nationals
by drawing attention to the fact that it first took the precaution of denaturalizing
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The final aspect of the law of nationality or state succession is the obli-
gation to permit persons to return to their places of origin, or of habitual
residence in the case of state succession. This right of return is also a
well-settled principle under public international law. The ILC Articles on
State Succession incorporate it in article 14 as follows:
1. The status of persons concerned as habitual residents shall not be
affected by the succession of States.
2. A State concerned shall take all necessary measures to allow per-
sons concerned who, because of events connected with the succes-
sion of States, were forced to leave their habitual residence on its
territory to return thereto.
30 7
Israel has acceded to the major human rights conventions codifying
principles on the right of return and the related obligation of a state not
to expel its nationals and to accept their return. Israel is a signatory to the
ICCPR.308 Article 12(4) of the ICCPR states: "No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter his own country., 309 Israel has made no
reservation to this provision. Israel is also a party to the CERD.3 '0 Arti-
cle 5(d)(ii) of the CERD requires states:
them."); GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 2, at 242 ("[f]or international law purposes,
States do not enjoy the freedom to denationalize their nationals in order to expel
them as 'non-citizens'." (citations omitted)). On the prohibition of expulsion of
individuals and groups under humanitarian law, see Alfred de Zayas, The Right to
One's Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 6 CRIM. L.F. 257 (1995); Alfred de Zayas, The Illegality of
Population Transfers and the Application of Emerging International Norms in the
Palestinian Context, 7 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 17 (1991); Alfred de Zayas,
Population, Expulsion and Transfer, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1997).
307 Articles on Nationality, supra note 295, at art. 14.
308 ICCPR, supra note 66, 999 U.N.T.S. at 171. Although Israel ratified the ICCPR
on October 3, 1991, it has not ratified the First Optional Protocol, which gives the
Human Rights Committee jurisdiction to hear individual complaints. See Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Table of Ratifications of the
Major International Human Rights Instruments,http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf
(last visited June 25, 2003). Israel has also not made a declaration under article 41
that would give the Human Rights Committee competence over interstate claims in
which Israel might be involved. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Declarations
and Reservations to the ICCPR, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5-asp.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2003).
309 ICCPR, supra note 66, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
310 CERD, supra note 69, 660 U.N.T.S. at 195. Israel ratified the CERD on
January 3, 1979, but has not agreed to be bound by art. 22 by which it would be
required to litigate disputes under the Convention to the International Court of
Justice. Israel has also refused to give the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination competence over individual complaints against it under article 14.
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[t]o prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and
to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race,
colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, nota-
bly in the enjoyment of the following rights: ... (d) Other civil rights,
in particular ... (ii) The right to leave any country, including one's
own, and to return to one's country.
Israel has also made no reservation to this provision.
311
The chosen phrases in the. ICCPR text-enter, return, arbitrary, and
own country-have been the subject of much academic commentary in
determining the parameters of the right of return.3 12 Interpreting the
right to enter as applying to a broader group of persons than those enti-
tled to return is supported by the travaux preparatoires of the ICCPR.313
Article 12(4) thus incorporates a broader right to return for second or
third generation refugees born outside their country. The modifier "arbi-
trarily" is a limitation on the right to return and implies that the state may
interfere with this right as long as the interference is not on an arbitrary
basis. The Human Rights Committee, the interpreting and enforcing body
of the ICCPR, has taken the position that any interference with the right
to enter or to return should be lawful, "in accordance with the provisions,
aims and objectives of the ICCPR and should be, in any event, reasona-
ble in the particular circumstances.
3 14
Many commentators conclude that aside from being required by spe-
cific provisions in international treaties, the right to return is obligatory
under customary international law in the human rights context.315 Such
conclusions are based on the fact that the right to return is expressly rec-
ognized in most international human rights instrument, for example: arti-
cle 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"); 311
311 General Recommendation XXII on Article 5 emphasizes that refugees and
displaced persons have "the right to return to their homes of origin under conditions
of safety." CERD, supra note 69, art. 5, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220-22.
312 For a thorough discussion of these questions, and an argument that return to
one's country means, under international law, return to a country with which one has
a 'genuine connection', see Kathleen Lawand, The Right of Return of Palestinians in
International Law, 8 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 532 (1996).
313 MARC J. Bossuyr, GUIDE TO THE Travaux Preparatoires of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 261 (1987).
314 General Comment No. 27, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., at paras. 19-21,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999).
315 For authority affirming that the right of return is a customary international law
principle, see THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACRoss BORDERS 39-40 (Louis B. Sohn
& Thomas Buergenthal, eds., 1992); HANNUM, supra note 305, at 7-16; Eric Rosand,
The Right to Return under International Law Following Mass Disclocation: The Bosnia
Precedent? 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1091; Lawand, supra note 312; John Quigley,
Displaced Palestinians and the Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 171 (1998).
316 UNDHR, supra note 287, at art. 13(2).
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article 12(4) of the ICCPR;317 article 5(d)(ii) of the CERD;31 8 article VIII
of the American Declaration of the Rights of Man;319article 22(5) of the
American Convention on Human Rights;32 0 article 12(2) of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights;321 and article 3(2) of Protocol 4
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. 22 It is also included in many draft declarations,
constitutions, laws, and the jurisprudence of many states.32 3
The right to return is also consistently referred to in U.N. resolutions
dealing with rights of refugees. 24 Resolutions refer to the right of return
as an "unconditional right, ' 3 25 as an "inalienable right, '3 2' and as an
317 ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 12(4), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
318 CERD, supra note 69, art. 5(d)(ii), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220.
311 See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. GA, 3d
Sess., O.A.S. Doc. AG/RES. 1591 (XXVIII-O/98) (June 2, 1998).
320 American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San-Jose, Costa Rica, Nov.
22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (1969) [hereinafter American Convention on Human
Rights].
321 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, art. 12(2), OAU doc. CAB/
LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter].
322 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Protocol 4, Sept. 16, 1963, art. 3(2), 46 Europ. T.S. 46 [hereinafter ECHR
Protocol].
323 See, e.g., Draft Declaration on Freedom and Non-Discrimination in Respect of
the Right of Everyone to Leave any Country, Including One's Own and to Return to
One's Own Country, U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/DEC/1996/102 (1996);
Report of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities on its 48th Session, at 89, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/2-E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/41
(1996); The Right to Leave Any Country, Including One's Own, and to Return to
One's Own Country, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/RES. 1988/46 (1988); Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and to
Return 1986; Declaration on the Right to Leave and the Right to Return (1972);
Draft Principles on Freedom, supra note 304.
324 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1145, U.N. SCOR, 3843d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1145 (1997)
(reaffirming the right of all Croatian refugees to return to their homes of origin); S.C.
Res. 1019, U.N. SCOR, 3951st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1019 (1995) (demanding that
the government of Croatia respect the right of the Serb population to remain or
return in safety); S.C. Res. 1078, U.N. SCOR, 3710th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1078
(1996), S.C. Res. 1029, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1029 (1995) (calling
on the Government of Rwanda to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees); see also
S.C. Res 999, U.N. SCOR, 3544th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/999 (1995) (calling for
return of refugees after mass displacement in Tajikistan).
325 G.A. Res. 46/242, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/242 (1992);
G.A. Res. 47/147, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/47/147 (1992).
326 G.A. Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 2, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974) (referring to Palestinian refugees).
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"imprescriptable right."3 7 Resolutions also reaffirm the right of refugees
and displaced persons to return to their homes of origin. 2 U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 194(111), December 11, 1948, embodies customary
law relative to the right of return.329 Resolution 194, paragraph 11, sets
327 S.C. Res. 1311, U.N. SCOR, 4179th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1311 (2000); S.C.
Res. 1255, U.N. SCOR, 4029th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1255 (1999); S.C. Res. 1255,
U.N. SCOR, 4029th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1255 (1999); S.C. Res. 1225, U.N. SCOR,
3972d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1225 (1999); S.C. Res. 1287, U.N. SCOR, 4094th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1287 (2000).
328 S.C. Res. 1311, U.N. SCOR, 4179th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1311 (2000); S.C.
Res. 1287, U.N. SCOR, 4094th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1287 (2000); S.C. Res. 1255,
U.N. SCOR, 4029th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1255 (1999); S.C. Res. 1239, U.N. SCOR,
4003d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1239 (1999); S.C. Res. 1225, U.N. SCOR, 3972th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1225 (1999); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1203 (1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 3930th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1199
(1998); S.C. Res. 1187, U.N. SCOR, 3912th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1187 (1998); S.C.
Res. 1150, U.N. SCOR, 3851st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1150 (1998); S.C. Res. 1124,
U.N. SCOR, 3807th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1124 (1997); S.C. Res. 1120, U.N. SCOR,
3800th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1120 (1997); S.C. Res. 999, U.N. SCOR, 3544th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/999 (1995); S.C. Res. 1096, U.N. SCOR, 3735th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/
RES/1096 (1997); S.C. Res. 1079, U.N. SCOR, 3712th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1079
(1996); S.C. Res. 1065, U.N. SCOR, 3680th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1065 (1996); S.C.
Res. 1036, U.N. SCOR, 3618th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1036 (1996); S.C. Res. 1009,
U.N. SCOR, 3563d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1009 (1995); S.C. Res. 993, U.N. SCOR,
3535th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/993 (1995); S.C. Res. 971, U.N. SCOR, 3488th mtg.,
U.N. Doe. S/RES/971 (1995); S.C. Res. 947, U.N. SCOR, 3434th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/
RES/947 (1994); S.C. Res. 941, U.N. SCOR, 3428th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/941
(1994); S.C. Res. 937, U.N. SCOR, 3407th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/937 (1994); S.C.
Res. 906, U.N. SCOR, 3354th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/906 (1994); S.C. Res. 896, U.N.
SCOR, 3332th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/896 (1994); S.C. Res. 892, U.N. SCOR, 3325th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/892 (1993); S.C. Res. 884, U.N. SCOR, 3313d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/884 (1993); S.C. Res. 876, U.N. SCOR, 3295th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/876
(1993); S.C. Res. 874, U.N. SCOR, 3292d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/874 (1993); S.C. Res.
859, U.N. SCOR, 3269th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/859 (1993); S.C. Res. 853, U.N.
SCOR, 3259th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/853 (1993); S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 3228th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 3200th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/820 (1993); S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 3137th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/787
(1992); S.C. Res. 779, U.N. SCOR, 3118th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/779 (1992); S.C.
Res. 752, U.N. SCOR, 3075th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/752 (1992); S.C. Res. 361, U.N.
SCOR, 1794th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/361 (1974).
329 The analysis of Resolution 194 is based on a review of working papers prepared
by the Secretariat of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP). The
U.N. General Assembly has reaffirmed Resolution 194(111) annually since 1948.
Other resolutions reaffirming the right of return in the Palestine case include: G.A.
Res. 273(111), U.N. GAOR (1949) (admitting Israel as a member of the U.N.
conditional to the implementation of Resolution 194); S.C. Res. 93, U.N. SCOR,
547th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2157 (1951) (calling on Israel to facilitate the return of those
Palestinians expelled from the demilitarized zone after the 1948 war); G.A. Res. 3236,
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forth a clear hierarchy of solutions. Paragraph 11(a) delineates the spe-
cific rights and primary durable solution for Palestinian refugees:
330
return, real property restitution, and compensation for loss of, or damage
to, property. 31 The Resolution specifically reaffirms the right of refugees
to return to their homes.33 2 Refugees who choose not to exercise the right
of return set forth in paragraph 11 may opt for resettlement in host states
or in third countries, as well as for real property restitution and compen-
sation.33 General Assembly Resolution 194(111) also affirms the princi-
ple of individual refugee choice. 3 4
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 2, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (reaffirming the
right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the right of refugees to
return to their homes). For a list of resolutions, see INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE
STUDIES, supra note 142.
330 The General Assembly, "[r]esolves that refugees wishing to return to their
homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the
earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid . . . for loss of or
damage to property." UNCCP Mandate, supra note 246. For a general analysis of
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194, see Analysis of Paragraph 11 of the General
Assembly's Resolution of 11 December 1948, Working Paper Prepared by the
Secretariat, U.N. Conciliation Committee for Palestine, U.N. Doc. A/AC.25/W.45
(1950) [hereinafter Analysis of Paragraph 11].
331 The U.N. Mediator in Palestine, whose recommendations formed the basis of
Resolution 194, explicitly noted that the right of return should be affirmed (rather
than recognized) by the United Nations. That the right of return had already assumed
the status of customary law is also reflected in comments made by the U.S.
representative at the U.N. concerning the original draft resolution submitted by Great
Britain. Paragraph 11, wrote the U.S. representative, "endorsed a generally
recognized principle and provided a means for implementing that principle." For
more analysis of the right to restitution and compensation, see Operations of the
Custodian of Absentee Property and Estimation of the Compensation Due to Arab
Refugees Not Returning to Their Homes, Working Paper Prepared by the Secretariat of
the Commission at Jerusalem, U.N. Conciliation Committee for Palestine, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.25/W.52 (1950); Note on the Problem of Compensation, Note Drafted by the
Secretariat of the Commission at Jerusalem, U.N. Conciliation Committee for
Palestine, U.N. Doc. A/AC.25/W.53 (1950).
332 The General Assembly clearly meant the return of each refugee to "his or [her]
house or lodging and not to his or [her] homeland." The Assembly rejected two
separate amendments that referred in more general terms to the return of refugees to
"the areas from which they have come." Analysis of Paragraph 11, supra note 330, 3.
333 Paragraph 11 instructs the UNCCP, the body mandated to facilitate
implementation of durable solutions for Palestinian refugees, to facilitate the
resettlement of those refugees choosing not to return and the payment of
compensation. UNCCP Mandate, supra note 246, para. 11.
334 By 1948, the principle of refugee choice or voluntariness had already become
an established principle of refugee law and practice. The principle of individual
refugee choice is repeatedly emphasized in documents prepared by the U.N. Mediator
in Palestine, whose recommendations formed the basis for Resolution 194. The U.N.
General Assembly intended to confer upon individual refugees the "right of
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Finally, widespread state practice implements the rights of resident
nationals to enter their state of origin. Such mass displacements as took
place in Indochina, Central America, and the Balkans were resolved with
a primary focus on repatriation. a 35 Peace agreements that affirmed the
right of return include: the 1989 Agreement on Resettlement of the Popu-
lation Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict in Guatemala; 36 the
1989 Declaration and Comprehensive Plan of Action in Favor of Central
American Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons ("CIREFCA");
3 17
the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action Concerning Indochinese Refu-
gees ("CPA");3 ' the 1991 Paris Agreement concerning Cambodia;3 39
Protocol III of the 1992 comprehensive peace agreement in
exercising a free choice as to their future." Analysis of Paragraph 11, supra note 330.
"The verb 'choose' indicates that the General Assembly assumed that [...] all the
refugees would be given a free choice as to whether or not they wished to return
home." In order to make a free choice, the United Nations recognized that refugees
should be "fully informed of the conditions under which they would return." BADIL
Resource Center, The Meaning of the UN General Assembly Resolution 194(111), 11
December 1948 (The Right of Return), Occasional Bulletin No. 11 (Apr. 2002), http://
www.badil.org/Publications/ Bulletins/B_11.htm (last visited June 27, 2003).
335 See Dayton Peace Accord, supra note 262, annex 7, art. 1, 35 I.L.M. at 136 ("All
refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of
origin."); Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western
Sirmium, Nov. 12, 1995, at art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/1995/951, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 184
(1996) [hereinafter Erdut Agreement] ("The Transitional Administration shall ensure
the possibility for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes of
origin."); id., para. 7, 35 I.L.M. at 186 ("All persons have the right to return freely to
their place of residence in the region and to live there in conditions of security."); see
also Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed
Conflict, June 17, 1994, http://www.usip.org/library/pa/guatemala/gust-940617.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2003) (1994) (including the principle that "the Government of the
Republic [of Guatemala] undertakes to ensure that conditions exist which permit and
guarantee the voluntary return of uprooted persons to their places of origin .. .in
conditions of dignity and security"); Paris Agreement, supra note 262, art. 20(1), 31
I.L.M. at 187.
336 Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed
Conflict, supra note 335, at principle 1, states:
Uprooted population groups have the right to reside and live freely in
Guatemalan territory. Accordingly, the Government of the Republic undertakes
to ensure that conditions exist which permit and guarantee the voluntary return
of uprooted persons to their places of origin or to the place of their choice, in
conditions of dignity and security.
331 CIREFCA, supra note 262.
338 International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees, Declaration and
Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.148/2 (1989).
331 See Paris Agreement, supra note 262, art. 20, 31 I.L.M. at 187 (affirming that
"Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, located outside Cambodia, shall have
the right to return to Cambodia and to live in safety, security and dignity, free from
intimidation or coercion of any kind").
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Mozambique;34 the 1993 Protocol of Agreement Between the Govern-
ment of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation
of Rwandese Refugees;3 4 1 the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement;3 4 2 the 1995
Erdut Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Slavonia;343
and the 1999 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self Government in
Kosovo. 3" The international community has employed a variety of
means, including conditionality,3 45 extraordinary administrative pow-
ers,3 46 and threat and use of force3 47 to ensure return of refugees and
displaced persons.
340 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at
protocol III, art. IV U.N. Doc. S/24635/Annex (1992), available at http://www.usip/
library/pa/Mozambique/ Mozambique-03129992-p3.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003)
("The parties undertake to co-operate in the repatriation and reintegration of
Mozambican refugees and displaced persons," preferably to their original places of
residence).
341 Protocol of Agreement Between the Government of Rwanda and the
Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees and the
Resettlement of Displaced Persons, at pmbl. (1993) (recognizing the "inalienable
right" of return of Rwandese refugees).
342 Dayton Peace Accord, supra note 262, annex 7, art. 1, 35 I.L.M. at 136 ("All
refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of
origin."). The parties to the agreement, moreover, "confirm that they will accept the
return of such persons who have left their territory, including those who have been
accorded temporary protection by third countries." Id.
343 Erdut Agreement, supra note 335, para. 7, 35 I.L.M. at 186 ("All persons have
the right to return freely to their place of residence in the Region and to live there in
conditions of security").
344 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 1999,
art. 2, para. 3 ("The Parties recognize that all persons have the right to return to their
homes.").
345 This includes, for example, the "Open-Cities Initiative" in Bosnia-Herzegovina
in which cities facilitating minority return became eligible for more comprehensive
and substantive donor assistance. Other types of conditionality include the threat of
sanctions and the cessation of international assistance.
346 In Bosnia, for example, the Office of the High Representative ("OHR") is
empowered to remove elected officials obstructing implementation of the Dayton
Peace Agreement, revoke discriminatory legislation, and write new legislation. Lynn
Hastings, Implementation of Property Legislation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 37 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 221, 224-25 (2001).
347 See, e.g, S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 4011th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(1999) (authorizing the Secretary General to establish an international security
presence in Kosovo "to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and
displaced persons to their homes); see also S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 4045th mtg.,
at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1264 (1999) (establishing a multinational force in Kosovo
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and stressing it is the responsibility of
Indonesian authorities "to ensure the safe and dignified return of refugees to East
Timor").
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The exact parameters of the right under customary international law
are difficult to delineate, but article 13(2) of the UDHR, on which many
other right of return provisions are based, provides: "Everyone has the
right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his coun-
try.",3 18 Some have argued that the right of return under this and other
provisions does not apply to persons who are non-nationals of the expel-
ling state.34 9 Not surprisingly, Israeli supporters have advanced this argu-
ment with some vehemence.350 But the view most consistent with other
convention provisions, as well as with general principles of international
law, is that "everyone" means all persons, nationals or non-nationals, and
"his country" must be interpreted as place of origin.A
51
The UDHR, and other international human rights documents, make
clear distinctions between provisions applying to nationals and provisions
applying to persons from a country or a state.352 Basic principles of statu-
tory interpretation inform us that the broader term, "his own country,"
was chosen to include both place of nationality and place of origina53
Moreover, if the narrower term were chosen, the effect would be to per-
mit states to avoid their obligations toward inhabitants in their territories
by arbitrarily expelling them, removing them of their nationality, and
then denying them the right to return on the pretext that they are non-
nationals-propositions that are prohibited under public international
348 UNDHR, supra note 287, at art. 13(2).
349 See Ruth Lapidoth, The Right to Return in International Law, with Special
Reference to the Palestinian Refugees, 16 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 103, 107-115 (1986);
see also Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future
Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 300-312 (1995) (arguing that
Israel has a legitimate right to deny Palestinians the right to return and to restitution
of their properties as "enemies of the state" and "enemy property").
350 See generally Lapidoth, supra note 349; Benevenisti & Zamir, supra note 349;
Kurt R. Radley, The Palestine Refugees: The Right to Return in International Law, 72
AM. J. INT'L L. 586 (1978); and Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Prisoner, Reflections on
the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REV. 279 (1968).
351 See Quigley, supra note 199, at 233; Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol,
Natives, Newcomers and Nativism: A Human Rights Model for the Twenty-First
Century, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075, 1114-1121 (1996); Arthur C. Helton & Eliana
Jacobs, What is Forced Migration, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 521 (1995) (concerning the
right to return after arbitrary displacement); see also CERD, supra note 69, art
5(d)(ii), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220 ("The right to leave any country, including one's own,
and to return to one's country.").
352 This interpretation is confirmed by comparing the use of the term "country" in
ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 12(4), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176; CERD, supra note 69, art.
5(d)(ii), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220; UNDHR, supra note 287, at art. 13(2); African Charter,
supra note 321, art. 12(2), 21 I.L.M. at 61, with the use of the term 'national' in the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 319, at art. viii;
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 320, at art. 22(5); ECHR, supra
note 72, art. 3(2).
353 See Lawand, supra note 312, at 547-58.
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law, as discussed above. 54 The ICCPR provision is also based on the
UDHR language. Again, the terms chosen are "no one" and "own coun-
try," in contrast to "national," "state," or "state of nationality.
355
Supporters of the Israeli position have noted that the right of return is
an individual right and does not apply to situations of mass exodus.
356
There is, however, no textual support for this position. Nothing in the
travaux preparatoires implies that the drafters intended suspension of the
principle in cases of mass exodus.3 5 7 The UNCHR has very clearly
affirmed the right of return for the Palestinian refugees, grounding it in
the UDHR.358
354 HANNUM, supra note 305, at 62. See also Rosalyn Higgins, The Right in
International Law of an Individual to Enter, Stay in, and Leave a Country, 49 INT'L
Ari. 341, 350 (1973).
311 "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country."
ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 12(4), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176; "Everyone shall be free to
leave any country, including his own." Id., art. 12(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176; "Everyone
has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country."
UNDHR, supra note 287, at art. 13(2); Lawand, supra note 312, at 549-558.
356 See Lapidoth, supra note 349, at 114; Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 349, at
587-95.
357 For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Lawand, supra note 312; see also
Eric Rosand, The Right to Return under International Law Following Mass
Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent?, 19 MICH. J. OF INT'L L. 1091 (Summer 1998);
Quigley, supra note 199, at 171 (refuting the arguments that the right of return under
international law does not address mass displacement).
361 U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts. Resolution 6 of 1968 states:
Mindful of the principle embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
regarding the right of everyone to return to his own country... 2. Affirms the
right of all the inhabitants who have left since the outbreak of hostilities in the
Middle East to return and that the Government concerned should take the
necessary measures in order to facilitate the return of those inhabitants to their
own country without delay.
Question of Human Rights in the Territories Occupied as a Result of Hostilities in the
Middle East, U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/6 (1968). See also
Resolution 10, which affirms the principle and:
Further calls upon Israel immediately: (d) to ensure the immediate return of
deported and transferred persons to their homes without any formalities the ful-
fillment of which would render their return impossible.
Question of Human Rights in the Territories Occupied as a Result of Hostilities in the
Middle East, U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/10 (1970). See also
Resolution No. 6A (XXXI) (1975), reprinted in II UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON
PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1975-1981 207-09 (Regina S. Sherif
ed., 1988) ("Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Arab people to return to their
homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted and calls for
their return").
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Under humanitarian law, codified in the Hague Regulations, 359 the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal,360 the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court,3
6 ' and the Fourth Geneva Convention,
362
there are very clear provisions prohibiting forcible expulsion and
affirming that persons forced from their homes due to hostilities have the
right to repatriate. Articles 45,363 49,364 134,365 and 147366 of the Fourth
359 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 46(1),
annexed to Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 90 (1908) [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
360 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S.
279, at art. 6 (explaining "crimes against peace" in 6(a), discussing "war crimes" in
6(b). and describing "crimes against humanity" in 6(c)). "War Crimes" under article
6(b) include "murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory .... ." "Crimes Against
Humanity" under article 6(c) include: "murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population
before or during the war."
361 The Rome Statute classifies deportation or forcible transfer of civilians as a
crime against humanity when committed as part of a systematic attack against civilian
populations. It classifies the following as war crimes: "unlawful deportation or
transfer..."; "The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of
its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer
of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this
territory"; "ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to
the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons
so demand .... Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 7-8, U.N.
DOC. A/CONF/183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999.
362 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
363 "Protected persons shall not be transferred to a Power which is not a party to
the Convention. This provision shall in no way constitute an obstacle to the
repatriation of protected persons, or to their return to their country of residence after
the cessation of hostilities." Id. at art. 45.
364 "Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected
persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of
any country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. Nevertheless,
the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the
security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such
evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the
bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to
avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their
homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased."
Id. at art. 49.
365 "The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour, upon the close of hostilities or
occupation, to ensure the return of all internees to their last place of residence, or to
facilitate their repatriation." Id. at art. 134.
366 Article 147 classifies as "grave breaches... those involving the following acts, if
committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: ...
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Geneva Convention expressly prohibit expulsion and require return of
any persons leaving areas of conflict, whether forcibly or otherwise.
These principles are extended to non-international armed conflict situa-
tions under Protocol II of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
367
The right of return is, thus, fundamental to the rights framework estab-
lished through the interrelated provisions and mandates of the UNCCP,
UNHCR, UNRWA, and the Refugee and Stateless Conventions for the
benefit of Palestinians as refugees and stateless persons. Accurately inter-
preted, the regime of UNCCP, UNRWA, and article 1D of the Refugee
Convention was designed to guarantee that Palestinian refugees would at
all times receive both protection and assistance, whether from the two
other U.N. agencies, or from UNHCR (preferably in combination with
UNRWA). Article ID of the Refugee Convention was meant to ensure
that if the twin agency regime of UNRWA/UNCCP were to fail in either
of its functions, the Refugee Convention would automatically cover Pal-
estinian refugees as an entire group or category, without the necessity of
applying the individualized definition of refugee in article IA(2). Since
the Refugee Convention only obliges states to respect the principle of
non-refoulement, states are free to grant refugees any additional status
they choose, whether asylum, temporary protection, or some other form
of more permanent status.
However, article 1D mandates that in the Palestinian case, states must
grant "the benefits of [the] Convention" to these refugees pending "the
position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the
relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations."368 This language has several implications. First, once article ID
is triggered, states are required to grant Palestinian refugees protection,
or "the benefits of this Convention." '369 Second, states are required to
grant protection to Palestinian refugees only until their position is settled
unlawful deportation or transfer ... or a protected person... " Id. at art. 147. Grave
breaches under the Four Geneva Conventions trigger international responsibility to
remedy the breach and to try the transgressing state or authority for criminal acts in
any state jurisdiction. Id. at arts. 146, 148.
367 Article 17 of Protocol II reads:
1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons
related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative
military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all
possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be
received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and
nutrition. 2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for
reasons connected with the conflict.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, art. 17, 1125
U.N.T.S. at 609.
368 See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1D, 189 U.N.T.S. at 156 (emphasis
added).
369 Id.
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according to the relevant U.N. resolutions. The relevant resolutions
clearly center on U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194(111), which
embodies the consensus of refugee repatriation and compensation. This is
primarily because the drafting history of article ID makes clear that the
drafters intended to create-and did create-the special protection
regime with an agreed upon durable solution, and mandated both a pri-
mary and an alternative body to bring about that solution, the UNCCP
and UNHCR.7 ° Third, such protection should be consistent with the
international legal rights of refugees both to return to their places of ori-
gin and to choose the appropriate solution for their plight.
371
States, then, are obligated to extend protection to Palestinians until a
comprehensive durable solution is found under the framework of U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 194 and the body of law it codifies. Such
protection need only be temporary and consistent with the Refugee Con-
vention regime that places no greater burden on a state than non-refoule-
ment over time. The obligation to provide protection may be affected by
the article IC cessation clauses and the article 1E exclusion clause, as
there is no evidence that they are inapplicable to Palestinians brought
under Convention coverage by article D. 72 The following three subsec-
tions of article IC are arguably relevant to the Palestinian case: article
1C(3), 373 article IC(5), and article IC(6).37 a However, although these
370 See TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 65-67; Akram & Rempel, supra note 243,
at 31-36.
371 See Akram & Rempel, supra note 243, at 45-65.
372 See TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 128. Similarly, Palestinians seeking refugee
status would be subject to the exclusion clauses found in article 1F. Discussion of this
issue is beyond the scope of this paper, and not directly relevant to the argument for
temporary protection.
311 Article 1C(3) states that the Refugee Convention ceases to apply if a refugee
"has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new
nationality." See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1C(3), 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.
Nevertheless, for consideration of the applicability of the cessation clauses in general,
as discussed below, many Palestinian refugees who were born or lived in Jordan have
been able to acquire Jordanian citizenship under the Jordanian Nationality Law of
1954. Palestinian refugees have also obtained citizenship in limited numbers in Iraq,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and a few other states in the Arabian Gulf. See
TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 149-71. Far greater numbers of Palestinians in the
Arab states have a wide range of identity, travel and other documents, including
'temporary passports', which do not grant them either residence or citizenship. In
examining whether grants of citizenship in these states triggers article 1C(3), both
factors of acquiring nationality, and enjoying the protection of the new state must
exist. On the acquisition of nationality, the UNHCR Handbook makes clear that
possession of a passport creates a prima facie presumption of nationality, but that a
person claiming not to have nationality "must substantiate his claim, for example, by
showing that the passport is a so-called "passport of convenience." See UNHCR
HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at para. 19. Many of those Palestinians carrying passports
of their countries of habitual residence are not considered citizens with rights equal to
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non-Palestinian nationals. For example, Jordan has issued both passports and
'residence cards' for time-limited periods. Jordan has also withdrawn grants of
citizenship to groups of Palestinians in the past. See infra note 577. On the enjoyment
of protection of the new country of nationality, three points are important for
analyzing article 1C(3). First, the Arab states never intended to permanently resettle
the Palestinians in their territories. It was the Arab states delegates that introduced
both amendments that became article 1D in the Refugee Convention. The Arab states
conceded to establishing Palestinian refugee camps in their territories as a temporary
measure. This was consistent with their policy of not prejudicing the Palestinians'
demands to return, and with the many U.N. Resolutions reaffirming the Palestinians'
right to return, restitution and compensation. See supra notes 310-320 and
accompanying text. Second, the Arab states entered into a series of agreement and
issued domestic legislation as a result of League of Arab States Council Resolutions
making clear that their grants of travel, work and identity documents to Palestinians
were not intended as grants of citizenship, nationality or permanent status. See supra
notes 95-105 and accompanying text. Third, the lack of effective protection by the
Arab states has meant both discriminatory laws and regulations affecting Palestinians'
fundamental rights as well as extreme vulnerability to persecution by both state and
non-state actors. See supra notes 516-551 and accompanying text. For example,
between 800 and 3000 Palestinian refugees were massacred in Lebanon by Lebanese
Christian Phalangist militia in 1982 while Israeli soldiers stood by. For a description of
this event, see International Campaign for Justice for the Victims of Sabra and
Shatila, The Sabra and Shatila Massacre, http://www.indictsharon.net (last visited
Apr. 30, 2004). See also Reuters, Beirut Palestinians Recall Sabra, Shatila Massacre
(Sept. 16, 2000), available at http://www.cnn.com/2000 WORLD/meast/09/16/
palestinians.anniversary.reut/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2003); LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
ISRAEL: A COUNTRY STUDY 265 (Helen Metz ed., 1990) (describing the "Black
September" massacre in Jordan). For accounts of Israeli invasions and military
operations in Lebanon, see Human Rights Watch, Israel/Lebanon, "Operation Grapes
of Wrath" The Civilian Victims, Human Rights Watch Publications Vol. 9, No. 8
(1997), http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/isrleb/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2003) (detailing a
deadly campaign by Israel to forcibly displace the civilians in South Lebanon in 1996
and describing the massacre at Qana, where the IDF slaughtered civilian refugees,
then dropped crater bombs to destroy roads leading to the camps of the victims,
severely hindering humanitarian assistance).
314 Articles 1C(5) and (6), are considered together because they both refer to the
effects of changed circumstances in the country from which the person has fled
claiming persecution, 1C(5) referring to persons with a nationality, and 1C(6)
referring to persons who are stateless. Both require cessation of Convention coverage
if circumstances have changed in the state of claimed persecution such that there is no
longer a basis of persecution. See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, arts. IC(5)-(6),
189 U.N.T.S. at 154. These changed circumstances provisions are applied much more
frequently under the Refugee Convention than the 'voluntary re-availment'
provisions discussed above. See Sopf, supra note 35, at 127, 151. Under current
interpretations and applications of article 1A(2) and article 1D to Palestinians, these
clauses would apply to individual Palestinian asylum applicants claiming persecution
from any state of last residence when conditions changed such that a persecution
claim was no longer viable. See supra note 239. However, as discussed above, the
authors contend that these interpretations are incorrect, and article 1D requires prima
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provisions may be applicable to Palestinians seeking asylum, subject to
appropriate interpretation under the second sentence of article 1D, 75
they are not necessarily applicable to considerations of a grant of tempo-
rary protection-as reflected by state practice through existing temporary
protection models.376 In other words, the language of article 1D provides
a separate "'cessation clause" for Palestinians it covers that alters the
time when Refugee Convention protection terminates. We propose a har-
monized temporary protection program that is directly connected to a
comprehensive durable solution based on the legal principles of return,
restitution, and compensation through shared state responsibility. With
such a program, cessation will be clearly defined by the existence of a
comprehensive peace plan based on these principles, 77 and temporary
protection in the meantime will be granted on a prima facie basis without
necessity for individual asylum status determinations.
The exclusion clause of article IE may preclude Palestinians from cov-
erage under the Refugee Convention. Article 1E excludes from the Con-
vention anyone who has "the rights and obligations attached to the
possession of nationality of the country of residence., 37 Article 1E indi-
cates that protection under the Convention is not called for where some-
thing approaching national protection is otherwise available. 79 Article
facie refugee recognition for all Palestinian refugees and stateless persons, subject to
the limitations of article 1E, without the individualized persecution assessment of
article 1A(2). Moreover, a temporary protection regime that is consistent with article
1D requires that the TP status be terminated only when a comprehensive and durable
solution is found for the Palestinian refugee situation. Changed circumstances for an
individual Palestinian vis-A-vis a state of last habitual residence should be irrelevant to
cessation of TP status in the context of the protection offered under article 1D. See
Akram & Rempel, supra note 243, at 45-65.
375 The cessation clauses are restrictive, and accurate interpretation is essential
given the complexities of the Palestinian situation. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra
note 37, at para. 116 (stating the cessation clauses are "negative in character and are
exhaustively enumerate. They should therefore be interpreted restrictively, and no
other reasons may be adduced by way of analogy to justify the withdrawal of refugee
status"). See TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 127-30, for an overview of the issues
arising from articles 1C and 1E relating to the Palestinians.
376 State practice shows that most states rarely terminate grants of asylum or
refugee status based on these provisions, so the cessation clauses are marginally
relevant to a discussion of a grant of temporary protection consistent with the
Refugee Convention. See Sopf, supra note 35, at 127, 151.
377 The optimal framework for a just and durable solution as part of a
comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian-Arab peace plan, consistent with the principles
articulated in this paper, are beyond the scope of this discussion, although the authors
make reference here to the basic outlines of a necessary framework on the refugee
issue. See infra notes 614-85 and accompanying text.
378 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art 1E, 189 U.N.T.S. at 156.
379 The Convention drafters intended this clause to exclude refugees of German
extraction who arrived in the Federal Republic of Germany and were recognized
2004] TEMPORARY PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 85
1E is also intended to be strictly interpreted.38 ° In order to be excludable
under article 1E, a person must be granted a status which in no respect is
inferior to that of a 1951 Refugee Convention "refugee." Otherwise, the
provision may be open to abuse.381
Regardless of the interpretation of the article 1C, 1E and 1F cessation
and exclusion clauses vis-A-vis Palestinian refugees, their application does
not affect the independent mandate of UNHCR toward refugees or per-
sons of concern to that body. Thus, even if Palestinian refugees are
denied Refugee Convention or Stateless Convention coverage, they
should be eligible for UNHCR protection concerning durable solutions if
the General Assembly extends UNHCR's mandate toward them. 382 Fur-
thermore, Palestinian claims to restitution, compensation for damages
and loss of property,383 and reparations for war crimes and crimes against
there as having the rights and obligations of German nationals. See Akram &
Goodwin-Gill, supra note 244, at 65 n.295.
380 See TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 130 (citing GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 2,
at 270).
381 GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 2, at 270. Thus, in situations where Palestinians
have been given rights of residency, or some form of protection in other states, such
rights must be compared with whether they guarantee all the rights the Refugee
Convention guarantees to other refugees. As discussed below, Palestinians have
benefited from generous laws in Jordan and Syria, which in many ways places them on
similar footing to the nationals of those countries. Even in Syria, however,
Palestinians do not have the right to vote, to buy most kinds of property, and the right
to own more than a single residence. In recognition of the Syrian position towards the
solution of the Palestinian refugee question-consistent with the unified position of
the Arab states-they are not considered Syrian nationals by the "competent
authorities" of the state. They cannot hold Syrian passports, and are issued
Palestinian travel documents. See infra notes 519-37 and accompanying text.
382 Currently, the UNHCR Statute precludes extending UNHCR's mandate
towards Palestinian refugees. See UNHCR Statute, supra note 9, at par. 7(c).
However, UNHCR has extended de facto protection activities towards Palestinians
outside UNRWA territories, and the General Assembly has authority to extend
UNHCR protection towards persons 'of concern,' as it has done in numerous other
refugee and refugee-like situations. See Akram & Rempel, supra note 243, at 13-14.
Moreover, UNHCR's recently-issued Note on the Interpretation of Article 1D to
amend its Handbook, explicitly recognizes the necessity of extending UNHCR
protection to this refugee population. See NOTE ON ARTICLE 1D, supra note 250.
383 Provisions in human rights instruments to which Israel is a party expressly
protect the right to property, and to restitution of wrongfully confiscated property.
See CERD, supra note 69, art. 5(d)(v), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220 (protecting the right to
property); ICESCR, supra note 67, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5 (prohibiting
discrimination in property rights and the right to means of subsistence); ICESCR,
supra note 67, art. 11(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 7 (protecting the right to adequate housing
and prohibiting illegal government interference in rights to one's housing). See also
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims
of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, U.N. ESCOR
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humanity,3 8 4 remain independently grounded in general international
law, humanitarian, and human rights law principles regardless of any spe-
cific refugee law provisions or state practice.
385
IV. THE EXISTING REGIONAL APPROACH TO TEMPORARY
PROTECTION, ITS FAILURES, AND PRINCIPLES NECESSARY
FOR A RIGHTS-BASED FRAMEWORK
Temporary protection, granted by states toward persons who may or
may not fall within the 1951 Refugee Convention definition but are
deserving of international protection, although relatively recent in terms
of a recognized or formalized status, is not a new concept. It has prece-
dents in temporary refuge, or safe haven, and has been extended in
response to large-scale humanitarian emergencies such as in Southeast
Asia, where surrounding states accepted, on a de facto basis, the presence
of thousands of Vietnamese and Cambodians fleeing conflict;38 6 in Paki-
Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 56th Sess., Annex, Provisional Agenda Item 11(d), U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/62 (2000) (affirming the right to restitution). Under article 21, states
must provide victims the following: "restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition." Id. Under article 22, restitution must
include "restoration of liberty, legal rights, social status, family life and citizenship;
return to one's place of residence; and restoration of employment and return of
property." Id. Under customary international law, property rights are also of a
fundamental character. See UDHR, supra note 287, at art. 17; CERD, supra note 69,
art. 5(d)(v), 660 U.N.T.S. at 220; American Convention of Human Rights, supra note
320, at art. 21; African Charter, supra note 321, arts. 14, 21(a), 21 I.L.M. at 61-62;
ECHR, supra note 72, art. 1. Humanitarian law also protects the right to property
and restitution. See Hague Regulations, supra note 359, at arts. 23, 25, 28; Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 362, arts. 33, 53, 147, 75 U.N.T.S. at 308-10, 322, 388
(defining as "grave breaches" the "destruction and appropriation of property not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly"). For a
detailed review of the human rights, humanitarian, and general international law
bases of property restitution and compensation, see Akram & Rempel, supra note
243, at 48-52.
384 See supra note 217.
385 Provisions implementing restitution of refugee property have been
implemented in most major peace agreements incorporating durable solutions in the
last 20 years. See, e.g., the Dayton Peace Accord, supra note 262, annex 7, 35 I.L.M. at
136 (providing that refugees "shall have the right to have restored to them property of
which they were deprived in the course of hostilities.. .and to be compensated for any
property that cannot be restored to them"); General Peace Agreement for
Mozambique, supra note 340, at protocol III, art. I (providing that "Mozambican
refugees and displaced persons shall be guaranteed restitution of property owned by
them which is still in existence and the right to take legal action to secure the return of
such property from individuals in possession of it."). For additional examples, see
Akram & Rempel, supra note 243, at 53-55.
386 See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 2000: FIFTY YEARS OF
HUMANITARIAN ACTION, 80-103 (2000) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN ACTION].
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stan and Iran which accepted approximately six million Afghan refugees
while war raged in their home country;. 87 and in Mexico and Honduras,
which temporarily admitted hundreds of thousands of refugees from civil
war in El Salvador and Guatemala. 88 Africa presents a compelling
regional model for temporary protection, as it incorporates a prima facie,
or group determination, refugee status for persons not meeting the Refu-
gee Convention definition, which does not necessarily create an obliga-
tion on the state to grant asylum. The 1969 OAU Convention
incorporates a provision for temporary protection, stating: "Where a ref-
ugee has not received the right to reside in any country of asylum, he may
be granted temporary residence in any country of asylum in which he first
presented himself as a refugee pending arrangement for his re-settle-
ment ....38 9 The OAU Convention expressly authorizes states to grant
either asylum or temporary status if an individual or a group meets the
Refugee Convention or a broader definition of refugee. 90 In the throes
of decolonization and wars of independence creating large refugee move-
ments,3 9 ' African states took the initiative to re-examine the realities of
refugee flows in their territories and drafted an instrument that incorpo-
rated both the Refugee Convention definition (without the geographic
and temporal limitations), and a much broader definition of refugee.
Article I(1) of the OAU Convention states the Refugee Convention arti-
cle 1A(2) definition, and then provides in article 1(2):
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seri-
ously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his coun-
try of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual
387 Id. at 115-21.
388 Id. at 121-31.
389 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
Sept. 10, 1969, entered into force June 20, 1974, art. 11(5), 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 48
[hereinafter OAU Refugee Convention].
390 All but four of the African states were party to the Convention as of June 24,
2002. See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, 189 U.N.T.S. at 137. The nonsignatories
to the Refugee Convention are Libya, Eritrea, Comoros, and Mauritius. Id.
391 The OAU Refugee Convention was drafted in response to the refugee crisis
created all over Africa by wars of independence, and ethnic conflicts following
decolonization. By 1965, there were approximately 850,000 refugees in Africa, the
numbers were growing rapidly, and it was quickly apparent that the Refugee
Convention did not apply to the majority of them. See HUMANITARIAN ACTION, supra
note 386, at 52. Until the adoption of the Refugee Protocol in 1967, the Refugee
Convention covered only those persons who were refugees before January 1, 1951,
and in many states, also covered only European refugees. According to the UNHCR,
the Refugee Convention did not apply to the majority of refugees the agency was
assisting by the mid-1960's. Id. at 53.
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residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country
of origin or nationality ... 392
This prima facie definition encompasses both groups and individuals, in
stark contrast to the individualized definition of the Refugee Convention.
The OAU Refugee Convention also incorporates a number of other sig-
nificant departures from the Refugee Convention. It clarifies and
strengthens the non-refoulement obligation:
No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as
rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel
him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integ-
rity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article
I, paragraphs 1 and 2."'
It incorporates an obligation of shared responsibility among member
states by providing:
Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum
to refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other Mem-
ber States and through the OAU, and such other Member States
shall in the spirit of African solidarity and international cooperation
take appropriate measures to lighten the burden on the Member
State granting asylum. .. 394
It also incorporates, for the first time in an international convention,
the principle of voluntary repatriation, stating: "The essentially voluntary
character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and no refugee
shall be repatriated against his will . . . . " Finally, although it does not
incorporate any obligation to grant asylum, it encourages member states
to "use their best endeavours consistent with their respective legislations
to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who,
for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their coun-
try of origin or nationality." 396 Africa continues to bear a large percent-
392 See OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 389, art. 1(2), 1001 U.N.T.S. at 47.
393 Id., art. 11(3), 1001 U.N.T.S. at 48.
394 Id., art. 11(4), 1001 U.N.T.S. at 48 (emphasis added). This language contrasts
strikingly with the non-obligatory burden-sharing provision found in the preamble of
the Refugee Convention. See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, pmbl., 189 U.N.T.S.
at 150-52.
311 OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 389, art. V(1), 1001 U.N.T.S. at 49. See
also HUMANITARIAN ACTION, supra note 386, at 57.
396 OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 389, art. 11(1), 1001 U.N.T.S. at 48. See
also HUMANITARIAN ACTION, supra note 386, at 57.
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age of the world's refugee flows and,397 until recently, managed to be
surprisingly generous given its relative paucity of resources.398
Armed conflicts in Central America caused mass refugee flows
throughout the region in the 1980s. Like Africa, the Central American
states responded by drafting a broader refugee definition for the region,
calling on states to provide protection not only to those meeting the Ref-
ugee Convention, but also to "persons who have fled their country
because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by genera-
lized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of
human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed pub-
lic order."'399 The Cartagena Declaration has found wide approval,400 and
has been incorporated in the domestic laws or policies of several states in
the region, 40 ' but has yet to be formally codified in a regional
instrument.402
311 UNHCR's figures reflect that Africa and Asia host the largest absolute
numbers of refugees (and persons of concern), and the largest percentages of the
world's refugee populations. See HUMANITARIAN ACTION, supra note 386, at 310.
Africa and Asia together host more than half of the entire world's refugee and
"refugee-like" populations. Id. For a detailed breakdown of UNHCR refugee
statistics, see HUMANITARIAN AcTION, supra note 386, at 301-25; see also Press
Release, UNHCR, Poor Countries Host Most Refugees; Rich countries Should Share
Burden, Says New UNHCR Statistics Book (Nov. 8, 2002) (on file with author)
(stating that "most (refugees) are concentrated in developing countries .... The fact
that seven out of ten refugees are hosted by low-income countries underscores the
responsibility of industrialized states to share in international refugee protection").
398 From the 1960's to the 1980's, Africa was considered a region where refugees
were treated with remarkable generosity. African governments permitted large
numbers of refugees to reside-some for long periods-on their territories. Large
numbers of refugees had secure living conditions, and were provided land and
resources for self-sufficiency. Many benefited from generous standards of social,
economic, and legal rights, and many were able to reside permanently and obtain
citizenship in host states, Moreover, there was broad respect for non-refoulement, and
voluntary repatriation was the norm. See JEFF CRISP, AFRICA'S REFUGEES:
PATTERNS, PROBLEMS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 4 (2000).
391 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, in 2 UNHCR, COLLECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER LEGAL TEXTS CONCERNING REFUGEES
AND DISPLACED PERSONS: REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS 206 (1995).
40 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the OAS General
Assembly have recommended the expanded definition for use in the region. See
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1984-1985,
OEA/Ser.L/II.66, doc.10, rev. 1, at 190-93 (1985).
40' For a review of states' actions adopting the Declaration, see generally Eduardo
Arboleda, Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin America: The Lessons of
Pragmatism, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 185 (1991).
402 Id.
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In 1980 and 1981, the ExCom issued two conclusions concerning tem-
porary protection in situations of large-scale refugee influx. 0 3 These con-
clusions recommended, in relevant part:
In the case of large-scale influx, persons seeking asylum should
always receive at least temporary protection; and ... States which,
because of their geographical situation or otherwise, are faced with a
large-scale influx, should as necessary and at the request of the State
concerned receive immediate assistance from other States in accor-
dance with the principle of equitable burden-sharing. 04
The UNHCR's proposals that states should grant temporary refuge or
temporary protection, pending durable solutions for refugees found in
their territories, evolved into various temporary protection statuses under
state domestic legislation.
In Europe, temporary protection was instituted in the early 1990s as a
widespread European response to the more than two million refugees
flooding Europe from the Yugoslav Republics due to the conflict in the
Balkans. °5 European practice for dealing with large groups of refugees
who either did not fit the Refugee Convention definition or were not
perceived as meriting asylum or long-term status was to grant various
kinds of temporary statuses: Duldung, or tolerated residence in Ger-
many;406 Exceptional Leave to Remain in the United Kingdom; 40 7 Provi-
sional Permission to Remain in the Netherlands; 40 8 or "B" or "F"
temporary residence status in other parts of Europe.40 9
403 UNHCR, Executive Committee, Conclusion on Temporary Refuge, No. 19
(XXXI) (1980) [hereinafter Conclusion on Temporary Refuge]; UNHCR, Executive
Committee, Conclusion on the Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of Large-
Scale Influx, No. 22 (XXXII) (1981).
404 See Conclusion on Temporary Refuge, supra note 403, at para (b)(i-ii).
405 See HUMANITARIAN AcrION, supra note 386, at 165. See also Matthew J.
Gibney, Between Control and Humanitarianism: Temporary Protection in
Contemporary Europe, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 689 (2000).
406 See Fitzpatrick, Flight From Asylum, supra note 47, at 49-50.
407 See Johan Cels, Responses of European States to De Facto Refugees, in
REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 187, 192 (Gil Loescher & Laila
Monahan eds., 1989) (describing temporary statuses offered de facto refugees in
Europe before the 1990s).
408 See Gibney, supra note 405, at 694; Karoline Kerber, Temporary Protection on
Germany: The Case of the Bosnians, http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/ueberfak/fzaa/
german/ veranstaltungen/mm2l/Kerber.html (last visited June 15, 2003); JOANNE
VAN-SELM THORBURN, REFUGEE PROTECTION: LESSONS OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS
198-200 (1998).
409 See Fitzpatrick, Flight from Asylum, supra note 47, at 21 n.33.
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As close to half a million Bosnians flooded into Europe4 1 at the height
of the harmonization and asylum restriction efforts,41' the UNHCR
sought to encourage appropriate humanitarian responses. It proposed
temporary protection as a means by which European states could absorb
the refugees in a manner that addressed their control and management
concerns. 41 2 As the crisis continued, UNHCR, as well as European inter-
governmental bodies, became increasingly concerned about inconsistent
and highly discretionary policies of temporary protection, and initiated a
series of proposals to harmonize temporary protection. 413 The UNHCR
Executive Committee adopted a series of instruments establishing guide-
lines on temporary protection,414 which European states considered as
reference documents.415
The E.U. Immigration Ministers first responded to UNHCR's efforts
and adopted the Conclusion on People Displaced by the Conflict in the
Former Yugoslavia at their 1992 meeting in London.41 6 This document
listed those individuals who should receive protection on a priority basis
and described the basic benefits states should offer such individuals until
410 UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: A HUMANITARIAN
AGENDA 208-09 (1997) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN AGENDA].
411 See infra note 502 and accompanying text.
412 HUMANITARIAN AGENDA, supra note 410, at 208.
413 See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, ExCom, Progress Report on Informal
Consultations on the Provision of International Protection to All Who Need It, U.N.
Doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.27 (1997) [hereinafter Progress Report]; UNHCR,
Comprehensive Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.96/830 (1994); Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note
12, at 294.
414 See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Executive Committee, International
Protection in Mass Influx, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/850 (1995); U.N. High Comm'r for
Refugees Executive Committee, Conclusion on International Protection, No. 85
(XLIX) (1998); U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Executive Committee, General
Conclusion on International Protection, No. 71 (XLIV) (1993); Conclusion on the
Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx, supra note 403;
Conclusion on Temporary Refuge, supra note 403.
415 See Commission Proposal for Council Directive, COM(00)303, at 251, 254
(describing minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass
influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between
member states in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof).
416 Press Release 10518/92 (Presse 230), Council of the European Communities
General Secretariat, Conclusion of the Meeting of the Ministers Responsible for
Immigration, Annex IV: Conclusion on People Displaced by the Conflict in the
Former Yugoslavia (Jan. 30, 1992), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00001095/01/
immigration-ministers.pdf (last visited May 18, 2004) (describing the meeting of
Ministers Responsible for Immigration in London) [hereinafter Conclusion on People
Displaced]; KALIN, TOWARDS A CONCEPT OF TEMPORARY PROTECTION 19 (1996);
Sopf, supra note 35, at 130.
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they could be repatriated in safety.417 In June 1993, the Immigration Min-
isters passed a Resolution on temporary protection for "particularly vul-
nerable persons" from former Yugoslavia,418 precipitating a policy change
in a number of countries that had not yet offered temporary protection to
former Yugoslav nationals.419 Following the Immigration Ministers' Res-
olution, the E.U. Council and Commission adopted a series of instru-
ments, first under the Maastricht Treaty4 0 and later under the Treaty of
Amsterdam,42' moving toward a framework for joint decisions on tempo-
422rary protection.
The European Council adopted a series of Conclusions, Directives, and
Joint actions from early 1999 to July 2001, including the following: conclu-
417 Conclusion on People Displaced, supra note 416; see also Sopf, supra note 35, at
130.
418 Council Resolution of 25 September 1995 on Burden-Sharing with Regard to
the Admission and Residence of Displaced Persons on a Temporary Basis, 1995 O.J.
(C 262) 1 [hereinafter Council Resolution of 25 September 1995] (citing Resolution
on Certain Common Guidelines as Regards Admission of Particularly Vulnerable
Groups of Distressed Persons from the Former Yugoslavia (1993), adopted at the
Meeting of Ministers with Responsibility for Immigration in Copenhagen); Karoline
Kerber, Temporary Protection in the European Union: A Chronology, 14 IMMIGR. L.J.
35, 43 (1999).
419 Hailbronner, supra note 47, at 88.
420 See Council Resolution of 25 September 1995, supra note 418 (discussing article
K.1 of the E.U. Treaty); Council Decision of 4 March 1996 on an Alert and
Emergency Procedure for Burden-Sharing with Regard to the Admission and
Residence of Displaced Persons on a Temporary Basis, 1996 O.J. (L63) 10 (discussing
article K3(2)(a) of the E.U. Treaty).
421 See Action Plan on Minimum Standards for Temporary Protection, 1999 O.J.
(C 19) 20.1; see also Proposal to the Council for Joint Action based on article K
3(2)(b) of the Treaty on European Union Concerning Temporary Protection of
Displaced Persons, COM (97) 93; COUNCIL OF EUROPE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,
REPORT ON TEMPORARY PROTECTION OF PERSONS FORCED TO FLEE THEIR
COUNTRIES 15-16 (1997). For an analysis of the European temporary protection
harmonization process, see Caroline Kerber, Temporary Protection: An Assessment of
the Harmonization Policies of European Union Member States, 9 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
453, 455 (1997). See also Kerber, supra note 418, at 43 (discussing the proposal as
amended in 1998).
422 These proposals included definitions, standards, and policies for temporary
protection regimes, including provisions for social security, housing, welfare benefits,
education, asylum, residence permits, family reunification and employment. There
was a great deal of support for the proposals within the E.U. bodies. See Commission
Proposal for Council Directive Laying Down Minimum Standards for the
Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as
Refugees, COM(01)510 final. However, no measures were adopted and the effort was
superseded by action taken by the E.U. under the Treaty of Amsterdam in the face of
a renewed refugee influx from Kosovo. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997 O.J. (C 340) (1997).
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sions on displaced persons from Kosovo;42 3 joint action to support assis-
tance to displaced persons from Kosovo; 424 a proposal for a Council
Directive on minimum standards;425 and finally, a Council Directive that
was issued on July 20, 2001 on minimum standards for temporary protec-
tion in the event of a mass influx.426
Since 1992, E.U. states have treated temporary protection as an urgent
issue, and the E.U. bodies have paid significant attention to temporary
protection.427 Nevertheless, it has been difficult for E.U. member states
to reach agreement on details of temporary protection, and the 2001
Council Directive provides only a very general outline of a temporary
protection regime. Thus, although the 2001 Council Directive forms the
"common basis" of the temporary protection regime in Europe, the
actual elements are found in the intergovernmental decisions, the instru-
ments mentioned above that have been reached at various levels during
the Bosnian and Kosovar crises, and in the actual implementation of tem-
porary protection within individual European states.428
423 Kerber, supra note 418, at 41 (discussing Council of the European Union,
Justice and Home Affairs, Conclusions on displaced Persons from Kosovo (1999)).
424 Council on Establishing Projects and Measures to Provide Practical Support in
Relation to the Reception and Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees, Displaced
Persons and Asylum Seekers, Including Emergency Assistance to Persons Who Have
fled as a Result of Recent Events in Kosovo, 1999 O.J. (L 114) 2 (adopting Common
Position 1999/290/JHA, Joint Action of Apr. 26, 1999).
425 Commission Proposal for Council Directive on Minimum Standards For Giving
Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on
Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts Between Member States in Receiving Such
Persons and Bearing on the Consequences Thereof, 2000 O.J. (C 311E), COM (00)
303 (2000).
426 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for
Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and
on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts Between Member States in Receiving
Such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof, 2001 O.J. (L 212) 12
[hereinafter Council Directive].
427 At the Tampere Summit in Finland in October 1999, the Council acknowledged
that the E.U. must reach agreement on temporary protection on an urgent basis.
European Council, Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions (1999),
available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm (last visited
Mar. 9, 2003). See also Gibney, supra note 405, at 696.
428 It is important to note that the Council Directive provides only minimum
standards; thus, state policies and practices will remain decisive of the temporary
protection status offered in any individual state, to the extent they are not
inconsistent with the Directive or Council and Commission action taken under it. The
Directive states: "It is in the very nature of minimum standards that member states
have the power to introduce or maintain more favourable provisions for persons
enjoying temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons." See
Council Directive, supra note 426, at preamble, para. 12. Moreover, state practices
and policies prior to the passage of the Directive may change in accordance with the
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Temporary Protected Status ("TPS") in the United States as a defined
legal status is also relatively recent. The United States has not exper-
ienced the overwhelming numbers of mass refugee flows such as those in
Africa or Asia.429 Nonetheless, in the last thirty years or so, thousands of
individuals, many fleeing civil wars and armed conflict, have sought ref-
uge in the United States. In response to large groups of refugees, or to
those not precisely defined as "Convention refugees" (those fleeing war,
natural disaster, or upheaval in their home states) the United States has
devised various types of statuses to provide short-term protection.4 30
From the early discretionary parole status offered to individuals fleeing
communist countries,4 3 ' to Extended Voluntary Departure ("EVD") for
groups of individuals from war-torn countries, the U.S. government
granted temporary humanitarian protection for people not qualifying
under the strict Refugee Convention definition. a32
Directive. "This Directive shall not apply to persons who have been accepted under
temporary protection schemes prior to its entry in to force." Id. at art. 3(4).
429 For a comparison of regional distribution of refugees and persons of concern
from 1950-1999, see generally HUMANITARIAN ACTION, supra note 386, at 310, annex
3 (comparing refugee distribution in 1989; North America, 543,200; Africa 4,811,600;
Asia, 6,819,100; and Europe, 1,213,300; with refugee distribution in 1999: North
America, 649,600; Africa, 3,523,100; Asia, 4,781,800, and Europe, 2,167,700).
430 Martin et al., supra note 47, at 548. Two additional mechanisms exist in U.S.
policy to provide short-term non-Refugee Convention humanitarian protection, pre-
dating TPS: Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) and nonenforcement of
deportation. Id. at 551-52. President Bush created the DED designation to prevent
removal of Chinese nationals during the crackdown on the student democracy
movement in 1989, and then issued an Executive Order incorporating DED on April
11, 1990. Id. at 550-51. DED was resurrected for Salvadorans in June 1992, and
extended through 1995. Id. at 551. Nonenforcement of deportation is simply a
discretionary decision not to act on final orders of deportation. Id. at 551-52.
Although it has meant that thousands of people have not been forcibly removed
despite final deportation orders, it has been used sporadically and more for political
expedience than for humanitarian reasons. See 1990 Stat. Y.B. of the INS 173; 1995
Stat. Y.B. of the INS at 77, 86-87. Neither DED nor nonenforcement of deportation
provides any reliable mechanism for temporary protection.
431 Colleen V. Thouez, New Directions in Refugee Protection, 22 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFFAIRS 89, 99 (1998). For a discussion on early forms of temporary
protection statuses, see Martin et al, supra note 47.
432 EVD was granted at the discretion of the Attorney General to groups of people
from particular countries where civil strife made it difficult for them to return.
Between 1960 and 1990, EVD was granted to Ethiopians, Ugandans, Iranians,
Nicaraguans, Afghans, Poles, and Lebanese. See BILL FRELICK & BARBARA
WISCHERMANN, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, FILLING THE GAP: TEMPORARY
PROTECTED STATUS 11-12, 28 (1994); Martin et al., supra note 47, at 547.
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Temporary Protected Status was finally incorporated as a distinct legal
remedy in the Immigration Act of 1990 ("IMMACT 90,,).433 Congress
passed TPS specifically in response to the pressure of thousands of civil
war refugees from El Salvador, in the face of mounting criticism of politi-
cally-biased refugee determinations that made it practically impossible
for Salvadoran claims to succeed 4 3 and after failed efforts to require the
Executive Branch to extend EVD to Salvadorans.aa5
Thus, temporary protection has emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as a
regionally-specific approach to the problems of mass influx and non-Con-
vention refugees. The common elements and significant differences in
three main regions-Europe, the United Startes, and Africa-will be
examined to determine useful parameters for a temporary protection
model. A number of different regional temporary protection situations
will then be used as illustrations of failure to be avoided in, and principles
to be applied to, the Palestinian refugee case. A detailed discussion of the
temporary protection type statuses granted Palestinians in the Arab
world then follows in Part V.
A. Elements of Three Temporary Protection Models: Europe, the
United States, and Africa
The main elements of each of the temporary protection regimes,
whether in regional or domestic instruments, intergovernmental discus-
sions, or state implementation, address the following questions: (1) Which
individuals are to be covered by temporary protection?; (2) What will be
the duration of temporary protection status and what measures will be
taken at the cessation of status?; and (3) What standards of treatment are
to be afforded temporary protection applicants? Very general compari-
sons can he drawn in the approach to these questions among the three
regions.
433 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 244(b)(1), 66 Stat. 163, 216
(1952), amended by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 302(a), 104 Stat.
4978 [hereinafter INA].
431 Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum-seekers sued the Attorney General for
politically biased asylum determinations that systematically disfavored their claims.
See American Baptist Churches v. Thronburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
Numerous commentators have criticized U.S. asylum and refugee policy as being
primarily driven by foreign policy and domestic political pressures. See, e.g., NORMAN
ZUCKER & NAOMI ZUCKER, DESPERATE CROSSINGS: SEEKING REFUGE IN AMERICA
(1996) (comparing differential treatment of Cuban and Haitian refugees); T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 1162-67 (4th
ed. 1998) (comparing treatment of Salvadorans to Nicaraguans, and Haitians to
Cubans); Kevin R. Johnson, Comparative Racialization: Culture and National Origin
in the Latinalo Communities, 78 DENY. U. L. REV. 633 (2001) (comparing different
types of "racialization" of immigrant groups, and the effect on immigration law and
policies).
" See Martin et al., supra note 47, at 550.
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1. Which individuals are to be covered by temporary protection?
In terms of who is to be covered by temporary protection, the Euro-
pean approach focuses on addressing cases of mass influx. In its June
1998 draft proposal to the E.U. on temporary protection, the European
Commission defined the intended beneficiaries as third country nationals
or stateless persons outside their country of residence who could not
return in safety and dignity. The proposal singled out as temporary pro-
tection beneficiaries: persons who had fled armed conflict or persistent
violence; persons at serious risk of being subject to systematic or wide-
spread human rights abuses; and people forced from their place of origin
by campaigns of ethnic or religious persecution.436
The Council Directive of July 2001 gives little guidance on beneficiaries
of temporary protection, but provides some basic definitions. It defines
temporary protection as, "a procedure of exceptional character to pro-
vide, in the event of a mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced
persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of
origin. '4 37 It further defines displaced persons as:
[t]hird-country nationals or stateless persons who have had to leave
their country or region of origin, or have been evacuated, in particu-
lar in response to an appeal by international organizations, and are
unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the situa-
tion prevailing in that country ... [and] in particular: persons who
have fled areas of armed conflict or endemic violence; ... persons at
serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or gener-
alized violations of their human rights."3
436 Amended Proposal for a Joint Action Concerning Temporary Protection of
Displaced Persons, COM (98) 372 final at art. 1(b) [hereinafter Amended Proposal].
The Amended Proposal also suggested that based on E.U. practice, the following
groups should be included in a formalized temporary protection model: persons
fleeing international or internal armed conflict facing serious risks to their lives,
physical integrity, and liberty if forced to return to their state of origin; persons facing
such risks due to internal strife or communal violence; persons fleeing genocidal
violence or similarly grave harm at the hands of non-state actors; and persons fleeing
severe natural disasters threatening their physical safety. Id. at art. 1(b)-(c). A
Resolution passed by the Immigration Ministers in June 1993 defined those to whom
temporary protection would apply as including persons who were in internment
camps; the seriously injured or ill; those subjected to sexual assault; and persons from
combat zones who could not return because of conflict or serious human rights
abuses. See supra note 418. See also Hailbronner, supra note 47, at 86-87. UNHCR
adopted this as a Resolution for Common Guidelines on Admitting Particularly
Vulnerable People from the Former Yugoslavia. See ELSPETH GUILD, THE
DEVELOPING IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:
ADOPTED CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, DECISIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS 293-309 (1996); Sopf, supra note 35, at 130.
437 See Council Directive, supra note 426, at art. 2(a).
438 Id. at art. 2(c)(i), (ii).
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Various kinds of temporary statuses were either instituted or renewed
to provide temporary protection to Bosnians in Europe. Between 1991
and 1995, when the Dayton Accords were signed, five states hosted the
largest numbers of Bosnian refugees fleeing ethnic cleansing and large-
scale persecution in the breakup of the former Republic of Yugoslavia.439
Between 1990 and 1999, there were 1,044,000 asylum-seekers from all ter-
ritories of the former Yugoslavia in Western European states.44 0 Euro-
pean states' definitions of individuals or categories benefiting from the
various temporary protection statuses ranged from broad definitions such
as "citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who had to leave their country of
origin due to armed conflict.. ."44 to very specific groups or individuals
439 Of the half-million Bosnian refugees in Europe, Germany extended temporary
protection to 342,500; Austria, 88,609; Sweden, 60,671; Netherlands, 25,000; and
Denmark, 21,458. Total recorded population of Bosnians in the E.U. is 584,017, as of
August 1997. Khalid Koser et al., Temporary Protection and the Assisted Return of
Refugees from the European Union, 10 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 444, 447 (1998).
440 HUMANITARIAN ACrION, supra note 386, at annex 10, 325.
441 Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia, Survey on the Implementation of Temporary Protection (1995)
(survey on temporary protection) (on file with author). Austria passed a temporary
protection law in July 1993, which broadly applied to "citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina who had to leave their country of origin due to armed conflict, who did
not find protection elsewhere, and who entered Austria before 1 July 1993 ...."
Temporary protection was also granted to Bosnians entering after July 1, 1993, but on
the condition that they presented themselves at an official border crossing, and were
allowed entry. There is no particular temporary protection eligibility procedure, as the
criteria are simply place of origin, entry date, and manner of entry into Austria.
Temporary protection recipients may separately file for asylum. Id. (discussing
Austria). Slightly more complicated than Austria's provisions, Belgium's Aliens Act
of 1980 was amended in 1993 to incorporate a temporary protection scheme
(displaced persons' status) with two additional policy changes. Beneficiaries of the
temporary protection status are identified as persons from the former Yugoslavia of
any nationality present in Belgium since 1991. Under the first policy change of 1992,
this group was identified as persons coming from a combat zone or belonging to a
threatened religious or ethnic minority, as well as conscientious objectors and draft-
evaders. The second policy change, the Minister of Interior Note of September 1993,
listed additional cumulative criteria granting "displaced persons' status" to Bosnian
Muslims who have "fled their area of origin for reasons other than those foreseen in
article 1A(2) of the [Refugee Convention] and who could not remain in their area of
origin because of the prevailing dangerous situation there." The policy excluded
Kosovars, FYR Macedonians and Croatians from the temporary protection scheme,
requiring instead that they apply for refugee status. Id. (discussing Belgium).
Denmark's Special Law of November 1992 granted temporary residence permits to
three categories of persons: (1) former Yugoslavians who needed urgent medical or
other treatment that was not available to them, who would be brought in by
agreement between Denmark and UNHCR; (2) former Yugoslavians arriving in
Denmark who fled due to war or similar disturbance and need temporary protection
and who have asylum applications pending; and (3) former Yugoslav nationals still in
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for whom temporary protection took different forms depending on which
category applied.442
In the United States, TPS is clearly not a response to mass influx, but is
granted to individuals from specific groups designated for the status, at
the discretion of the Attorney General, who come from one of the follow-
ing situations: (1) ongoing armed conflict, which poses a serious threat to
life or safety; (2) earthquake, flood, epidemic or other natural disaster
causing disruption to living conditions, and the government of the state
officially requests protection of its nationals in the United States on a
temporary basis; or (3) extraordinary temporary conditions preventing
nationals from returning home in safety, unless the Attorney General
finds that such temporary grant of protection is not in the national inter-
est. 43 The United States has designated the following twelve countries
for TPS status thus far: El Salvador, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Somalia,
Bosnia, Rwanda, Montserrat, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and
KoSoVo.
4 4 4
The African model of temporary protection also focuses on situations
of mass influx, based on its expanded definition of "refugee" under the
1969 OAU Convention that includes persons fleeing armed conflict. In
practice, African states have combined the two quite distinct regimes of
the Refugee Convention, with its individualized definition, and the OAU
with its group definition, in many significant ways. They have not, for the
most part, differentiated between one category and another in terms of
how long they will provide protection or whether they will respect non-
refoulement.
4 45
Yugoslavia needing immediate protection, who would be brought in by agreement
between Denmark and UNHCR. Id. (discussing Denmark).
442 Germany's temporary protection policy was probably the most complicated of
all the European states, as there was no single scheme for temporary protection in
place. Persons from Bosnia-Herzegovina falling under various categories, such as "ex-
detainees or particularly vulnerable persons," "individual guarantee of care and
maintenance," "medical evacuees," and "rejected asylum-seekers whose deportation
would pose a threat to life or liberty," would qualify for any of a number of statuses,
such as "Kontingent" or special admission quota, 3-month visa or toleration permit,
"Aufenthaltsbefugnis," or residence permit, "Duldung," or toleration permit, for the
categories listed above, respectively. Id. (discussing Germany). The UNHCR reported
in 2001 that Germany completed a draft revision to the German Immigration Law
and that Germany and the UNHCR were cooperating to determine whether the draft
conforms to international standards. See UNHCR, Mid-Year Progress Report 2001-
Western Europe 228 (2001), available at www.unhcr.ch. (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
443 INA, supra note 433, at ch. 477, 244(b)(1).
444 Martin et al., supra note 47, at 550.
441 Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note 12, at 283.
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2. What will be the duration of temporary protection status and
what measures will be taken at the cessation of status?
In the E.U. member states, the approaches to duration of status and
conditions at termination varied from offering more permanent status
after a set period of temporary protection 446 to required repatriation
when conditions in the place of origin were considered to be sufficiently
safe.447 European Union principles and practices have been tied closely
to UNHCR conclusions and guidelines in this regard, particularly con-
cerning safe return." 8 In assessing state practice in compliance with pre-
2001 recommendations on safe return and cessation of temporary protec-
tion, Khalid Koser's 1998 study illustrates by various measures the success
of the effort to harmonize temporary protection in the Bosnian case.449
446 Koser, supra note 439, at 450-51.
447 Id.
448 The 1998 Amended Proposal addressed the issue of duration of status,
requiring that "the situation in the country of origin allows a safe return ... under
conditions respecting human dignity." Amended Proposal, supra at art. 4(2)(b). The
commission's Explanatory Memorandum, attached to the draft proposal, describes
the human rights conditions that would satisfy a finding of safe return, including: the
right of free return to homes of origin; legal and physical safety; respect for
fundamental rights on a nondiscriminatory basis (including respect for family life,
freedom of opinion and religion, and property rights); basic assistance and shelter;
and a monitoring process to determine the condition of returnees and adequate
protection of human rights. Id. The Immigration Ministers' Resolution of 1993 also
addressed duration of status and conditions of stay in the host states, with the aim
that: "[P]ersons from the former Yugoslavia who are admitted to the member states
and given temporary protection are to return.. .as soon as the conditions in that area
make it possible to do so in safety." Ministers Responsible for Immigration,
Resolution on certain common guidelines as regards the admission of particularly
vulnerable persons from the former Yugoslavia (Copenhagen 1993), reprinted in
GUILD, supra note 436, at 293, 294; Hailbronner, supra note 47, at 87. The UNHCR
organized informal consultations on temporary protection, which drew similar
conclusions to those in the EC's Explanatory Memo. See Progress Report on Informal
Consultations on the Provision of International Protection to All Who Need It, 8th
mtg., U.N. Doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.27 (1997), reprinted at http://www.unhcr.ch (last
visited Mar. 30, 2003).
449 See Koser, supra note 439, at 447. According to the study, the majority of
Bosnians in Germany, Belgium, italy, and the United Kingdom still held temporary
protection status two years after the Dayton Accords were signed; elsewhere,
temporary protection mostly expired and more permanent types of residence status
were granted temporary protection recipients. In France and the United Kingdom,
although Bosnians still retained Exceptional Leave to Remain status, there was an
expectation that they would be given residence. The same was true in Italy and
Belgium. Id. at 450-51. The Koser study applied a "security of residence" test to the
Bosnian case and concluded that it was the combination of policies toward settlement
and return that determined security of residence of Bosnians in Europe. Id. at 449-53.
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In practice, few states deported Bosnians.450 The study concluded that the
vast majority of Bosnians in E.U. states received or were slated to receive
permanent status, with about 75,000 Bosnians estimated to have returned
under repatriation schemes since 1996.451
The Council Directive has now standardized the duration of temporary
protection, requiring member states to grant temporary protection for
one year. Unless automatically terminated (under article 6(l)(b) of the
Directive), this period can be extended by six month periods for another
year.452 Member states can apply to the Council for additional one-year
extensions.453 Under article 6, temporary protection terminates when the
designated time period has expired. It can also terminate by a majority
vote of the Council based on clearly established facts that temporary pro-
tection beneficiaries can return to their place of origin in safety. 454 In
article 21, the Directive requires states to make voluntary return possible
450 In 1998, all states other than Germany, had deported approximately 305
Bosnians. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Office of the Special Envoy and Former
Yugoslavia Liaison Unite, Information Notes 1, November-December (1998)
[hereinafter UNHCR Information Notes]. In 1997, Germany deported 968 people to
Bosnia-Herzegovina alone and in 1998, another 1,809. MATTHEW J. GIBNEY &
RANDALL HANSEN, DEPORTATTION AND THE LIBERAL STATE: THE FORCIBLE
RETURN OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND UNLAWFUL MIGRANTS IN CANADA, GERMANY
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (working paper No. 77, 2003). Although a significant
overall number, it cannot compare either to those who have voluntarily returned or to
those Germany accepted. Germany was heavily criticzed when it became the first
state to begin repatriating Bosnians. Germany's actions were considered
extraordinary because the return program violated the UNHCR standards and
UNHCR participation, and because Germany entered into a bilateral agreement with
Bosnia without consulting UNHCR. Against UNHCR's advice, German Lander
interior ministers agreed on October 1, 1996, to begin returns. AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, "WHO'S LIVING IN MY HOUSE?:" OBSTACLES TO THE SAFE RETURN
OF REFUGEES AND DISPLANCED PEOPLE (1997), at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.
nsf/index/EUR630011997 (last visted Jan. 25, 2003). Amnesty International claimed
that "temporary protection is being revoked by the German authorities without
reference to international standards for the protection of refugees." Id. at 15-16. The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom acted consistently with the UNHCR on safe
returns, but also encouraged voluntary return through different mechanisms. Id. at 16.
For example, the United Kingdom funded visits for refugees to see for themselves
whether conditions were safe for return. Germany and the Netherlands also funded
such efforts. Koser, supra note 439, at 457. Germany also gave financial assistance
packages to returnees. Id. at 457 tbl. 7. In a "negative incentive" effort, Austria,
Denmark, Italy, and Greece reduced the social and economic benefits for refugees
remaining past a temporary protection status grant, seeking to encourage
repatriation. Koser, supra note 439, at 457.
451 Koser, supra note 439, at 448.
452 Council Directive, supra note 426, at ch. II, art. 4(1).
453 Id. at art. 4(2).
454 Id. at art. 6(1), (2).
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when temporary protection is terminated, but to "ensure that the provi-
sions governing voluntary return of persons enjoying temporary protec-
tion facilitate their return with respect for human dignity."45 It also
requires states to consider humanitarian reasons making return "impossi-
ble or unreasonable in specific cases." '456
In the United States, the Attorney General has complete discretion
over TPS determinations, but once such a determination is made, it
applies to all nationals of that state if they entered the United States by
the specific cut-off date given with the designation.5 7 Temporary Protec-
tion Status designations can, and have been, renewed, but the strict cut-
off date means that TPS is not a response to ongoing refugee flows. 458
Moreover, TPS is not perceived by the United States as a means of mov-
ing large groups of individuals into permanent status, 459 although it has
been difficult in practice for the United States to enforce removals at the
cessation of the TPS period.46°
It is difficult to draw clear conclusions on African practice concerning
the duration and conditions at cessation of temporary status, as it varies
significantly from state to state.46' Whether due to cultural attitudes, the
normative standards of the refugee and human rights instruments binding
African states, or perceived absence of options, African states have
shown remarkable tolerance in hosting lengthy stays by putative refu-
gees. 462 Despite major problems of security, armed insurgents in refugee
camps, and environmental and other resource pressures, African states
have incorporated UNHCR standard-setting on the issues of duration of
protection and cessation of status in durable solution plans. However,
455 Id.at ch. V, art. 22(1).
456 Id. at ch. V, arts. 22, 23.
457 INA, supra note 433, ch. 477, 244(c).
458 See Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note 12, at 285 (noting
that because of the ongoing Kosovo situation, the United States granted refugee
status to Kosovars rather than designate them as TPS recipients).
459 Id. (noting that the United States does not grant TPS in mass refugee
situations, but applies various policies such as containment and/or status
determinations outside its territory, or admits some people as refugees).
460 See Michael. S. Tietelbaum, Immigration, Refugees and Foreign Policy, INT'L
ORG. 38:3, 64 (1985).
461 See Jeremy R. Tarwater, Analysis and Case Studies of the "Ceased
Circumstances" Cessation Clause of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 15 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 563 (2001) (using illustrations from Africa as well as other regions to argue that
the majority of host country repatriations in the 1990s, although termed "voluntary,"
were primarily coercive and that UNHCR guidelines purportedly based on the
Refugee Convention cessation clauses are unworkable because states fail to comply
with the requirement that conditions in the home state be durable and stable before
repatriating refugees).
462 See Paul Kuruk, Asylum and the Non-Refoulement of Refugees: The Case of the
Missing Shipload of Liberian Refugees, 35 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 313, 331-37 (1999).
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implementation of the required standards has been heavily criticized.
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For example, the Plan of Action adopted at the OAU/UNHCR Regional
Conference on Refugees in the Great Lakes Region incorporated inter-
national standards and UNHCR guidelines on repatriation and cessation
of status in host states.464 The participating states adopted principles and
guidelines on repatriation that included the following: (1) the right to
return safely to the country of origin; (2) voluntariness based on informed
consent; (3) scrupulous observance of non-refoulement; (4) access to
objective information on conditions in the home country; (5) adherence
to return in safety and dignity, based on UNHCR-established factors,
such as physical safety, humanitarian and human rights standards existing
in the home country, and monitoring by UNHCR of safe return; and (6)
respect for private property by the home country.465 The Plan of Action
also set specific requirements for each state to address particular
problems of humanitarian and human rights violations vis-A-vis refugees
and displaced persons.466 However, the prior African state practice of tol-
erating long periods of temporary status has more recently devolved to
repatriation under pressure;467 forced resettlement of temporary protec-
tion beneficiaries to areas away from border camps;468 refusal of entry to
463 The UNHCR and the OAU played major roles in the search for durable
solutions for refugees and other displaced persons in the Great Lakes Region during
the massive refugee crisis affecting Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zaire, Uganda,
Kenya, Zambia and Tunisia. Moreover, the plan incorporated specific reference to
major human rights and humanitarian instruments and formally involved the
UNHCR, ICRC, OAU, and the UNAMIR, as well as non-governmental
organizations in the durable solution process. See OAU/UNHCR Regional
Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced persons in the Great
Lakes Region: Bujumbura, Burundi (1995) [hereinafter OAU/UNHCR Plan of
Action]. Compliance with the standards has received criticism. See Tarwater, supra
note 461; Hathaway & Neve, supra note 34.
464 See OAU/UNHCR Plan of Action, supra note 463. The Plan of Action called
on the participating states to conclude Tripartite Repatriation Agreements with other
asylum countries and the UNHCR, following the examples of Burundi and Zaire.
465 Id. at Note on Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees para. 13.
466 See generally id.
467 See UNHCR, STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: A HUMANITARIAN AGENDA
(1997) (describing Tanzanian army's forced "redirection" of Rwandese refugees back
across the border); see also George Okoth-Obbo, Does Refugee Protection in Africa
Need Mediation? 9 REFUGEES, CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RES., No. 3, at 40-55 (2000),
available at http://www.queensu.ca/samp/migdocs/Documents/2000/1.htm (last visited
Mar. 9, 2003) (illustrating forced returns by Tanzania of Rwandese refugees and by
Kenya of Somali refugees, among others).
468 See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 34, at 127 (describing the Sudanese
government's forcible removal of Eritrean refugees from border camps and Mexican
authorities' forcible transfer of Guatemalan refugees from self-settled border areas to
internal camps, which involved physical violence as well as serious human rights
violations).
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or forced removal of temporary protection applicants to other neighbor-
ing territories;. 9 and forced confinement in armed or unsafe camps. °
African states have also implemented another strategy to contain refugee
flows that has drawn great criticism, the creation of safe zones within the
country of origin.47'
3. What standards of treatment are to be afforded temporary
protection applicants?
Standards of treatment concerning individual rights vary significantly,
both within each region and across the three regions under discussion. In
the European Union, many member states treat temporary protection
beneficiaries on the same level as recognized refugees,472 others grant
rights on an incremental basis,473 while still others grant full rights in
469 Id. at 124 (discussing the actions of Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and
Guinea in denying entry to boatloads of Liberian refugees suffering from lack of food
and water on overcrowded ships, and Zaire's forcible expulsion of thousands of
Rwandan refugees back to Rwanda).
470 Id. at 127 (illustrating insecurity and human rights abuses of refugees in armed
or restricted camps by host government authorities and non-state elements).
471 The idea of creating "safe zones" was incorporated in the Plan of Action for the
Great Lakes Region. Id. For a critique of both the practice and legal basis for creating
"safe zones" in Africa, see Rutinwa, supra note 46, at 9-11. For a discussion of the
failures of "safe zones" to protect individuals' human rights in the situations where
they have been established, see infra note 494.
472 In the United Kingdom, Bosnians receive Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR)
status, with rights almost identical to full Convention status, including freedom of
movement, full access to social security benefits, access to the national health system,
and immediate family reunification rights. Alan Travis, Last Refugee Flight to Land
Next Week, GUARDIAN, June 16, 1999, at 5; see also Gibney, supra note 405, at 698.
"Special ELR" entitles certain Kosovars and Bosnians to full income support. Those
on regular ELR receive ninety percent of income support and must wait four years
before they are eligible for family reunification. Neither type of ELR recipient can
receive travel documents. DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONDITIONS FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES (2000), available at http://www.
flygtning.dk/publikationer/rapporter/legalandsocial/indh/index.php (last visited May
18, 2004).
"I In the Netherlands, the main status for Bosnians and Kosovars is Provisional
Permission to Remain, with rights phased in over a three-year period. In the first two
years, temporary protection recipients can study Dutch, access the National Health
Service, secure limited work authorization, receive income support from
municipalities where they reside (which is lower than the national government
support provided to citizens), and have freedom of movement (but they must be
authorized by the municipality if they seek an allowance when they move). DANISH
REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 472. Denmark does not allow family reunification for
persons in temporary protection status. However, after three years a holder of
Provisional Permission to Remain can apply for family reunification, and at that point
is also granted full rights to work. See id.
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some areas but not in others. 4 The European Commission draft propo-
sal included a framework for harmonizing rights granted by member
states to temporary protection beneficiaries. The rights discussed were
family reunification, employment, social security, housing, welfare, edu-
cation, and residence authorization.475
The UNHCR's Progress Report linked rights under temporary protec-
tion to standards of international human rights in general. It urged a pro-
gressive improvement of rights according to the individual temporary
protection recipient's length of stay in the host state. The Report stated
that: "'The right to education, employment, freedom of movement, assis-
tance and personal identification should be granted without discrimina-
tion, while it is understood that any restrictions imposed must be justified
on grounds of legitimate national interest and must be proportional to the
interest of the state.
' 476
In the European Union's attempt to standardize temporary protection,
it has incorporated minimum standards of treatment in the 2001 Council
Directive. The Directive requires states to provide residence permits for
the period of temporary protection,477 to allow temporary protection
recipients employment or the chance to pursue professional activities,
education, and vocational training, and to apply the same general wage,
social security, and other employment conditions to temporary protection
recipients as to its residents.478 It requires states to provide suitable hous-
ing, social welfare and subsistence means,479 medical care,48 ° and access
to education for persons of minority age under the same conditions as
nationals.481 Possibly the most detailed provisions concern family reunifi-
cation and the definition of family members for purposes of family
474 For example, in Germany, the most common temporary protection status,
duldung, entitles one to the same level of social support as German nationals, as well
as access to national health provisions. However, an individual is not free to internally
resettle anywhere in Germany but is confined to the local district that accepts him.
DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 472; Gibney, supra note 405, at 697. Germany
imposes limitations on the right to work, and a temporary protection holder is not
entitled to family reunification except for "urgent humanitarian reasons," a condition
which is not satisfied if a family member has received asylum elsewhere. PHILIP
RUDGE, ECRE, THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION (1996).
475 Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note 12, at 303; See
Amended Proposal, supra note 436, at arts. 6-9. The Immigration Ministers' 1993
Resolution called on member states to provide decent living conditions, authorization
to work or appropriate social benefits, health care, schooling for children, and contact
or reunification for close relatives. Id. See also Hailbronner, supra note 47, at 87.
476 Progress Report, supra note 413, at para 4(1).
477 Id. at ch. III, art. 8(1).
478 Id. at art. 12.
479 Id. at art. 13.
480 Id. at art. 13(3), (4).
481 Id. at art. 14.
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reunification."a 2 The 2001 Council Directive requires states to grant resi-
dence permits under the temporary protection scheme to family members
meeting the definitions for family reunification purposes.
48 3
In the United States, a TPS recipient is granted work authorization
484
and cannot be detained on immigration grounds.48 5 However, TPS bene-
fits do not include eligibility for federal public assistance, and state bene-
fits are a matter of individual state discretion.486 In Africa prior to 1990,
refugee hosting states guaranteed basic rights consistently.487 In the
1990s, protection of refugee rights in Africa declined significantly. 488 The
focus on rights standards in Africa is on the most basic of elements: strict
respect for non- refoulement and guarantees of physical security.4 89 None-
theless, UNHCR's African Bureau has, as recently as 2001, reiterated
that host states must not focus solely on minimum standards in guaran-
teeing rights of refugees, but also on fulfilling essential needs that
increase over time.49 °
B. Lessons from Current Regional Temporary Protection Models
Temporary protection has operated both in the optimal context of
shared responsibility among states receiving the putative refugees and in
the context of burden-sharing, with stronger states in a region forcing
weaker states to absorb the bulk of refugee flows. 491 One of the more
482 Id. at art. 15.
483 Id. at art. 15(6).
484 See INA, supra note 433, at ch. 477, 244(f).
485 Id. at 244(d)(4).
486 Id. at 244(f).
487 See Rutinwa, supra note 46, at 7 (noting that during this period, basic refugee
needs were met, including family unity, economic opportunities, relative freedom of
movement within the host country, equal access to health, education and job markets
and, in some states, full access to social welfare and education systems, as well as
government job opportunities).
488 Id. at 14.
489 Id. at 14.
490 UNHCR Africa Bureau, Discussion Paper on Protracted Refugee Situations in
the Arican Region (Geneva 2001) (calling for a change from a "minimum standards"
to an "essential needs" focus premised upon essential needs implying a gradual
improvement of rights over time, which is more consistent with UNHCR and
international legal standards). The Discussion Paper also calls for promotion of self-
reliance, including full enjoyment of civil and socio-economic rights. Id. at 3
(emphasizing freedom of movement, access to job markets, self-employment, and
education in protracted refugee situations).
491 For commentators discussing burden-sharing as burden-shifting in the refugee
and temporary protection context, see Astri Suhrke, Burden-Sharing During Refugee
Emergencies: The Logic of Collective Versus National Action, 11 J. REFUGEE STUD.
396 (1988); Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17;
Hathaway & Neve, supra note 34.
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positive illustrations of how temporary protection can work to comple-
ment convention protection for refugees includes the CPA, initiated to
address the massive Indochinese refugee flows of the 1970s. The CPA was
initiated as a result of the shameful wholesale denial of non-refoulement
by the frontline states of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong, and
Indonesia, which refused to accept huge numbers of fleeing Vietnamese
and Cambodian boat people.4 92 The CPA was designed to prevent
frontline states from turning back the desperate refugees by implement-
ing an agreement for short-term temporary protection in those states,
with a longer-term obligation of states outside the region to resettle the
refugees and provide material assistance. 93 In a massive responsibility-
sharing effort, the frontline states permitted the refugees to remain, and
allowed resettlement processing by third states to take place in their
territories.
494
The CPA involved seventy governments and was one of the first exam-
ples of a commitment to multilateral durable solution mechanisms that
included the country of origin as well as stakeholders in the region and
third (resettlement) states. 495 The CPA incorporated the following five
important aspects: a process to stem unofficial boat departures while
increasing opportunities for legal migration under the Orderly Departure
Programme; institutionalizationing of temporary asylum to all those seek-
ing it in neighboring states until a durable solution could be found; guar-
antees of refugee status determinations for all asylum seekers under the
Refugee Convention and international standards; and, guarantees of
third-state resettlement for all recognized refugees and mechanisms for
repatriation with monitoring and assistance for safe reintegration.496
Despite acknowledged problems with implementation,497 the CPA is one
of the more successful examples of mechanisms including temporary pro-
tection that can ensure durable solutions for large refugee flows when
there is real commitment to shared responsibility among relevant states.
A different model of responsibility-sharing that involved organized ini-
tiatives of the refugee populations themselves was the repatriation and
return that took place in the context of the peace negotiations in the Cen-
tral American states of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua in the late
1980s. During almost ten years of civil conflict and proxy wars in Central
492 See HUMANITARIAN ACriON, supra note 386, at 82-88.
493 Id. at 84-91.
494 Id.
495 Id. at 84.
496 Id.
491 Some of the problems plaguing the Indochinese refugee situation, both before
and during the CPA, were forced returns, piracy, serious human rights violations,
reneged commitments, premature closing of camps, and anti-immigrant sentiment in
resettlement states. Id. at 82-103.
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America, over two million people became refugees.498 Hundreds of
thousands scattered across the region sought asylum in neighboring
states, in the United States, and in other countries. Less than 150,000
were granted refugee status in the region; the majority remained in tenu-
ous temporary statuses in refugee and internal displacement camps in
Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. 499 Even before the 1987
regional peace agreement of Esquipulas II was signed, groups of Salvado-
ran refugees in Honduras began self-repatriation programs of their
own.50° By the time multilateral peace efforts brought together the states
of the region, the United States, and the UNHCR at the 1989 CIREFCA
to draft a plan for durable refugee solutions, large numbers of Guatema-
lan refugees followed their Salvadoran counterparts and returned home
from Mexico.5 ' By the mid-1990s, all registered Salvadoran refugees in
neighboring states had returned home, and between 1984 and June 1999,
approximately 42,000 Guatemalan refugees repatriated on their own or
with UNHCR assistance.502
High refugee participation and voluntary choice were two significant
elements contributing to the durability of the CIREFCA process, which
lasted from 1989 to 1994.503 Additional critical principles in the success of
CIREFCA were the involvement of all states of the region, the commit-
ment to peace building in tandem with development, an international
human rights framework for the major aspects of the peace process offi-
cially monitored by the United Nations, and the critical role of local and
international non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"). °4 The process
involved coordination of national, regional and international action to
achieve lasting solutions to displacement and refugee flows in the entire
505region.
Non-formalized temporary protection played a critical role in the ulti-
mate durable solutions for Mozambican refugees who fled to Malawi,
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe between 1976
and 1992. Approximately 1.3 million Mozambican refugees remained in
Malawi for over a decade before the General Peace Agreement for
Mozambique was signed in October 1992.506 Malawi, one of Africa's
poorest states, and the sixth poorest country in the world, gave temporary
498 See HUMANITARIAN ACTION, supra note 386, at 136.
499 Id. at 136-37.
500 Id. at 137.
501 Id.
502 Id.
503 Id. at 136-43.
504 See id.
505 Id. at 141.
506 More than 1.7 million Mozambicans, out of a population of 16 million, became
refugees in the three decades of conflict in the country. Of these, four million were
internally displaced and approximately one million lost their lives. Id. at 148.
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protection to a refugee population equivalent to ten percent of its own
population. °7 Until 1987, Malawi permitted refugees to settle freely.
When numbers and resource constraints became overwhelming, however,
Malawi requested the UNHCR to construct camps where it required the
refugees to live.5"' As in Central America, the Mozambican refugees
began to return on their own before the peace agreement came into
effect. The repatriation process under UNHCR auspices began in
December 1992 and was part of a larger U.N. peacekeeping and peace
building effort.50 9
The UNHCR's repatriation and reintegration assistance in
Mozambique excecded that in either Central America or Cambodia. 510
Among the critical factors contributing to the durable nature of the
Mozambican refugee situation were the commitment of the host states to
providing temporary protection over a lengthy period, despite enormous
drains on their resources; the involvement of major international organi-
zations and donor states to post-conflict rehabilitation and develop-
ment;511 and the focus on community development involving former
adversaries to the conflict. 512 According to the U.N. Secretary General's
Special Representative in Mozambique, two of the primary reasons the
U.N. Operation in Mozambique ("ONUMUZ") was successful were:
"the strong will of the Mozambican people to build peace ... and the fact
that the international community had been willing to commit substantial
funds and other resources from the moment the peace agreement was
signed."513
Another example of responsibility-sharing arising out of an extreme
emergency situation was the 1999 airlift of Kosovar refugees into Euro-
pean states where they were granted temporary protection tied to a reset-
tlement plan for the longer term.514 The "humanitarian evacuation
programme" was initiated by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia ("Macedonia"), which had prevented thousands of Kosovo Albanians
507 Id. at 112.
508 Id. at 113. The large numbers of refugees and inadequate resources to support
them over such a long period led to severe problems for Malawi, including a negative
impact on the economy, environmental degradation (particularly deforestation), and
social problems. Id.
509 The U.N. Operation on Mozambique (ONUMUZ) included significant troops,
police, civilian monitors, and an Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination to
oversee reintegration and refugee/IDP assistance. Id. at 148.
510 Id. at 151.
511 The UNHCR, UNDP, and the World Bank, with significant funding from
donor states, committed to development and rehabilitation projects including roads,
schools, clinics, and "quick impact projects." Id.at 152.
512 Id.
513 Id.(citing A. Ajello, Winning the Peace: Concept and Lessons Learned of Post
Conflict Peacebuilding, International Workshop (Berlin, 1996)).
514 Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note 12, at 279.
2004] TEMPORARY PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 109
from fleeing into Macedonian territory. As a condition of admitting the
Kosovars temporarily, the Macedonian government insisted on rapid air-
lift of the refugees from its territory. The program resulted in the evacua-
tion of approximately 96,000 refugees to 28 states, primarily in Europe.515
Despite the creative solution it presented, the humanitarian evacuation
program raised concerns about states applying ad hoc standards of rights
and legal status. Nevertheless, the unprecedented relief effort in Kosovo
and engagement of large numbers of states both inside and outside the
region, provide another illustration of successful use of temporary protec-
tion in the context of shared state responsibility.
Critics of temporary protection point to recent trends that undermine
core Refugee Convention principles such as: harmonization of asylum
policies;51 stringent visa requirements and carrier sanctions; 517 bilateral
515 As with the Bosnians, Germany accepted the largest number of Kosovars for
temporary protection (14,700 people); the United States accepted 9,700; Thrkey
accepted 8,300; France, Norway, Italy, Canada, and Austria each accepted more than
5,000 refugees for temporary protection. See HUMANITARIAN ACTION, supra note
386, at 239.
516 The breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the Balkan conflicts took place at a
time when Western European states were undergoing an extensive reevaluation of
their asylum policies and reacting to the perceived threat of an influx of illegal
migrants in the guise of refugee claimants. See Fitzpatrick, Flight from Asylum, supra
note 47, at 27-28; Rosemarie Rogers, Western European Responses to Migration, in
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND SECURITY 107 (Myron Weiner ed., 1993). The E.U.
states introduced major structural changes to their asylum systems, which took two
basic forms: streamlining and harmonizing the asylum process itself, and creating
barriers to deter putative asylum-seekers from accessing an asylum adjudication
process in their states. See Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their
Common Borders, June 14, 1985, 30 I.L.M. 68, 73 (1991) (attempting to reduce
controls at common borders) [hereinafter Schengen Agreement]; see also Convention
Applying the Schengen Agreement of June 14, 1985 Between the Governments of the
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the
French Republic, on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders,
June 19, 1990, arts. 28-38, 30 I.L.M. 84 (1991) (governing state responsibility for
examining asylum applications and permitting an asylum-seeker only one opportunity
to seek asylum within any of the member states); Convention Determining the State
Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member
Staes of the European Communities, June 15, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 425, 428 (1991)
(incorporating the 1990 Schengen Agreement single-country application provisions
for adoption by all the E.U. states). The impetus for inter-governmental and E.U.
efforts in these two major areas came from the process of economic integration and
the move towards eliminating internal border checks to facilitate free movement of
goods and people within the E.U. treaty states. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb.
7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
517 The instruments introduced visa restrictions for persons coming from high
refugee-producing states. See Fitzpatrick, Flight from Asylum, supra note 47, at 33
n.89. also contained provisions which prevent asylum-seekers from filing claims in
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and multilateral burden-shifting arrangements; 518 interdiction 51 9 and
member states if they arrived through safe third countries. Id. at 33 n.91. In addition,
sanctions on carriers for transporting individuals without valid documentation for
entry were developed. Id. at 33 n.90. Finally, integrated data systems that maintain
detailed information about rejected refugee claimants for access by member states
were developed, the Schengen Information System (SIS). See Bernd Schattenberg,
The Schengen Information System: Privacy and Legal Protection, in FREE MOVEMENT
OF PERSONS IN EUROPE: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND EXPERIENCES 43, 45-51 (Harry G.
Schermers et al. eds. 1993).
518 Other examples of burden-shifting measures to avoid state responsibility
toward refugees include U.S. policies toward Haitians arriving by boat and, more
recently, toward Cubans. Despite its obvious attractiveness as a mechanism to deal
with mass refugee influx, TPS has not been used in the two most recent refugee
emergencies facing the United States: the Haitian and Cuban refugee flows.
Responding to Haitian boat people entering U.S. waters in the 1970s and 1980s, the
United States and Haiti entered into an agreement permitting U.S. interdiction of
Haitian boats, and the forcible return of those not qualifying as refugees. See
Agreement Between the United States of America and Haiti, Sept. 23, 1981, 33
U.S.T. 3559, T.I.A.S. No.10241. The Haiti refugee crisis of the 1990s was precipitated
by the 1991 overthrow of President Aristide in a military coup. Thousands of Haitians
fled the brutal repression that followed, many making their way to U.S. shores in
unsafe boats. United States interdictions escalated from 1277 before the coup to
36,500 between November 1991 and May 1992. U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard
Haitian Rescue Statistics (Oct. 3, 1994). On May 24, 1992, President Bush issued the
Kennebunkport Order, requiring the Coast Guard to interdict Haitians and return
them to Haiti without permitting them to make refugee status applications. Exec.
Order No. 12807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (1992). The Clinton Administration, after
apparently discussing a number of policy alternatives to the interdiction program,
rejected offering temporary protection to the Haitians. See Martin et al., supra note
47, at 554-55. Instead, the Administration sought agreement with other small states in
the Caribbean to allow containment and processing of Haitian asylum claims there.
U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 180 (1995) [hereinafter
WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY]; U.S. Dep't. of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and
Migration, Daily Interdiction of Haitian Boat People by U.S. Coast Guard and U.S.
Navy, 6/15/94-10/6/94 (1994). Ultimately, 20,000 Haitians were brought to the U.S.
Naval Base on Guantanamo, Cuba, where refugee processing commenced. By early
1995, the vast majority of Haitians either voluntarily repatriated, or were forcibly
removed to Haiti. Id. at 180. In marked contrast to the treatment of Haitians, Cubans
coming to the United States in the early 1960s had the benefit of a generous parole
policy, allowing them lawful entry and right to remain under the 1966 Cuban
Adjustment Act, which permitted Cubans to adjust to permanent residence after one
year of parole status. Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat.
1161 (1966). Over 600,000 Cubans entered the United States and obtained lawful
permanent resident status between 1961 and 1993. See Martin et al., supra note 47, at
555. In the early 1990s, however, attitudes toward the Cubans changed and, as large
numbers fled renewed unrest in Cuba, the Clinton Administration announced that
Cubans interdicted at sea would be taken to Guantanamo as a safe haven. Those
arriving in the United States would be detained. Id. at 556-57; see also ZUCKER &
ZUCKER, supra note 434, at 45-46. Some 30,000 Cubans were housed on Guantanamo
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summary exclusion policies;52 ° long-term detention or forced confine-
ment of refugees;52' and the creation of "safe zones. 5122 These measures
or taken to a U.S. base in panama City. See Martin et al., supra note 47, at 556. The
majority were paroled into the United States, while about 1,600 returned to Cuba and
about 300 were forcibly returned to Cuba. Id. at 558; see WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY,
supra, at 187. These two situations reflect the U.S. Administration's tendency to seek
ways to deflect large flows of refugees from its shores rather than to offer short-term
humanitarian benefits under domestic law or conduct refugee status determination as
required by the Refugee Convention. In the same manner, these two crises show that
the United States is not willing to use TPS as a response to mass refugee flows.
519 The United States has engaged in interdiction at sea of Haitian refugees since
the 1970s. The U.S. Coast Guard has forced asylum-seekers onto its vessels, destroyed
Haitian boats, and returned thousands to Haiti despite well-documented widespread
human rights abuses in that country. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 34, at 122. See
also Bill Frelick, Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return: First Asylum and First
Principles of Refugee Protection, 26 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 675 (1993); Arthur Helton,
The United States Government Program of Intercepting and Forcibly Returning
Haitian Boat People to Haiti: Policy Implications and Prospects, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 325 (1993). The US. Supreme Court held that such interdictions did not
violate the United State's obligations of non-refoulement. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). Recently, boatloads of Liberian refugees have been
pushed away from port after port in West Africa, and denied entry to many countries,
including Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Ghana, which in the past had
hosted thousands of Liberians fleeing civil war. The Liberian refugees remained in
unsafe, unhealthy, and overcrowded ships without adequate food and water for long
periods of time. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 34, at 124 (citing Jana Mason,
Liberian Refugee Crisis: Africa Reconsiders its Tradition of Hospitality, REFUGEE
REP. 1-10 (1996)).
520 Both the United States and European states have adopted procedures for
summarily excluding putative refugees at entry without offering full status
determination or due process review of their claims. The United States Codified
summary exclusion in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA].
European governments' approval of summary exclusion procedures are found in the
Resolution on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum of the Ministers of the
Member States of the European Communities Responsible for Immigration (1992),
reprinted in EUROPEAN CONSULTATION ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, SAFE THIRD:
COUNTRIES MYTHS AND REALITIES, App. C (1995).
521 Examples of forced confinement of refugees include the Vietnamese,
Cambodian, and Laotian refugees in Thailand, who, from 1979 to 1993, were forced to
remain in isolated and overcrowded holding centers where serious problems included
inadequate water and sanitation and lack of physical security for the refugees. Somali
refugees held in Kenyan camps were subjected to violence and rape by Kenyan police
and military. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 34, at 127 (citing AFRICA WATCH,
KENYA: FORCIBLE RETURN OF SOMALI REFUGEES AND GOVERNMENT REPORESSION
OF KENYAN SOMALIS, 1989).
522 Another recent trend undermining generous refugee policies is the institution
of "safe zones" within a country experiencing armed conflict and widespread human
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have the effect of forcing poorer states to bear the brunt of refugee flows,
and undermine a core premise of the Refugee Convention that responsi-
bility toward refugees is to be equitably shared among states. Distressing
examples show that temporary protection-at least as it is operating on a
regional level-has contribute to these negative trends in significant
ways. At the same time, it is clear that in many respects temporary pro-
tection has benefited persons who face significant risks to their lives or
safety, but who would not qualify for Convention coverage. Temporary
protection can also be viewed as complementary protection to the Refu-
gee Convention; or, as some commentators persuasively argue, tempo-
rary protection is exactly what the Refugee Convention requires.523
Despite the criticism temporary protection engenders, it has played a pos-
itive role in major refugee emergencies, particularly in the context of
committed responsibility sharing.
Assuming that the measure of success of a temporary protection pro-
gram is interim protection tied to ultimate return of the majority of recip-
ients, then the European experiment with the Bosnian program was
perhaps a failure. 524 If, however the measure of success is interim protec-
tion tied to a durable solution of the refugee's choice and implementation
of safe return, then the Bosnian experiment was surprisingly successful
(with the possible exception of the German actions).525
rights abuses. Under the rubric of an individual's "right to remain" in their homes,
refugee-receiving states have institutionalized "safe zones," often in tandem with
barring refugees from seeking asylum. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 34, at 137.
The creation of a U.N.-sanctioned "no-fly zone" in northern Iraq came about as
Turkey refused entry to Iraqi Kurds. Id. at 135. The Iraqi "no-fly zone" has prevented
thousands of Kurds from fleeing to safety in the wake of both Turkish and Iraqi
military operations. Id. at 136. The U.N.-patrolled "safe areas" were created in Bosnia
when European states initially implemented visa restrictions on Bosnians. Id. at 135.
Thousands of people who could not leave the "safe areas" of Srebrenica, Goradze,
and Zepa were killed by Serb troops in 1995. Id. at 136. France established refugee
camps for Rwandan Hutus in southwest Rwanda, preventing the refugees from
fleeing to Zaire, and at the same time denying them access to refugee determinations
in France. Id. at 137-38. When France abruptly abandoned the camps, thousands of
Rwandans were killed. See id. at 136-37.
523 James Hathaway argues that the Refugee Convention's obligation to grant non-
refoulement through time requires no greater status than temporary protection. See id.
524 See Sopf, supra note 35; see also Graf, supra note 17; Fitzpatrick, Temporary
Protection of Refugees, supra note 12.
525 See Hailbronner, supra note 47, at 81; Koser, supra note 439. Koser notes that
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom had no legal
provision for transfer of Bosnians granted temporary protection to more permanent
status. In Germany, when temporary protection expired for Bosnians, they were
"tolerated" under several other statuses pending decisions on deportation. In the host
states with the largest Bosnian influx, significant numbers applied for asylum, with
mostly negative results in Austria, Belgium, Greece, France, Italy, and the United
Kingdom; and mostly positive results in Denmark and the Netherlands. In Sweden,
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Thus, to be consistent with international refugee and human rights
norms, any temporary protection regime must apply a framework based
on rights principles that includes the following: (1) respect for the core
Convention principles: non-refoulement through time, access to refugee
status determinations,and access to durable solutions options tied to refu-
gee choice; (2) responsibility-sharing among states, involving implemen-
tation of multiple durable solutions options tied to refugee choice; and
(3) durable solutions driven by adherence to international human rights
standards, including absolute respect of the right to return in safety and
dignity, and implementation of incrementally-based rights tied to length
of stay.
V. AN ARGUMENT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY-HARMONIZED
APPROACH TO TEMPORARY PROTECTION FOR PALESTINIANS:
APPLYING RIGHTS-BASED PRINCIPLES TO THE
SEARCH FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS
A. The Current Status of Palestinians in the Arab States
Despite efforts by the League of Arab States to create region- wide
standards for the treatment of Palestinian refugees in the Arab world,
chronic protection gaps persist. Approximately 4 million refugees are
affected in varying degrees.52 6 Day-to-day security and human rights pro-
tection is particularly problematic in Lebanon, Kuwait, and other Gulf
states; 527 protection has been inconsistent in Egypt and Libya;528 and
the majority was processed as asylum-seekers immediately and were never granted
temporary protection. Id. at 453.
526 The distribution of Palestinian refugees in these areas is as follows: Jordan
(2,716,188), Lebanon (402,977), Syria (423,453), Egypt (60,114), Iraq and Libya
(112,177), Saudi Arabia (300,565), Kuwait (38,254), other Gulf countries (120,612),
and other Arab countries (6,333). See PALESTINIANS AT THE END OF THE YEAR 2002,
supra note 121, at 25. The figure is upgraded to 2002 based on an average population
growth of 3.5% per annum. The number of registered refugees in Jordan, Lebanon,
and Syria as of December 2002 is 2,493,105. UNRWA in Figures: Figures as of 31
December 2002, supra note 123.
527 In Lebanon Palestinian refugees face some of the most severe protection gaps
primarily as a result of political considerations concerning sectarian power sharing in
the country along confessional lines. The majority of Palestinian refugees are Sunni
Muslims. Integration of the refugee population is regarded as a threat to the sensitive
division of power between Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, as well
as Druze, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, and Armenian
Catholic. TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 162. Kuwait and other Gulf states strictly
control the presence of non-nationals, including Palestinian refugees. The situation of
Palestinian refugees in Kuwait and other Gulf countries began to deteriorate during
the 1980s. ZUREIK, supra note 116, at 35. During and after the 1991 Gulf war several
hundred thousand Palestinians in Kuwait came under heavy pressure and
administrative restrictions aimed at the rapid forced departure of Palestinians due to
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armed conflict in the region renews concern about basic security for Pal-
estinian refugees in Iraq.
529
Region-wide implementation of standards set forth in LASC resolu-
tions and the 1965 Casablanca Protocol is inconsistent. Only ten of
twenty-one Arab states have ratified the Casablanca Protocol.53 ° Saudi
Arabia, Morocco and Tunisia are not signatories.53' Several states-
Kuwait, Lebanon, and Libya-have ratified the Protocol but with reser-
vations. Kuwait does not accord national treatment to Palestinian refu-
gees with respect to the right to self-employment. 2 In Lebanon the right
to employment is subject to "social and economic conditions" in the
country; the right to leave and enter is subject to "applicable rules and
regulations"; and holders of travel documents must obtain a re-entry visa
to return to Lebanon.5 3 In Libya the right to employment is subject to
PLO support for the regime of Saddam Hussein during the war. TAKKENBERG, supra
note 98, at 159-62.
528 Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95, at 39. See
ZUREIK, supra note 116, at 35 (describing 3 phases of treatment towards Palestinians
in Egypt: 1) (1948-mid 1950s) refugees were settled in urban centers and accorded
limited employment opportunities; 2) (mid 1950s-mid 1970s) refugees accorded
national treatment; and, 3) (mid 1970s to present) refugees treated as foreigners). See
also TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 150-54; BRAND, supra note 114, at 43-63.
Refugees in Libya generally enjoy national treatment as set forth in the Casablanca
Protocol, however, implementation has been inconsistent. In 1995, for example, Libya
ordered all Palestinians to leave the country in protest against the Oslo political
process and in response to U.N. imposed economic sanctions over Libya's refusal to
extradite two men alleged to have been involved in the Pan Am attack over
Lockerbie, Scotland. Hundreds of Palestinian refugees, particularly those from Gaza
holding expired Egyptian travel documents and who had lost residency rights in the
Gaza Strip were stranded on the border between Libya and Egypt between August
1995 and April 1997 when Libya permitted refugees to remain in the country.
TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 166-67.
529 Supra note 157. See also TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 154-55. There are an
estimated 90,000 Palestinian refugees in Iraq. Refugee population by origin and
country or territory of asylum, 1992-2001, in UNHCR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2001,
REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND OTHER PERSONS OF CONCERN-TRENDS IN
DISPLACEMENT, PROTECTION AND SOLUTIONS, annex A.7 at 93 (2000).
530 Jordan, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Kuwait, Lebanon, and
Libya. The remaining Arab states joined the League after the Protocol was signed in
1969. On the status of Palestinian refugees in these host states, see generally
Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95. See also
TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 154-55, 167-69. For a list of current members of the
League of Arab States, and the states that joined the League after 1969 see id. at 376.
531 Tunisia did not attend the 1965 summit in Casablanca during which the
Protocol was adopted. TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 376.
532 Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95, at 35-36;
TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 376.
533 TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 376.
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the same conditions imposed upon other nationals of Arab states.3 4
LASC Resolution 5093, recommending that the "rules in force in each
state" govern the application of the Casablanca Protocol, significantly
weakened protection afforded to Palestinian refugees." 5 At least one
commentator has suggested that the Resolution "officially revoked the
Protocol, which has been superseded by the internal laws of each host
state. '5 36 However, other commentators question "whether member
states are able by mere recommendation to nullify an international agree-
ment which was officially ratified by the member states or to which the
member states became bound by other means.
5 37
Protection gaps vary from state to state. Despite the obligation to pro-
vide national treatment in the areas of employment, the right to leave and
enter, travel documents, and visas and residence, treatment accorded to
Palestinian refugees in Egypt, Libya, Kuwait, and other Gulf states is
often similar to protection standards accorded to all other categories of
foreigners. Standards in Lebanon, in particular, are below those
accorded to foreigners and do not meet minimum requirements set forth
in the 1951 Refugee Convention. In the area of employment, Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon are barred from employment in nearly seventy dif-
ferent professions due to nationality requirements and the principle of
reciprocal treatment applicable to foreigners.538 Palestinian refugees in
534 Id.
531 Under Reolution 5093 (1991), LASC amended paragraph 7 of the report of the
46th session of the Conference of Supervisors of Palestinian Affairs in the host
countries based on suggestions submitted by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Paragraph 7,
as amended, reads:
Having taken notice of the memorandum presented by the delegation of
Palestine, the Conference expresses the hope that all Arab states, in spirit of
brotherhood and solidarity, will seek to abide by the [Casablanca] Protocol
Relating to the Treatment of Palestinians, in accordance with the rules and laws
in force in each state, and calls upon the Arab states to overcome the negative
impact of the Gulf crisis, as regards the implementation of this Protocol in
respect of the Palestinian People.
The text of the resolution is reprinted in Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre
(SHAML), supra note 95, at 35.
536 Abbas Shiblak, Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in
Arab Countries, J. PALESTINE STUD., Spring 1996, at 42 (1996).
537 TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 149.
538 Decree 621/1 (1995), article 1 provides a list of jobs and professions "restricted
to Lebanese citizens only." Entry into professional syndicates and employment is
based on the individual having Lebanese nationality for a minimum of 10 years and
reciprocal rights for Lebanese citizens in the foreigner's state of citizenship. Petter
Aesheim, The Palestinian Refugees and the Right to Work in Lebanon: A Minor
Field Study (2000) (unpublished graduate thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Lund)
(on file with author) (citing Law No. 8/70, Mar. 11, 1970, article 5 in UNRWA
Handout on the Status of Palestinians in Lebanon). Lebanese law permits foreigners
to practice medicine, pharmacy and engineering in Lebanon, for example, if they are
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Jordan who arrived in 1967 or after are not officially permitted to
work,539 while refugees in Egypt and Iraq are no longer accorded
national treatment with respect to employment.5 a° In most Gulf coun-
tries, including Kuwait, work permits are tied to an individual employer
and are usually not valid for other employment.
541
In the area of residency, Lebanon imposes greater restrictions on Pal-
estinian refugees than it does on other foreigners.542 Moreover, Palestin-
ian refugees who arrived in Lebanon after the 1948 war are considered
illegal residents.5 43 Egypt requires Palestinian refugees resident in the
nationals of a state that applies the reciprocal treatment principle. See Law No. 8/70
(1970) (Leb.) (regulating the entry in professional syndicates); Law No. 1658 (1979)
(Leb.) (regulating the entry into Medical Associations). Generally, Palestinian
refugees are unable to acquire Lebanese nationality. Due to the fact that most
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are stateless, there is no possibility of reciprocal
agreements and no possibility of entry into professional syndicates or medical
associations. Under the 1969 Cairo Agreement between the PLO and the Lebanese
government, Palestinian refugees were accorded the right to work; this agreement was
unilaterally abrogated by the Lebanese parliament in 1987. It is estimated that only a
few hundred Palestinians are issued work permits. Law No. 17561 (1964) (Leb.)
delineates the prerequisites for a foreigner to acquire a work permit. Amendments
include Decision No. 289/2 (1982) (Leb.) and Decision No. 621/1 (1995) (Leb.).
Aesheim, supra, at 46, 48.
539 TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 162.
540 Shiblak, supra note 536, at 42.
541 The Kuwait government, for example, maintains strict control over foreign
employment. Kuwaiti employers are responsible for their non-Kuwaiti employees in
all financial and legal matters, including application for work permits through the
Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour. BRAND, supra
note 114, at 113. TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 158.
542 Souheil al-Natour, The Legal Status of Palestinians in Lebanon, 10 J. REFUCEE
STUD. 360, 364-65 (1997) (citing Ministry of Interior Decree No. 319, Aug. 2, 1962
[Arrete no. 319 reglementant les situations des etrangers au Liban]; Decree No. 136,
Sept. 20, 1969, placing foreigners in Lebanon on an equal footing excludes Palestinian
refugees; and article 4(e), concerning identification cards issued by the General
Directorate of the Department of Palestine Refugee Affairs). During the 1980s,
following the 1982 departure of the PLO, Lebanon imposed new residency
restrictions for Palestinians. Under the new procedures it is estimated that as many as
12,000 refugees were unable to return to the country. Supra note 157. In 1995,
following Libya's decision to expel Palestinians Lebanon imposed new travel
restrictions requiring Palestinian refugees resident in the country to obtain a re-entry
visa prior to departure. Supra notes 528, 533. Palestinian refugees holding Lebanese
travel documents and outside the country at the time were required to apply for a re-
entry visa from the nearest Lebanese diplomatic mission. In practice, however, many
found it difficult to obtain the necessary visa. TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 165.
Lebanon revoked the requirement of obtaining a re-entry visa in 1999. Palestinians in
Lebanon Welcome Cancellation of Travel Restrictions, 1 AL-MAJDAL 19, Mar. 1999,
available at http://www.badil.org/Majdal/1999/lm.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
513 TAKKENBERG, supra note 98.
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country wishing to travel outside of the country to obtain a visa in order
to re-enter its territory.5 44 In Kuwait, cessation of employment is grounds
for cessation of residency. 45 In general, entry to Gulf states for Palestin-
ian refugees holding Arab or foreign passports is difficult. 546 Finally, with
regard to travel documents, receipt of a valid travel document in Leba-
non is linked to registration with UNRWA or the LRCS.54 7 Refugees not
registered with either agency receive travel documents with a stamp indi-
cating that the holder is not eligible for return to Lebanon. 48 Palestinian
refugees from Gaza displaced to Jordan in 1967 are not eligible for
Jordanian citizenship and use Egyptian travel documents when traveling
abroad. Return visas are required to re-enter Jordan. 549 A substantial
number of holders of Egyptian-issued travel documents outside of the
544 Most Palestinians residing in Egypt hold temporary residency permits, which
are valid for one to three years. Egyptian law provides for three types of residency
status: special (valid for 10 years), ordinary and temporary. Law No. 89/1960, 18 Mar.
1960, O.J. 71 (1960) (Egypt) amended by Law No. 49/1968, 124/1980, & 100/1983
(relating to the entry and stay of foreigners and their exit from Egypt). TAKKENBERG,
supra note 98, at 152. BRAND, supra note 114, at 50-51. As of mid-1994 Egypt has
imposed entry restrictions on residents of the Gaza Strip, which was under Egyptian
control between 1948 and 1967. Entry is limited to students and persons requiring
medical care; special permission must be obtained from Egyptian authorities. Shiblak,
supra note 536, at 39-40.
-45 Residency in Kuwait may be acquired only at the request of a Kuwaiti through
the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. BRAND, supra
note 114, at 113.
546 Shiblak, supra note 536, at 42. TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 165. At the end
of 2002 Kuwait imposed new measures to reduce the presence of Arab nationals from
outside the Gulf region, including Palestinians, for so-called security reasons. Under
the new measures, persons from Jordan, the 1967-occupied Palestinian territories,
Sudan and Yemen will not be allowed to stay in Kuwait for more than three months.
Under the new regulations, Jordanians, Palestinians, Sudanese and Yemenis will be
given one-month visas for family visits in Kuwait. After that month, the visa could be
extended for up to two more months. At that point, the nationals would be asked to
leave the country. Those nationals arriving on business trips would be issued one-
month visas. Officials said these visas would not be renewed. Officials said other
regulations would be introduced for Iraqi nationals in Kuwait. Kuwait Restricts Stay of
Non-GCC Arabs, MIDDLE EAST NEWSLINE, Dec. 12, 2002 (on file with authors).
547 Refugees registered with UNRWA receive a travel document valid for one year
and renewable three times. Refugees registered with the League of Red Crescent
Societies (LRCS) in 1948, but not with UNRWA in 1950, are also eligible for a travel
document valid for one year, renewable for three times. The document is
distinguishable from the one accorded to refugees registered with UNRWA by a
stamp indicating "Valid for Return". TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 165.
548 Id.
549 Egypt administered the Gaza Strip between 1948 and 1967. For more on
Egyptian travel documents, see infra note 550.
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country are no longer able to renew expired travel documents. 550 In con-
trast, Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia enjoy relatively favorable standards of treatment by host country
authorities.55'
Monitoring and enforcement initiatives have not produced significant
or lasting improvements. Investigations conducted by the Conference of
Supervisors of Palestinian Affairs552-composed of the heads of govern-
ment departments in host countries that administer Palestinian refugee
affairs-have concluded that implementation of LAS standards for the
treatment of Palestinians in member states are far below standard.5 53 The
LAS Council has further requested member states to submit information
concerning implementation of the Casablanca Protocol. 4 Protection
550 Palestinian refugees who took refuge in Egypt in 1948 are eligible for Egyptian
travel documents. Between 1948 and 1967, Egypt, as administrative authority of the
Gaza Strip, provided travel documents to Palestinians residing there. BRAND, supra
note 114, at 50-51 (citing Decision No. 28, 1960). Refugees holding expired Egyptian
travel documents have been refused entry to the country. During the Gulf war, for
example, many ex-Gazan holders of Egyptian travel documents who were forced to
leave Kuwait and who had lost their residency status in the Gaza Strip following
Israel's 1967 military occupation of the area, were unable to return to Egypt. A
significant number eventually found refuge in Iraq. TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at
161.
551 TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 169. Of these states, Morocco and Tunisia are
signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and are eligible for Convention Travel
Documents. Supra note 78. See also Shiblak, supra note 536, at 42 (noting that
Palestinian refugees holding travel documents are not permitted to enter Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia without the prior approval of PLO officials in these countries).
552 The annual Conference first met in 1964 based on the recommendation of
council members. See LASC Resolution, 1946, Mar. 31, 1964, reprinted in Diaspora
and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95, at 23.
553 TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 145. The first investigation took place in 1969.
The LASC adopted a follow-up resolution calling upon member states to fully
implement the Casablanca Protocol. LASC Resolution 2550, Sept. 13, 1969, states,
inter alia, that the Palestine Liberation Organization should establish bi-lateral
contacts with pertinent bodies in member states and other Arab states to look into
necessary solutions for Palestinian travel, residency and employment procedures
there, and present a report regarding the outcome of this endeavor to the General
Secretariat of the LAS. Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95, at
24.
54 In 1978, the Conference held an extraordinary session to examine
implementation of the Casablanca Protocol. LASC Resolution 3743, Sept. 13, 1978.
Under LASC Resolution 3807, Mar. 25, 1979, the Council noted that it had only
received replies to its request for information on implementation of the Casablanca
Protocol from Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq. In addition, the Council
noted that it had not received a report from the PLO concerning the results of
bilateral contacts with Arab states on improving implementation of the Protocol.
Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95, at 30-31.
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gaps, however, remain. During a 1985 field visit to Arab states with signif-
icant Palestinian refugee populations, the LAS obtained written assur-
ances from a number of states to relax arbitrary measures imposed on
refugees.555 Following the 1991 Gulf war, however, several states visited
by the delegation, including Kuwait, Lebanon, and Libya, imposed new
restrictions.
556
Moreover, regional instruments are limited in scope. Protection pro-
vided to Palestinian refugees under LASC resolutions and the Casa-
blanca Protocol is significantly narrower than that provided to refugees
under regional instruments in other regions of the world.557 The Casa-
blanca Protocol does not provide adequate protection in the context of a
protracted refugee problem.558 Neither the 1965 Casablanca Protocol nor
LASC resolutions include provisions for the protection of adequate hous-
ing, access to public education, property ownership, or social security.
5 59
Housing conditions for many refugees, particularly in camps, are inade-
quate, characterized by overcrowding, lack of basic infrastructure, and
poor environmental conditions.56 ° In Lebanon, Egypt, and the Gulf
states, Palestinian refugees do not have comprehensive access to public
education.56' Refugees in Lebanon and Egypt do not have access to pub-
555 TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 148.
556 Id.
557 For an overview of regional instruments see supra notes 89-117 and
accompanying text.
558 The scope of protected rights afforded to Palestinian refugees in Arab host
states has not expanded over time. See discussion supra note 476 and accompanying
text. This is due, in large part, to Arab government concerns that expansion of basic
rights beyond those set forth in the Casablanca Protocol may lead to de facto
resettlement (tawtiin) of the refugee population. TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 133.
551 For a list of protected rights under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1965
Casablanca Protocol, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
560 Overcrowding is related to the lack of resource to expand existing shelters or
build new ones, planning and building restrictions in host areas, and the high rate of
natural growth of the refugee community commensurate with the lack of access to
durable solutions. According to international standards, 3 persons per room or more
is generally regarded as a standard measure of overcrowding. In Jordan, for example,
more than 40 percent of households in camps have 3 persons per room. MARIE W.
ARNEBERG, LIVING CONDITIONS AMONG PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND DISPLACED
IN JORDAN (1997).
561 Shiblak, supra note 536, at 43; ZUREIK, supra note 116, at 34-36. In Egypt
Palestinian refugees were initially accorded national treatment. In addition,
Palestinians in need were exempted from university fees. Scholarships and subsidies
were cancelled in the early 1960s. BRAND, supra note 114, at 53, 61. Generally, there
is a weak relationship between education and social progress, due to limited
opportunities to translate education into suitable employment in primary host
countries in the region.
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lic health care.562 Most Arab states restrict foreign ownership of land.563
Additionally, refugees in Lebanon and the Gulf states pay the same fees
as citizens for social insurance but receive fewer or no benefits. 564 Most
Arab host states are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and
its 1967 Protocol or either of the two statelessness conventions. 565 Com-
pliance with standards set forth in regional draft human rights instru-
ments and in international human rights instruments, moreover, varies
from state to state.5 66 Regional mechanisms for monitoring, enforcement,
562 Shiblak, supra note 536, at 43. Until the early 1960s refugees in Egypt were
provided free health care. Under President Sadat, however, this status was revoked
and placed with the same treatment as foreigners. BRAND, supra note 114, at 51, 61.
563 Shiblak, supra note 536, at 42. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are subject to all
laws pertaining to non-Lebanese, which restrict foreign ownership of property. al-
Natour, supra note 542, at 372 (citing Decree No. 11614 (1969)). Foreigners must file
an application for a license with the Minister of Finance who transfers it, along with
his recommendation, to the Council of Ministers of the Cabinet. The Cabinet may
grant a license through a decree, which is not subject to appeal. There are also
restrictions concerning purchase of property near the border and the size of property
purchased. Foreigners must obtain a presidential consent to acquire immovable
property. TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 164; see also Report of the Commissioner-
General of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,
U.N. Doc. A/2171 (1952) (citing Legislative Order No. 196, July 24, 1942). In practice,
however, Palestinian refugees find it difficult to obtain this consent. Palestinian
refugees in Kuwait, Libya, and ex-Gazans in Jordan are not permitted to own
immovable property. Palestinian refugees in Syria and Egypt may not own arable
land. TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 168. See Acquisition of Immovable Properties
by Foreigners, Legislative Decree No. 189 (1952). See also Letters of the Minister of
Interior to the Real Estate Directorate in Damascus, no. 9816/5/1 (Oct. 13, 1977); no.
4174/5/1 (26-H) (Oct. 29, 1986); and no. 74/5/1 (26-H) (Jan. 1981). See especially
Letters of the Minister of Interior to the Real Estate Directorate in Damascus, no.
3917/5/1 (Oct. 1, 1969) and no. 3916/5/1 (Oct. 1, 1969), stating that: "A Palestinian
refugee living in Syria is excluded from the legislative decree No. 189 in 1952 which
entitled Arabs living in Syria the right of ownership in governorate centers and
summer resorts." HAMED SAID AL-MAWED, THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN SYRIA,
THEIR PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 61 (1999). In Egypt, Palestinian refugees were
originally exempt from legislation forbidding foreigners from owning agricultural
land. Egypt passed a law terminating this exemption in 1985. BRAND, supra note 114,
at 63.
564 Shiblak, supra note 536, at 43.
565 Supra notes 78, 88.
566 U.N. human rights treaty body committees commonly recognize the efforts
exerted by Arab states to host Palestinian refugees. Common concerns regarding
implementation of relevant human rights instruments, however, include protection for
ethnic groups and minorities, non-discrimination in incorporation of international
instruments into domestic law, monitoring and promotion of human rights, and
domestic human rights mechanisms. For details on Arab state signatories, see
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination,
Jordan, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.59 (1999); Concluding Observations of the
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and standard-setting, including the Arab League, do not include the refu-
gee-generating state of Israel.
B. The Current Status of Palestinian Refugees in 1967-Occupied
Palestine
In contrast to protection gaps in Arab states, a long-standing "protec-
tion crisis" characterizes the status of refugees in 1967-occupied Pales-
tine.567 More than 1.5 million refugees, who comprise over fifty percent
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination, Lebanon, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/
Add.49 (1998); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination, Syria, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.70 (1999); Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jordan,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.46 (2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Lebanon, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993/10 (1993);
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Syria, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.63 (2001); Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Convention on the Child, Jordan, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.125
(2000); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Convention on the Child,
Lebanon, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.54 (1996); Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Convention on the Child, Syria, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.70
(1997); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Convention on Civil and
Political Rights, Lebanon, U.N. Civil and Political Rights, Syria, U.N. Doc. CCPRJC/
71/SYR (2001).
567 The United Nations has long recognized the "protection gap" in 1967-occupied
Palestine. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, in the context of the
first Palestinian intifada the UNHCR issued annual executive committee conclusions
that "[e]xpressed concern about the lack of adequate international protection for
various groups of refugees in different parts of the world, including a large number of
Palestinians, and hoped that efforts would be undertaken within the United nations
system to address their protection needs." See ExCom. Conclusion No. 50 (XXXIX)
(1988); ExCom. Conclusion No. 55 (XL) (1989); ExCom. General Conclusion on
International Protection (XLI) (1990); ExCom. General Conclusion on International
Protection (XLII) (1991); ExCom. Conclusion No. 68 (XLIII) (1992); and ExCom.
Conclusion No. 71 (XLIV) (1993). The United Nations General Assembly also
adopted numerous resolutions during the same period recommending efforts by
UNRWA and the Secretary General to resolve outstanding protection gaps. See G.A.
Res. 2792 C, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., 2001st mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2792 (XXVI)
(1971); G.A. Res. 2963 C, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., 2108th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/
2963 (XXVII) (1972); G.A. Res. 3331 D, 29th Sess., 2322d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/
3331 (XXIX) (1974); G.A. Res. 3419 C, 30th Sess., 2430th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/
3419 (XXX) (1975); G.A. Res. 31/15 D, 31st Sess., 76th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/15/
D (1976); G.A. Res. 32/90 C, 32d Sess., 101st mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/90/C (1977);
G.A. Res. 33/112 E, 33d Sess., 87th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/112/E (1978); G.A.
Res. 34/52 F, 34th Sess., 76th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/52/F (1979); G.A. Res. 35/13,
35th Sess., 50th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/13 (1980); G.A. Res. 36/146, 36th Sess.,
100th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/146/ (1981); G.A. Res. 36/226, 36th Sess., 103d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/226 (1981); G.A. Res. 37/43, 37th Sess., 90th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
RES/37/43 (1982); G.A. Res. 37/120, 37th Sess., 108th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/120
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of the population of the occupied West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, and the
Gaza Strip, are affected."'8 There is virtually no day-to-day security or
human rights protection, with dire consequences for a population living
under protracted military occupation.
Implementation of regional standards in 1967-occupied Palestine is vir-
tually non-existent. Palestine is a founding member of the League of
Arab States, but without the derivative powers of a state5 9 is unable to
accord national protection to Palestinian refugees resident in the Israeli-
occupied West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.570 Limited
(1982); G.A. Res. 38/17, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., 66th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/17
(1983); G.A. Res. 38/83 E, I, and J, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., 98th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
RES/38/83 (1983); G.A. Res. 39/17, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 71st mtg., U.N. Do.c A/
RES/39/17 (1984); G.A. Res. 39/99 E, I, and J, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 100th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/99 (1984); G.A. Res. 40/25, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 96th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/25 (1985); G.A. Res. 40/165 E, I and J, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess.,
ll8st mtg., U.N. Doc. ALRES/40/165 (1985); G.A. Res. 41/69 E, I and J, U.N. GAOR,
41st Sess., 95th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/69 (1986); G.A. Res. 42/69 I, U.N. GAOR,
42d Sess., 89th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/69 (1987); G.A. Res. 42/95, U.N. GAOR,
42d Sess., 93d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/95 (1987); G.A. Res. 43/57 E and I, U.N.
GAOR, 43d Sess., 71st mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/57 (1988); G.A. Res. 44/47 I, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., 78th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/47 (1989); G.A. Res. 45/73 1, U.N.
GAOR, 45th Sess., 65th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/73 (1990); G.A. Res. 46/46 I, U.N.
GAOR, 46th Sess., 66th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/46 (1991); G.A. Res. 47/69 I, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., 85th mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/47/69 (1992); and G.A. Res. 48/40 H,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 73d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/40 (1993).
568 As of December 2002 there were 639,448 registered refugees in the West Bank
and 893,141 registered refugees in the Gaza Strip. UNRWA in Figures: Figures as of 31
December 2002, supra note 123. There are few non-registered refugees in 1967-
occupied Palestine. According to 1998 estimates non-registered refugees comprised
some 9 percent of the total refugee population in the West Bank and less than 1
percent of the refugee population in the Gaza Strip. ABu SIr-A, supra note 123, at 24
tbl. 7.
569 TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 181, stating:
Although there can be no doubt that the entity 'Palestine' should be considered a
state in statu nascendi [... ] the entity 'Palestine' currently does not fully satisfy
the international legal criteria of statehood: a permanent population, a defined
territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with out states.
For further discussion see id. at 178-83.
570 See infra note 572. ExComm Conclusions and U.N.G.A. resolutions concerning
refugee protection ceased following the commencement of the Oslo political process
in 1993 despite the continued legal and institutional protection gap in 1967-occupied
Palestine. Supra note 567. This may be attributed to at least two factors. First,
following the beginning of the Oslo process, the United States sought to remove the
question of Palestine from U.N. agenda and debate. See infra note 614 and
accompanying text. Secondly, there may have existed a general assumption that the
Palestinian Authority, established by the Oslo agreements, would facilitate resolution
of the protection problem. For recent commentary on protection and the limited role
of the Palestinian Authority in the context of the second Palestinian uprising see, for
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civilian powers transferred to the Palestinian Authority under the Oslo
agreements remain subject to Israel's overall authority.57' Israel's military
campaign directed at the Palestinian Authority since the beginning of the
second Palestinian intifada, as summarized above, brings into question
the political, administrative, jurisdictional, and financial viability of the
Palestinian Authority.
The PLO, which oversees Palestinian refugee affairs through its
Department of Refugee Affairs ("DORA"), is not a government in any
legal sense, and has neither the legal status nor the resources to provide
effective comprehensive protection for Palestinian refugees, in 1967-occu-
pied Palestine or elsewhere.572 The PLO has bilateral contacts with host
states and has raised protection issues with the Conference of Supervisors
of Palestinian Affairs, the Council of Ministers and the Council of Arab
Ministers of the Interior. 3 It has also signed agreements with states,
including the Cairo Agreement with Lebanon,574 in order to ensure
example, Commission Inquiry Report 2000, supra note 209, at art. IV. Paragraph 7,
states, inter alia:
The test for the application of the legal regime of occupation is not whether the
occupying Power fails to exercise effective control over the territory, but whether
it has the ability to exercise such power, a principle affirmed by the United States
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in In re list and others (The Hostages Case) in
1948. The Oslo Accords leave Israel with the ultimate control over the OPT and
the fact that for political reasons it has chosen not to exercise this control, when it
undoubtedly has the military capacity to do so, cannot relieve Israel of its
responsibilities as an occupying power.
Id.
571 Id. at para. 182.
Neither the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements nor
the subsequent agreements between Israel and the PLO, establish a Palestinian state
and the latter agreements only transfer limited powers and responsibilities to the
newly created Palestinian Authority.
For a comprehensive analysis of the powers transferred to the Palestinian Authority
and retained by Israel under the Oslo agreements see SHEHADEH, FROM
OCCUPATION TO INTERIM ACCORDS, supra note 146.
572 While the PLO is a recognized public body that represents the Palestinian
people and maintains offices, which are similar or equivalent to diplomatic missions, it
does not satisfy other criteria for statehood, including a defined territory, and a
government that represents all the Palestinian people. The Palestinian Legislative
Council, established under the Oslo process, only represents Palestinians in 1967-
occupied Palestine. The PLO has not claimed the status as a government in exile.
Mallison & Mallison, supra note 129 at 45 (citing Anis Kassim, The Palestine
Liberation Organization's Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under International
Law, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POLY 9 (1980)). On international legal criteria for
statehood see TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 181 n.46 (citing article 1, 1933
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 165 LNTS 19).
573 TAKKENBERG, supra note 98, at 145.
574 Cairo Agreement, Nov. 3, 1969, P.L.O.-Leb., reprinted in Palestinian Diaspora
and Refugee Centre (SHAML), supra note 95, at 25-26. Article 1.1 of the Agreement
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respect for basic economic and social rights.575 Despite these efforts,
however, the status of refugees has not improved significantly.
Israel is not a member of the Arab League and is not bound by LAS
standards. As an occupying power, however, Israel is bound by the
Fourth Geneva Convention relative to occupied territory to protect the
civilian population, including refugees, in the West Bank, eastern Jerusa-
lem, and the Gaza Strip.576 However, Israel does not accept the de jure
application of international humanitarian law in these territories.
577 Com-
mentators and U.N. treaty body committees also hold the view that Israel
has direct responsibility for international human rights law in 1967-occu-
pied Palestine in all areas where Israel maintains "geographical, func-
tional or personal jurisdiction."57 The military reoccupation and siege of
Palestinian cities, towns and refugee camps in the context of the second
intifada attests to Israel's absolute control over the whole of 1967-occu-
pied Palestine and its concomitant responsibility for human rights protec-
tion of the civilian population, including refugees. Israel rejects this
accorded Palestinians in Lebanon the right to employment, residence, and movement.
Id. Article 1.2 provided for limited autonomy through the establishment of local
Palestinian committees in refugee camps in Lebanon, but "in cooperation with local
authorities and under Lebanese sovereignty." Id. Additionally, the Agreement
permitted the presence of Palestinian armed positions in the camps. Id.
575 Id. In 1977 the PLO requested the League to issue a Palestinian passport,
however, the request did not receive wide support among LAS members. Id. at 12.
576 International consensus affirms the de jure applicability of the 4th Geneva
Convention to 1967-occupied Palestine. See, e.g., LEIN, supra note 158, at 20 ("The
International Red Cross, the UN, and the vast majority of states and international law
experts have often stated that the Fourth Geneva Convention is binding on Israel in
its activity in the Occupied Territories."). For a recent commentary see Commission
Inquiry Report, 2000, supra note 209, paras. 35-43. See also Special Rapporteur Report,
2002, supra note 209, paras. 8-10.
577 Israel argues that humanitarian law does not apply to the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip because their annexation by Jordan and Egypt never received
international recognition. Israel therefore argues that the West Bank, eastern
Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip does not meet the requirement for application of the
Geneva Convention because it was not the territory of a High Contracting Party. See
LEIN, supra note 158, at 20 (citing Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International
Law in the Administered Territories, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262-66 (1971)).
578 See, e.g., Commission Inquiry Report, 2000, supra note 209, at para. 37, stating,
inter alia:
[a] prolonged occupation lasting more than 30 years, was not envisaged by the
drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention (see art. 6). Commentators have
therefore suggested that in the case of prolonged occupation, the occupying
Power is subject to the restraints imposed by international human rights law, as
well as the rules of international humanitarian law.
See also Special Rapporteur Report, 2002, supra note 209, at paras. 8-9; CESCR 1998,
supra note 171, at para. 6; CCPR 1998, supra note 171, at para. 10; CERD 1998, supra
note 173, at para. 4.
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premise.57 9 Finally, Israel is a signatory to both the Refugee Convention
and Protocol, though it did not ratify them until 1999. Israel is the only
signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention that does not have legislation
to define and protect refugees. 580
The protection crisis in 1967-occupied Palestine spans the panoply of
basic rights afforded to refugees under international and regional instru-
ments. Restrictions on Palestinian economic and institutional develop-
ment imposed by Israel's military occupation and colonization severely
hamper refugees' access to employment.58' Under the Oslo agreements,
-79 See, e.g., Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 40
of the Covenant, Second Periodic Report, Addendum, Israel, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
ISR/2001/2 (2001), stating:
Israel has consistently maintained that the Covenant does not apply to areas that
are not subject to its sovereign territory and jurisdiction. This position is based on
the well-established distinction between human rights and humanitarian law
under international law. Accordingly, in Israel's view, the Committee's mandate
cannot relate to events in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, inasmuch as they
are part and parcel of the context of armed conflict as distinct from a relationship
of human rights.
Id. at paras. 8-9. See also Additional Information, Israel, supra note 171, at. paras. 2-3.
580 Einat Fishbain, Israel Lacks a Refugee Law, HA'ARETZ, May 26, 2002 (quoting
Dan Yakir, Association for Civil Rights in Israel). Israel does not have a refugee
board or immigration service to handle refugee status determinations for non-Jews. A
person seeking refugee status in Israel must apply to the UNHCR and the Interior
Ministry. Claimants are kept in prison until the Interior Ministry accepts the status of
refugee. The decisions of the UNHCR office in Israel, however, are usually only
considered recommendations by the Interior Ministry. In 2001, for example, 400
individuals applied for refugee status in Israel, 150 cases were sent to Geneva for
further examination and determination. Only 15 claimants were granted refugee
status. As of 2002, Israel retains the sole authority in determination claims under the
1951 Refugee Convention. Israel has adapted its system in response to the influx of
some 6,000 Israeli-allied South Lebanon Army forces after Israel's withdrawal from
south Lebanon in 2000. Generally, Israel does not resettle non-Jewish refugees in the
country, but rather searches for resettlement slots abroad. On the SLA, see, Amos
Harel, 1,000 SLA Refugees to Move Abroad, HA'ARETZ, June 2, 2000; Relly Sa'ar,
Sharansky Meets U.N. Refugee Boss on SLA, HA'ARETZ, May 26, 2000; Sharon Gal,
200 SLA Soldiers off to Oz, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 21, 2001; see also Sharon Gal, Kurdish
Refugees Sent Back to Lebanon, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 27, 2001; Jalal Bana, Israel Expels 42
Kurds Who Sought Asylum, HA'ARETZ, Aug. 10, 2001; Joseph Algazy, Don't Give Me
Your Tired or Hungry, HA'ARETZ, Jan. 9, 2002; Yossi Klein, A Refuge Refused, Facing
Persecution in Their Native Lands, Hundreds of Asylum Seekers Get the Cold
Shoulder in Israel, HA'ARETZ, Nov. 18, 2002.
581 Supra notes 232-33. For a detailed discussion see SARA Roy, THE GAZA STRIP,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DE-DEVELOPMENT (1995). Critically, Israel also
maintains control of West Bank and Gaza acquifers through the location of colonies
and military zones as well as restrictive drilling regulations. See, e.g., B'TSELEM,
THIRSTY FOR A SOLUTION: THE WATER CRISIS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND
ITS RESOLUTION IN THE FINAL-STATUS AGREEMENT (2000).
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Israel ceded authority to revoke residency rights in the occupied West
Bank, excluding eastern Jerusalem," 2 and the Gaza Strip; however, it is
unclear whether Israel still considers the agreements binding following
the collapse of the political process. "Palestinian Passports," which func-
tion as travel documents, are void upon nullification of the Oslo agree-
ments.58 3 Many Palestinian refugees in the occupied West Bank also hold
five-year renewable Jordanian passports.58 4 Palestinians still require spe-
cial Israeli permits to leave and to enter the occupied territories.585 Pales-
tinian residents holding passports in a second state are not permitted to
travel in and out of the occupied territories on foreign passports.
Palestinian refugees are permitted to own immovable property; how-
ever, property remains vulnerable to expropriation by Israel.586 As in
other parts of the Arab world, Palestinian refugee housing in 1967-occu-
pied Palestine, particularly in the Gaza Strip, is characterized by over-
crowding, lack of infrastructure, and poor environmental conditions.587
Refugees are also uniquely vulnerable to Israel's practice of house demo-
lition and military attacks on civilian residential areas, including refugee
camps. 88 Access to education and health services are also severely lim-
ited by Israel's military occupation.589 In the context of the second
intifada, basic physical security has become so urgent that it has sub-
sumed concern about protection of all other rights.
582 Supra notes 196-97.
583 JAMAL & DARWISH, supra note 197, at 40. The document, jointly issued by
Israel and the Palestinian Authority, includes the holder's serial number issued by the
Palestinian Authority and the holder's Israeli-issued ID number. Id.
584 The passport functions similar to a travel document and does not serve to
confer renewed Jordanian citizenship to West Bankers nor the national protection
derived there from. Palestinians, including refugees, residing in the West Bank
acquired the same status as Jordanian citizens following the 'unification' of the West
and East Bank in 1950 and the adoption of new nationality legislation in Jordan. In
principle, this status remained the same following Jordan's decision to severe legal
and administrative ties to the West Bank in 1988, although the validity of the
Jordanian passport held by Palestinians in the West Bank was shortened from 5 to 2
years. In October 1995 the Jordanian Department of Civil Affairs and Passports
announced that under new regulations, Palestinian residents of the West Bank who
held a Jordanian passport before July 1988 could replace their two-year documents
with a regular five-year passport, even if Israel had revoked their residency rights. Id.
585 On the residency status of Palestinians in 1967-occupied Palestine see generally
JAMAL & DARWISH, supra note 197.
586 See supra notes 217-221 and accompanying text.
587 In the Gaza Strip more than 40 percent of households in camps have 3 persons
per room compared to 31 percent in the West Bank. Refugee camp households are
more crowded than towns and villages. FAFO - INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SOCIAL
SCIENCE, GROWING FAST: THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION IN THE WEST BANK AND
GAZA STRIP 171 (2001).
588 See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
589 See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
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C. The Status of Palestinians in Europe and the United States
Protection gaps in Europe for Palestinian refugees largely relate to the
interpretation of the status of Palestinian refugees under article 1D of the
1951 Refugee Convention. The exact number of Palestinian refugees in
Europe is unknown. Most states do not include Palestinians as a separate
ethnic or national group in population censuses Statistical information
often categorizes Palestinians as 'other Middle East.' It is estimated that
over 200,000 Palestinian refugees currently reside in Europe. 59' This
includes some 30,000-80,000 Palestinian refugees in Germany; 20,000 ref-
ugees in Denmark; 15,000 refugees in Britain; 3,000 Palestinians in
France, and some 9,000 Palestinian refugees in Sweden.591
As detailed above, most European states either do not incorporate arti-
cle 1D into domestic law or interpret the article incorrectly.592 Palestini-
ans, for the most part, have difficulty when they apply for political
asylum,593 residence based on family reunification, or other related pro-
tections that are available to other refugees in the world. Many remain in
European states without recognized legal status, without work permits,
and without the basic essentials to live in freedom and dignity. The pro-
tection gap vis-A-vis Palestinians in Europe is most evident when com-
pared to rights granted other refugees under the Refugee Convention
590 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimates the total size of the
Palestinian population outside the Arab world and the United States at 295,075 at the
end of 2002. The Bureau does not provide a breakdown for the number of
Palestinians in Europe, however, it can be assumed that a majority of Palestinians
outside Arab world and the United States reside in Europe. PALESTINIANS AT THE
END OF THE YEAR 2002, supra note 121, at 35. The majority of Palestinian refugees in
Europe began to arrive during the 1960s and after in search of employment
(especially from Lebanon) as well as refuge from the combined effects of Israel's
military occupation of the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip in 1967, and
subsequent invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s. Few Palestinian refugees found refuge
in Europe as a direct result of the 1948 conflict and war in Palestine. Abbas Shiblak,
Palestinian Refugee Communities in Europe, An Overview, Workshop at the
University of Oxford (May 5-6, 2000) (on file with the authors).
591 Abbas Shiblak, Palestinian Refugees in Europe, Challenges of Adaptation and
Identity, Workshop on Palestinian Refugee Communities in Europe at St. Anthony's
College, University of Oxford (May 5-6, 2000) (On file with the authors).
592 Supra notes 252-54.
593 According to the Swedish Migration Board, for example, there are 934 stateless
Palestinians registered in Sweden. Of these, 895 do not have residency status.
Although 200 Palestinians have been ordered deported, no expulsions are being
carried out because the Swedish Immigration Department has concluded that
expulsions cannot be carried out to the West Bank and Gaza as it is impossible to fly
there. The Immigration Department has called for a policy change on Palestinian
asylum-seekers that would permit them to claim a 'need for protection' due to armed
conflict, entitling them to automatic residence. See Palestinians to be Allowed to Stay
in Sweden, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Apr. 11, 2002 (on file with the authors).
128 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22:1
and rights granted other stateless individuals under the two Conventions
on Statelessness. In the context of the second intifada some states have
placed tighter restrictions on asylum claims for Palestinians originating
from 1967-occupied Palestine.594
As in Europe, protection gaps in the United States largely relate to the
interpretation of article 1D and the status provided to Palestinian refu-
gees who are not accorded refugee status. It is estimated that more than
200,000 Palestinian refugees reside in the United States.595 Similar to the
situation of Palestinian refugees in Europe, precise figures for the num-
ber of Palestinian refugees in the United States are not available. Pales-
tinian nationality is rarely recognized; Palestinians therefore mysteriously
disappear, mostly likely categorized as 'other Middle Eastern.'59 6
D. Principles and Parameters of an Internationally-Harmonized
Temporary Protection Regime for Palestinians
1. Why Regional Temporary Protection is Not Workable for
Palestinians
It is clear from the examination of different treatments Palestinians
receive, both in areas where they receive a type of temporary protection
and elsewhere in the world, that a temporary protection regime based on
a regional approach is not desirable. In practice, it has not worked well in
terms of any of the concerns raised by states or refugees about temporary
protection. The piecemeal and confused applications of refugee, human
rights, and statelessness law toward Palestinians have undermined legal
standards in all those areas. It is a prime illustration of the burden-shifting
phenomenon roundly criticized in the United States-Haitian situation, the
"safe zones" of the former Yugoslavia and northern Iraq, and the barriers
514 ECRE notes that "in light of the current situation in the ME and an increase in
asylum applications made by Palestinian nationals, the Home Office is currently not
considering asylum applications." ECRE, Country Report: United Kingdom (2001).
The UK's asylum statistics, however, do not separately designate Palestinians as a
nationality, presumably categorizing them under "other ME."
595 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimates the total size of the
Palestinian population in the United States at 231,723 at the end of 2002.
PALESTINIANS AT THE END OF THE YEAR 2002, supra note 121, at 35. The 1990 U.S.
Census estimated 50,000 Palestinians in the U.S. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ETHNIC AND HISPANIC BRANCH, 1990 CENSUS SPECIAL
TABULATIONS. This number, however, is likely low due to the underestimation of
minority populations in the United States and it may not include Palestinian refugees
who have acquired citizenship in Jordan.
596 In the 1980 census, the first in which respondents had an opportunity to list
their ancestry, only 21,288 individuals listed Palestinian. See Kathleen Christison, The
American Experience: Palestinians in the U.S., J. PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1989, at
18 (citing CENSUS OF POPULATION: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT: ANCESTRY OF THE
POPULATION BY STATE: 1980 21 (1983)).
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to asylum erected in Western states to deflect refugee flows to poorer
regions; and, it is completely inconsistent with the special regime estab-
lished for Palestinians to ensure them protection and assistance.
As shown, the status and treatment given Palestinians in the UNRWA
areas fall below applicable standards in different states and regions, such
as the 1969 OAU Convention, the Refugee Convention, and the human
rights instruments ratified by various Arab states. Moreover, the status
and treatment given Palestinians everywhere is inconsistent with the spe-
cial regime established to ensure their protection pending a durable solu-
tion consistent with refugee law principles of safe return, absorption, or
resettlement based on the refugee's voluntary choice, as required by article
1D's implicit reference to the law of U.N. General Assembly Resolution
194 in its language: "the position of such persons being definitively settled
in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations." '597
2. Why an Internationally-Harmonized Approach is Imperative and
Timely
The fifty-four-year human rights and humanitarian emergency that has
driven hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their places of origin
has been exacerbated by the beginning of the second intifada and the end
of the Oslo peace process. Yet, the reasons for the recent and renewed
exodus of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza are a continuation
of all the reasons they have been forced to flee in large and small num-
bers over time: denial of the right to self-determination; armed conflict,
colonization, and foreign occupation; ethnic cleansing and racial discrimi-
nation; and apartheid at the hands of the Zionist Israeli state.598 The clear
evidence presented of an ethnic cleansing policy toward the Palestinians
is different from the policies toward the Bosnian-Muslims and Kosovar
Albanians only in degree and length of time over which it has been car-
ried out.
As described in detail in Part III, if article 1D were properly inter-
preted, Palestinians would be recognized as prima facie refugees in any
state, and would qualify for the benefits of the Refugee Convention. This
would not require that states grant Palestinians asylum, but might author-
ize a grant of temporary protection until a durable solution is found.
Guided by the lessons of temporary protection as implemented by states
in both formalized and non-formalized policies, we propose a temporary
protection regime for Palestinians involving the following elements.
First, temporary protection must be closely connected to durable solu-
tions guided by non-refoulement, voluntary choice, and the right of
return.599 The most remarkable feature of the Palestinian population as
91 See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1D, 189 U.N.T.S. at 156.
598 See supra notes 129-238 and accompanying text.
599 See supra notes 16, 21-29 and accompanying text.
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refugees worldwide is their fifty-four-year steadfast commitment to
return to their homes and lands. As compared to the post-World War II
refugee population for which the Refugee Convention was principally
designed, and many refugee groups since who have sought resettlement,
Palestinians have consistently declared their opposition to resettlement,
and demanded return.60 0 For Palestinians, "[t]he meaning of return in
the ... collective consciousness is the very opposite of that of the nakba
[the 'catastrophe' of 1948], of refuge and of exile." '' Today the individ-
ual and collective desire of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes
of origin inside Israel is expressed not only through countless statements
and petitions to political authorities, but also through the establishment
of village committees and societies 60 2 whose purpose is to preserve a liv-
ing memory of the refugees' villages of origin and to promote a culture of
return, and the emergence of a global Palestinian refugee coalition for
return.60 3 Israel, the state responsible for the expulsion of Palestinians, on
600 For early statements see, for example, FAYEZ A. SAYEGH, THE PALESTINE
REFUGEES 52 (1952) (citing a resolution issued in 1949 by Palestinian refugees from
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and those territories of Palestine not occupied by
Zionist/Israeli military forces during the armed conflict and war of 1947-49 reprinted
in al-Islah (New York), Aug. 19, 1949, which states: "The Arabs of Palestine insist
upon the return of the refugees to their homes in accordance with the resolution of
the General Assembly, including the provisions thereof for compensation and
guarantees of property rights and personal security. They reject any scheme or plan
calling for their resettlement in Arab countries."). For more recent statements see, for
example, Statements of Palestinian Refugees from 1967 Occupied Palestine, Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in, LABOUR MIDDLE EAST COUNCIL, CONSERVATIVE
MIDDLE EAST COUNCIL, AND LIBERAL DEMOCRAT MIDDLE EAST COUNCIL, RIGHT
OF RETURN, JOINT PARLIAMENTARY MIDDLE EAST COUNCILS COMMISSION OF
ENQUIRY - PALESTINIAN REFUGEES (2001). For a more detailed discussion see Jaber
Suleiman, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: From the Right of Return to
Bantustan, in PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN 87-102 (Naseer
Aruri, ed. 2001).
601 Suleiman, supra note 600, at 87.
602 On Palestinian identity and memory see, for example, Julie M. Peteet,
Transforming Trust: Dispossession and Empowerment Among Palestinian Refugees, in
MISTRUSTING REFUGEES 168-86 (E. Valentine Daniel & John Chr. Knudsen, eds.
1995). For examples of active village societies see http://www.PalestineRemembered.
corn (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
603 See, e.g., Declaration issued by the First Popular Refugee Conference in
Deheishe Refugee Camp/Bethlehem, Sept. 13, 1996 , at http://www.badil.org/
Refugees/Documents/ 1996/1-96.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003) ("[The] time has
come for the refugee community to organize itself in popular committees and to
design a strategic program of struggle based on the hidden capacities of the people-
the refugees themselves-who, with their unity, patience, and clear objectives, have
maintained the struggle for their national rights."). The coalition is comprised of
refugee activists and independent community initiatives from the West Bank, Gaza
Strip, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, internally displaced Palestinians inside Israel, as
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the other hand, denies responsibility for their plight and has prevented
them from returning to their homes of origin.6°4 "From Israel's point of
view," writes Israeli journalist Danny Rubinstein, "recognition of the
right of return means the destruction of the State of Israel."6 ° Recent
Israeli legislation prohibits the return of Palestinian refugees to their
homes inside Israel unless approved by a majority of eighty members of
the 120-member Knesset (parliament)." 6 It has thus fallen upon the
neighboring Arab states to host the vast majority of the Palestinian refu-
well as Palestinian refugees residing in Europe and the United States. For more on
the development of a global Palestinian right of return movement see Ingrid Jaradat
Gassner, A Programme for an Independent Rights Campaign, in PALESTINIAN
REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN 252-259 (Naseer Aruri ed., 2001).
604 The decision to prevent the return of Palestinian refugees was taken at a June
1948 Israeli cabinet meeting and confirmed in the Reply of the Provisional
Government of Israel to the Proposal Regarding the Return of Arab Refugees, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 11, Annex 2, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/648 (1948). During 1949-
1950, Israel briefly considered two conditional offers for the return of a limited
number of refugees,but never implemented them. For a discussion of these proposals
see MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, supra note 139, at
266-85. More recently see, for example, Labor and Likud Knesset Members, National
Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on Permanent Settlement with the Palestinians,
Jan. 1, 1997, reprinted in J. PALESTINE STUD., Spring 1997, at 160, 62 ("The right of the
state of Israel to prevent the entry of Palestinian refugees into its sovereign territory
will be recognized"). For a more detailed discussion of Israel's position on Palestinian
refugees see GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE, THE REFUGEE ISSUE, A BACKGROUND
PAPER (1994) [hereinafter THE REFUGEE ISSUE]; and, SHLOMO GAZIT, JAFFEE
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM (1995).
605 Danny Rubinstein, The Return of the Right of Return, HA'ARETZ, Feb. 4, 2002.
One of the earliest formulations of this premise was set out by Israel's first Prime
Minister, David Ben Gurion. DON PERETZ, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINE ARABS 42
(1958) (quoting Ben Gurion's response to U.S. pressure in late May 1948 to allow
Palestinian refugees to return to their homes: "The United States is a powerful
country; Israel is a small and weak one. We can be crushed, but we will not commit
suicide."). More recently see, for example, Ahmad Mashharawi, Interview with Israeli
Justice Minister Yosi Beilin, AL-QUDS, Jan. 5, 2001 (quoting former Israeli justice
minister and one of the architects of the Oslo process stating "[T]he moment Israel
loses its Jewish majority, it will lose its national character. It will not be able to exist
with the same contents of its creation, since it will be an ordinary state, and not a state
as we want it to be") (FBIS translation).
606 Bill 1220 for banning the Right of Return, 2001, S.H. 116 (English translation
can be found in NIMER SULTANY, CITIZENS WITHOUT CITIZENSHIP, MADA'S FIRST
ANNUAL POLITICAL MONITORING REPORT: ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN MINORITY
2000-2002 (2003)). Article 2 states, inter alia, "Prohibition of Entry of Refugees:
Refugees will not be returned to the State of Israel unless approved by a majority of
eighty members of the Knesset." Id.. Article 4 futher states, inter alia, "Superiority of
the Law: The government of Israel will not give guarantees or enter an agreement
which contradict the instructions of this law." Id.
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gees, with significant consequences to their economies, political stability,
and security.
The other remarkable feature of the Palestinian refugee problem is the
singular absence of western powers' commitment to an international legal
framework addressing protection issues for this population. Compared to
the guiding principles applied in other refugee cases, as summarized
above, western powers have addressed the Palestinian refugee issue
almost exclusively from the perspective of their own geopolitical interests
in the region. Foremost among these interests is Israel's security and well-
being."°7 Since the return of non-Jewish refugees is perceived by Israel as
a security threat,608 western powers consider the right of return in the
Palestinian case impractical.6" 9 As one commentator correctly observes,
607 On U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East see, for example, QUANDT, supra
note 140, at 14 (stating that early American support for Israel was rooted in a sense of
moral commitment to the survivors of the holocaust, as well as in the intense
attachment of American Jews to Israel. During the 1980s a "strategic" rationale was
added to the traditional list of reasons for supporting Israel, although this view was
never universally accepted.). See also Avi Shlaim, The Impact of US Policy in the
Middle East, J. PALESTINE STUD., Winter 1988, at 15 (1988); CLYDE R. MARK,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ISRAEL-UNITED STATES RELATIONS (2003).
On European interests see, for example, the 1980 Venice Declaration reprinted in I
DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 130, at 284 (recognizing "the right to
existence and to security of all the States in the region, including Israel..."). See also
P. de La Gorce, Europe and the Arab-Israel Conflict, J. PALESTINE STUD., Spring
1997, at 5; and, HAIFAA A. JAWAD, EURO-ARAB RELATIONS, A STUDY IN
COLLECTIVE DIPLOMACY (1992).
608 See, e.g., MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, supra
note 139, at 139 (citing a June 1948 IDF Intelligence Department warning that that
return of Palestinian refugees would constitute a serious danger and a potential fifth
column behind Israeli front lines). More recently see THE REFUGEE ISSUE, supra note
604, at 10 ( "The entry into Israel of masses of refugees would pose a very real threat
to security, law and order, and the viability of Israel's social fabric, as well as to the
demographic viability of Israel as the world's only Jewish state...").
609 See, e.g., President William Clinton, Remarks at Israel Policy Forum Gala, (Jan.
7, 2001), available at http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/papers/clinton-remarks.
html (last visited Mar. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Clinton Remarks] ( "[T]here cannot be
an unlimited language in an agreement that would undermine the very foundations of
the Israeli state or the whole reason for creating the Palestinian state"); National
Security Strategy of the United States of America, available at http://www.white
house.gov/nsc/nss.html (last visited Mar. 15th, 2003) (stating that "Israel also has a
large stake in the success of a democratic Palestine. Permanent occupation threatens
Israel's identity [i.e., as a Jewish state] and democracy"); Secretary of State Colin
Powell, Speech at the University of Louisville (Nov. 19, 2001), reprinted in J.
PALESTINE STUD., Winter 2002, at 165, 167 [hereinafter Powell Speech] ("Palestinians
must eliminate any doubt, once and for all, that they accept the legitimacy of Israel as
a Jewish state."). For earlier positions to the contrary, see, for example, MALLISON,
supra note 181, at 8 (citing 8 WHITEMAN DIG. INT'L. L. 35 (1967) quoting Letter from
Assistant Secretary of State Talbot to Dr. Elmer Berger, Executive Vice President of
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"Israeli positions function as base referents and are therefore deployed as
'pragmatic' a priori., 610 Solutions are largely framed in humanitarian
terms6 11 without reference to the guiding principles applied in other refu-
61gee cases. 12 It is not surprising, therefore, that while the Oslo agree-
the American Council for Judaism (Apr. 20, 1964) stating, "the Department of State
does not regard the 'Jewish people' concept as a concept of international law"). See
also Palestine Refugee Situation in the Context the Middle East Peace Process, Eur.
Parl. Ass., 14th Sess., Res. 1156 (1998), available at http://assembly.coe.int (last visited
Mar. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Resolution 1156].
610 Joseph Massad, Return or Permanent Exile, in PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, THE
RIGHT OF RETURN 105, 108 (Naseer Aruri, ed. 2001). Thus, for example, PLO
acceptance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242(1967) as a condition for U.S.
recognition was deemed by the Reagan administration a "serious evolution of
Palestinian thinking toward realistic and pragmatic positions on the key issues."
Statement by President Ronald Reagan, Statement on United States-P.L.O. Dialogue
(Dec. 14, 1988), reprinted in I DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 130, at 338
(emphasis added). Supra note 146 and accompanying text.
611 In 1949, for example, UNCCP, acting under article 12 of its mandate set forth
in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194(111), established an Economic Survey
Mission ("ESM") to design an organizational structure to coordinate, supervise, and
facilitate measures for relief, resettlement, and economic development-i.e., a Middle
East Marshall Plan-to "start [refugees] on the road to rehabilitation and bring an
end to their enforced idleness and the demoralizing effect of a dole." Final Report of
the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, Part I, supra note
155, at vii. For more details see BENJAMIN SCHIFF, REFUGEES UNTO THE THIRD
GENERATION, U.N. AID TO PALESTINIANS (1995). This approach still dominates
western policy on durable solutions for Palestinian refugees. See, e.g., American
"Nonpaper" on Israeli-Palestinian Stockholm Negotiations, June 2000, J. PALESTINE
STUD., Autumn 2000, at 154 (stating that the United States has "a vague wording that
meets Arab demands for the right of return, but it will be so limited in numbers and
additional limitations that it will not have any real significance such that it will meet
the needs of the Palestinians without causing concern to Israel."). Additionally, the
proposal outlines a package of over 100 billion U.S. dollars to be invested in refugee
rehabilitation. See also President Bill Clinton, Proposals for a Final Settlement, in J.
PALESTINE STUD., Spring 2001, at 171-72 [hereinafter Clinton Proposals];
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, MIDDLE EAST ENDGAME II: How A
COMPREHENSIVE MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT WOULD LOOK 7-8 (2002)
(outlining a package of resettlement opinions and substantial compensation in lieu of
return).
612 Chimni's analysis of the language of humanitarianism as "the ideology of
hegemonic states" in the context of the contemporary debate on globalization also
provides a useful framework in understanding the historical approach of western
powers to the Palestinian refugee issue. However, while Chimni argues that the
language of humanitarianism has turned repatriation into the only solution, in the
Palestinian case, it has turned resettlement into the only option. B.S. Chimni,
Globalization, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection, 13 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 243, 251 (2000).
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ments "established different negotiating forums, 61 3 on refugees they "do
not substantively deal with the issue. '614
The lack of respect for guiding principles is evident when European
and American policies vis-A-vis Palestinian refugees are contrasted with
their policy towards other refugees.615 The European Union, for example,
does not explicitly affirm the right of Palestinian refugees to return to
their homes and repossess their properties. Policy documents generally
recognize the need for a "just," "viable," and "acceptable" solution to the
Palestinian refugee issue.61 6 The Council of Europe considers the right of
return in the Palestinian case "politically and practically difficult to
achieve" and therefore recommends that the refugee issue "must be
613 Forums include the Quadripartite committee composed of Israel, Jordan, Egypt
and the Palestinians to "decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of
persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967..." Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-P.L.O., art.
XII, 32 I.L.M. 1525, 1532 [hereinafter Oslo I. See also Cairo Agreement, supra note
574, at art. XVI; Oslo II, supra note 187, art. XXVII, 36 I.L.M. at 567. The parties also
agreed to establish a multilateral track to address regional issues, including the
refugee issue. For an overview of the Refugee Working Group and the multi-lateral
track see, for example, Rex Brynen and Jill Tansley, The Refu gee Working Group of
the Middle East Multilateral Peace Negotiations, 2 PALESTINE ISR. J. 53 (1995); Rex
Brynen, Much Ado About Nothing? The Refugee Working Group and the Perils of
Multilateral Quasi-negotiation, 2 INT'L NEGOTIATIONS 2 (1997).
614 BELL, supra note 141, at 247. The Oslo agreements do not include reference to
relevant resolutions of the United Nations (i.e., General Assembly Resolution 194 of
1948, Security Council Resolution 237 of 1967, and General Assembly Resolution
2252 of 1967), nor do they affirm that the refugee issue should be resolved in
accordance with international law. See Oslo I, supra note 613, 32 I.L.M. at 1525; Oslo
II, supra note 187, 36 I.L.M. at 551.
615 On state practice in other refugee cases see supra notes 341 to 353, and
accompanying text. For a more detailed discussion see Akram & Rempel, supra note
243, at n.228-38, n.246-58, n.272-78, n.286-94 and accompanying text.
616 See, e.g., The EU & the Middle East: Position & Background, http://europa.eu.
int/comm/ externalrelations/mepp/faq/index.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). See also
Declaration by the European Union on the Middle East, Oct. 29, 2001, at http://www.
delwbg.cec.eu.int/en/declarations/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2003); Declaration by the
European Union on the Middle East (Seville European Council, June 21-22, 2002)
available at http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsfon/790db37e9f6b1596c1256be200567
e6f? OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 15, 2003). The single exception to this general
position appears to be a 1973 French initiative, known as the Shuman Paper.
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR RESEARCH, THE MIDDLE
EAST PEACE PROCESS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 14 (1999) (stating that the
European Community affirms "the choice for Arab refugees of either returning to
their homes or being indemnified"). It is also worth noting that European states
annually reaffirm U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194(111). On E.U. policy on
Palestinian refugees see also Alain Gresh, The European Union and the Refugee
Question, in PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, THE RIGHT OF RETURN 82-86 (Naseer Aruri
ed., 2001).
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resolved by resettlement to permanent accommodation." '617 The United
States provides annual assistance to Israel to help finance absorption of
new Jewish immigrants,618 but no longer supports unrestricted return of
Palestinian refugees to their homes of origin inside Israel.619 During the
1970s the United States vetoed several U.N. Security Council resolutions
affirming the right of all Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and
to repossess their properties.62 ° Since the signing of Oslo I in 1993, the
United States has "embarked on a strategy that appeared aimed at down-
grading the refugees from their international status as wards of the
United Nations to a strictly bilateral concern of Israel and the Palestinian
National Authority."62' Concomitant with this new approach, the United
States voted against reaffirming U.N. General Assembly Resolution
194(111).622
617 Resolution 1156, supra note 609. The resolution is based on a field investigation
conducted by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography. Palestine
Refugee Situation in the Context of the Middle East Peace Process: Report, Fur. Parl.
Ass., Comm. on Migration, Refugees and Demography, Doc. No. 8042 (1998),
available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A %2F%2Fassembly.coe.int
%2FDocuments%2FWorkingDocs%2Fdoc98%2Fedoc8O42.htm (last visited Mar. 15,
2003). The conclusions issued by the Committee rapporteur are interesting in that
they do not represent the majority of the views of refugees with whom the Committee
interviewed.
618 Between 1997 and 2000, the total grant has averaged around 70 million U.S.
dollars per year. Lois B. McHUGH, REFUGEE ASSISTANCE IN THE FOREIGN AID
BILL: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 3 (2000).
619 QUANDT, supra note 140, at 6. See, e.g., Powell Speech, supra note 609 (stating
"the parties must strive for a just solution that is both fair and realistic"). Recent U.S.
statements, moreover, call upon Palestinians, in the context of final status
negotiations, to recognize "the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state." Id. See also
Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Bush Calls for New Leadership (June 24,
2002). For early U.S. policy supporting the right of Palestinian refugees to return and
receive compensation see, for example, Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of
State, Palestine Refugees, Secret, Washington, DC, March 15, 1949 [Excerpts],
reprinted in DONALD NEFF, FALLEN PILLARS: U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE
PALESTINIANS AND ISRAEL SINCE 1945 233, 237 (1995). For a review of U.S. policy on
Palestinian refugees see id at 55-82. See also INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES, U.S.
OFFICIAL STATEMENTS: THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES (Norbert Scholz ed., 1994).
620 See S.C. Draft Res., U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/11940 (1976) (affirming the right
of refugees to return to their homes). See also S.C. Draft Res., U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/12119 (1976); S.C. Draft Res., U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/13911 (1980).
621 NEFF, FALLEN PILLARS, supra note 619, at 81.
622 Explaining the U.S. vote, then Ambassador to the U.N. Madelaine Albright
stated, "We believe that resolution language referring to 'final status' issues should be
dropped, since these issues are now under negotiation by the parties themselves.
These include refugees..." NEFF, FALLEN PILLARS, supra note 619, at 55. Letter from
Madelaine K. Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., to Ambassadors to the United
Nations (Aug. 8, 1994), excerpts reprinted in J. PALESTINE STUD., Winter 1995, at 152.
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Western powers largely envision durable solutions for Palestinian refu-
gees within the framework of two ethno-national states in historic Man-
date Palestine - Israel and Palestine. According to this framework,
refugees will be resettled in a future state of Palestine to be established in
most of the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. This is the
framework that guided U.S. mediation of Camp David II final status talks
between the PLO and Israel in July 2000.623 According to then-U.S. Pres-
ident Clinton, who was deeply engaged in the mediation process, "You
cannot expect Israel to acknowledge an unlimited right of return to pre-
sent day Israel [and] give up Gaza and the West Bank and have the settle-
ment blocks as compact as possible, because of where a lot of these
refugees came from." '624 The 'Road Map' drafted in 2002 by the "Quar-
tet"-the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United
Nations-is consistent with this framework-i.e., two states and non-rec-
ognition of the individual right of return.62 5 In relevant part, the draft
document merely calls for "an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to
the refugee issue. 626 Similar to the Oslo agreements, the "Road Map"
makes no reference to international law or to relevant U.N. resolutions as
a framework for crafting durable solutions for Palestinian refugees.
This proposal rejects such an approach on the premise that a principled
legal framework does matter, not just for the Palestinian refugee prob-
lem, but also for the overall strength of the refugee system.
With that premise, bringing Palestinian refugees into the framework
applied to other mass refugee solutions, our proposed temporary protec-
tion regime must adhere to non-refoulement, voluntary choice, and the
right of return to one's home. Palestinians have been given no "choice" in
623 For an analysis of Camp David 11 see, for example, Robert Malley & Hussein
Agha, Camp David: A Tragedy of Errors, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Aug.
9, 2001, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380 (last visited Apr. 30,
2004). Malley was Special Assistant to President Clinton for Arab-Israeli Affairs. See
also Akram Hanieh, The Camp David Papers, J. PALESTINE STUD., Winter 2001, at 75.
624 Clinton Remarks, supra note 609. See also Clinton Proposals, supra note 611.
625 A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
external_ relations/mepp/roadmap.htm (last visited June 10, 2003) [hereinafter Road
Map]. The 'Road Map' states, inter alia:
The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian
conflict by 2005, as presented in President Bush's speech of 24 June, and
welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the 16 July and 17 September
Quartet Ministerial Statements.
A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an
independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace
and security with Israel and its other neighbors.
Id.
626 Id.
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any meaningful sense concerning their desires for a durable solution.627
In the absence of any international body and mechanism to design and
implement durable solutions, the pattern of their status and migration has
been one of expulsions and lack of status in many states that have no
legal obligation to receive them.
628
We propose a five-year renewable, formalized temporary protection
status for Palestinians, applying the same principles and standards in
every state that participates in the regime.629 Temporary protection
627 When choice is accepted as a basic principle governing durable solutions, it is
often framed within the context of arbitrary limitations, constraints, and/or
disincentives whose objective is to limit to the greatest extent possible the number of
refugees choosing to exercise their right to return to their homes of origin inside
Israel. See, e.g., Resolution 1156, supra note 609; American "Nonpaper" on Israeli-
Palestinian Stockholm Negotiations, supra note 611; Israeli private response to the
Palestinian refugee proposal of January 22, 2001, Non-Paper, Draft 2 (on file with
author); MIDDLE EAST ENDGAME II, supra note 611.
628 See supra notes 225-241.
629 There are several factors suggesting that five years is an appropriate initial time
period for such a temporary protection program, some of which may be relevant to
the Palestinian situation. First, in the European context, open-ended temporary
protection is seen as undesirable, and both the UNHCR's Informal Consultations and
the European Commission's draft report recommend a five-year limit. See Excutive
Committee, U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Progress Report on Informal
Consultations on the Provision of International Protection to All who need it, 8th mtg.,
at para 4(r), U.N. Doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.27 (1997); and Commission Amended
Proposal for a Joint Action concerning Temporary Protection of Displaced Persons,
art. 13, 1998 O.J. (C 268) 13, 21. See Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees,
supra note 12, at 302. In the Palestinian context, a relatively short, clearly fixed period
tied to creating the conditions of safe return is essential for the program's success.
Given the length of time the Palestinian refugee situation has remained unresolved
and the longstanding resistance of major players to implementing a principled
solution, anything less than five years is unrealistic. Given the current critical cycle of
violence forcing a renewed exodus, anything greater than five years would give the
authority for continued ethnic cleansing. Second, two studies support the conclusion
that for mass refugee crises, five years is a critical period determining the feasibility of
return. A United Nations survey of the period 1970-1980 showed that large-scale
repatriation took place in 50% of the cases surveyed within five years of the creation
of the refugee problem. A study of integration of Vietnamese refugees in Finland
concluded that assimilation and acculturation of refugees did not occur until five
years after their arrival in a host state. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 34, at 182-83
(citing Sadruddin Aga Khan, United Nations Study on Human Rights and Massive
Exodus, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1503 (1981); and Karmela Liebkind, Self-
Reported Ethnic Identity, Depression and Anxiety Among Young Vietnamese Refugees
and their Parents, 6 J. REFUGEE STUD. 25, 34-35 (1993)). For Palestinians, obviously,
the statistics on five year repatriations have little meaning, but it is reasonable to
expect that if a temporary protection program creates the appropriate incentives, at
least for the latest refugees flows, repatriation could well take place within five years;
moreover, for the most recent refugees, five years would be the critical time when
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would be offered to all Palestinians fleeing the West Bank and Gaza as a
result of military occupation and the resultant humanitarian crisis, as well
as to Palestinians residing in any of the participating states who do not
already have citizenship or permanent residence, security of residence, or
protection. Consistent with the formal temporary protection status
offered in Europe after the Balkan crisis, and on the recommendation of
UNRWA or UNHCR, states would prioritize their temporary protection
slots for urgent humanitarian cases (emergency medical and physical
safety cases should be considered for airlift, such as in Kosovo), family
reunification, threat to life or safety, victims of severe human rights
abuses, and ethnic cleansing.
Second, we propose temporary protection that is internationally har-
monized, as part of a process that includes shared responsibility on many
levels, and which recognizes and accommodates both the legal and politi-
cal interests of the states involved.63 ° The temporary protection program
would be instituted through an international conference geared toward
designing and implementing mechanisms to address the root causes of the
conflict, and to create conditions that would allow Palestinian refugee
repatriation-to create meaningful choice.63' The temporary protection
regime proposed would engage all states that have significant Palestinian
populations, and all stakeholders in the outcome of Israeli-Palestinian
peace. It must, at a minimum, involve the PLO, all the Arab states, Israel,
as well as the Quartet comprising the United States, the E.U. states, Rus-
sia, and the United Nations.63 2 As part of the international conference on
Palestinian refugees, states would commit to the same kind of multilateral
repatriation, restitution, compensation, development and monitoring pro-
they would either develop more permanent ties to the host states, or be more
psychologically prepared to return. For the refugees who have been exiled for a
generation or more, a five-year limit on their status would be essential to motivating
them psychologically to take steps and invest in making their return possible.
630 For the overall framework accommodating legal and political obligations and
constraints that guide this proposal, see generally Excutive Comm., U.N. High
Comm'r for Refugess, Agenda for Protection, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
AC.96/965/Add.1 (2002); Excutive Comm., U.N. High Comm'r for Refugess, Note on
International Protection, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.96.951 (2001).
631 The centrality of voluntary repatriation to durable solutions for mass influx
situations has been repeatedly emphasized by UNHCR policies and practices all over
the world. See Note on International Protection, supra note 630, at 26-27. See also
Executive Comm., U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Reintegration: A Progress Report,
20th mtg., U.N. Doc. EC/51/SC/CRP.5 (2001); U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES,
REINTEGRATION AND SELF-RELIANCE UNIT PROGRAMME AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT
SECTION-DIvISION OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT, OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
REPATRIATION AND REINTEGRATION ACTIVITIES IN POST CONFLICT SITUATIONS,
DRAFT (1998), available at http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida- ind.nsf/0/0380a30646ec74
7f85256ae7004de2ac/$FILE/ATTMTV96/Po5.pdf (last visited May 18, 2004).
632 For text of the final Road Map of the Quartet, see Road Map, supra note 625.
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cess as in CIREFCA, Mozambique, and the Dayton process.6 33 The five-
year temporary protection period would be initiated through an interna-
tional conference on the Palestinian refugees. This proposal envisions a
combination of incentives and disincentives that would create both vested
interests in a principled solution for all the states involved and would
create pressure on non-complying states to participate. It can safely be
assumed that there are many states with a stake in resolving the Israeli-
Palestinian/Arab conflict underlying the refugee problem, that perhaps
most of those states have a stake in a durable peace, and perhaps as many
have a stake in a durable peace that is consistent with international law.
Based on European states' record and investment in applying interna-
tional human and refugee rights standards under the ECHR and the
ECJ;634 proximity and strategic interests in the Middle East;635 invest-
ment in the development of multi-lateral political, security, and economic
institutions in the region; 636 promotion of democracy and human
633 For discussion on these multilateral mass influx repatriation efforts, see supra
notes 498-515 and accompanying text.
634 See supra notes 413-28.
635 See, e.g., the 1980 Venice Declaration reprinted in I DOCUMENTS ON
PALESTINE, supra note 130, at 284 ( "The nine member states of the European
Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe
to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in
a more concrete way towards peace."). In the 1990s, the European Commission and
European Parliament endorsed a policy of cooperation with the south in order to
complement the policy of engagement with central and eastern European countries
and to give "geopolitical coherence" to the European Union's external relations. THE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 616, at 16.
See also Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Regional Strategy Paper, 2002-2006, at
http://europa.eu.int/commlexternal-relations/euromed/rsp/rsp02-O6.pdf (last visited
June 10th, 2003).
636 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Regional Strategy Paper, 2002-2006, supra
note 635, at 8 (stating that the main objective in the political domain will remain the
establishment of a framework-eventually the Charter for Peace and Stability-
within which the security concerns of the region may be comprehensively addressed).
Since the early 1970s, Europe has attempted to facilitate the establishment of regional
mechanisms in the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East that would entail a
"progressive institutionalization" of regional cooperation on the model of the
European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"), as part of a Global Mediterranean
Policy ("GMP"). The 1995 Barcelona Conference, which brought together ministers
from all member states of the European Union and partners of the Mediterranean
Basin-Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria,
Tunisia, Turkey and Palestinian Authority-endorsed the creation of a Euro-Med
Partnership to provide political, security, and economic partnerships as well as
cooperation in social and cultural affairs. See Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,
Barcelona Declaration, adopted Nov. 28, 1995, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external-
relations/euromed/bd.htm (last visited June 10, 2003).
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rights; s" 7 and immediate concerns about the effects regional instability
has on them 6 38 European states are likely to have significant interest in a
durable peace consistent with international law. If Palestinians continue
to flee in greater numbers and find Arab states restricting their entry,
they will be seeking entry into Europe based on relative proximity, family
ties, economics, and safe refuge. The European states may thus have
strong incentive and interest in addressing root causes of the protection
637 See, e.g., THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION,
supra note 616, at 16 (citing a 1989 European Commission proposal entitled "Towards
a New Mediterranean Policy" which placed a new emphasis on human rights and
democratic values). The three main goals of E.U. Mediterranean policy set out in the
Barcelona Declaration and in the Common Strategy adopted by the European
Council in Feira in June 2000 include, "the creation of an area of peace and stability
based on fundamental principles, including respect for human rights and democracy."
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Regional Strategy Paper, 2002-2006 supra note 635,
at 5. Human rights are also an important element of E.U. bilateral trade relations
with Middle Eastern states. See, e.g., European Union, Third meeting of the
Association Council EU-Israel: Declaration of the European Union, Oct. 21, 2002, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external-relations/israel/ intro/3ac.htm (last visited June
10, 2003) [hereinafter Declaration of the European Union]. The declaration states:
Our bilateral association is based on shared respect for democratic principles and
human rights, an essential element of our association agreement as set out in
Article 2. The E.U. upholds the universality, interdependence and indivisibility of
human rights. The promotion and protection of human rights including rights of
persons belonging to minorities as well as fundamental freedoms constitute a
major objective of the E.U.'s foreign policy.
Id. at para. 4.
638 Instability in the Middle East often leads to increased asylum claims in Europe.
In the 1980s, for example, large numbers of Palestinians, as well as Lebanese, sought
asylum in Europe to escape civil war and armed conflict in Lebanon. Shiblak, supra
notes 590, 591. Statistics indicate that Palestinian asylum claims increased again in the
context of the second intifada. See, for example, figures for selected European
countries at www.migrationinformation.org (In France, for example, Palestinian
asylum claims from the West Bank and Gaza Strip increased from 19 in 1999 to 36 in
2001. In Germany claims increased from 3 to 26 between 1999 and 2000.). Instability
in the region also has financial implications for Europe. Israeli military measures to
quell the second Palestinian intifada, for example, have forced European
development assistance to be effectively redeployed to offset the resulting economic
collapse. E.U. humanitarian aid, for example, increased by an average of 6.57 million
euros per year between 1994 and 1999 to an average of 32.6 million euros per year
between 2000 and 2002. Press Release IP/02/1561, European Commission,
Commission Approves EUR 29 Million in Support of Palestinian Reform Efforts and
In Response to the Deteriorating Situation on the Ground (Oct. 28, 2002).
Development assistance to the Palestinian Authority and to Palestinian NGOs
decreased from 59.7 million euros per year between 1994 and 1999 to 47 million euros
per year between 2000 and 2002. Support to the Palestinian Administration to help
meet urgent current expenses increased fourfold to some 100 million euros in 2002.
Id.
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crisis in 1967-occupied Palestine, and in initiating a temporary protection
regime that is geared to refugee returns as part of a comprehensive settle-
ment of the historic conflict.
Prospects for European participation in such a temporary protection
regime, however, should also be considered in light of disagreements on
common foreign policy among E.U. member states,639 inconsistent inter-
pretation of the status of Palestinian refugees under the 1951 Refugee
Convention, 640 and, problems associated with harmonization of tempo-
rary protection policy, generally, in Europe.64 ' Moreover, the European
Union has yet to demonstrate a willingness to use economic leverage as a
tool of foreign policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 642 Despite efforts
invested in promoting human rights in the region, for example, the Euro-
pean Union has been hesitant to adopt serious measures to enforce
human rights provisions in the E.U.-Israel Trade Association Agree-
639 For an overview of E.U. policy in the Middle East see, for example, THE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 616. See also
JAWAD, supra note 607. The E.U. position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is set
forth in the 1980 Venice Declaration and subsequent European Councils of Heads of
State and Government. Member states, however, often differ on implementation of
general principles. The foreign policy of Germany, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom, for example, has been regarded, traditionally, as more sensitive to Israel's
perceived interests. Germany and the Netherlands (in addition to Italy), for example,
prevented the 1973 Schuman Paper drafted by France from being made public due to
concerns about the Paper's substance. The Schuman Paper called upon Israel to
withdraw from 1967-occupied Palestine, for the internationalization of Jerusalem, and
for the choice for Palestinian refugees to return to their homes or to be indemnified.
Norway, Sweden, and Austria have historically maintained good relations with both
Israelis and Palestinians. France has often spearheaded initiatives, such as the
Schuman Paper, that are viewed as sensitive to Arab interests. France also initiated
efforts to create the post of Special E.U. Representative to the Middle East Peace
Process in the 1990s, and, more recently, the suggestion for early elections in 1967-
occupied Palestine and recognition of a provisional state of Palestine. Id.
640 Supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
641 Supra notes 413-28 and accompanying text.
642 Declaration of the European Union, supra note 637. The European Union has
considerable economic leverage, as it is Israel's primary trading partner. Israel
imports more products from the European Union than from anywhere else, and
exports more products to the European Union than to anywhere else. Israel is the
European Union's eighteenth largest export market, and is the twenty-fifth largest
importer of goods from the European Union.
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ment.643 The European Union opposes the use of sanctions against
Israel.644
The PLO and Arab states, particularly those Arab states hosting the
majority of Palestinian refugees and sharing a common border with
Israel, may have the strongest incentive to participate in a harmonized
temporary protection regime. The guiding principles for such a temporary
protection regime-i.e., a principled legal framework and shared respon-
sibility-as outlined above, would appear to be attractive to both the
PLO and member states of the Arab League. The right of Palestinian
refugees to return to their homes, for example, is a central component of
PLO policy." Likewise, Arab League resolutions, political statements
643 See, e.g., Declaration of the European Union, supra note 637. The European
Union has been reluctant to enforce sanctions for violations of the rules of origin
concerning labeling of products made in Jewish colonies in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, even though the E.U.-Israeli Trade Association Agreement clearly identifies
wrongful labeling as a material breach of the agreement. Euro-Mediterranean
Agreement (E.U.-Israel Association Agreement), Nov. 20, 1995, E.U.-Isr., 2000 O.J.
(L 147) 4, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ externalrelations/israel/intro/ (last
visited May 18, 2004). At the same time, it is important to note that the European
Community ("EC") refused to consider Israeli requests for a revision of the 1975
trade association agreement largely on political grounds. It was only in December
1993 that the Council authorized the Commission to begin negotiations leading to a
new EC-Israeli association agreement. THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 616, at 16.
644 See, e.g., The EU & the Middle East: Position & Background, supra note 616,
which states, in para. 7:
The EU's policy is based on partnership and cooperation, and not exclusion. It is
the EU's view that maintaining relations with Israel is an important contribution
to the Middle East peace process and that suspending the Association
Agreement, which is the basis for EU-Israeli trade relations but also the basis for
the EU-Israel political dialogue, would not make the Israeli authorities more
responsive to EU concerns at this time.
See also European Community, The Hague Statement on the Middle East Peace Pro-
cess, Oct. 11, 1991 reprinted in II DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 143, at 8
(welcoming "the willingness of Arab states to freeze the trade boycott of Israel in
return" for a suspension of Israeli settlement activity); European Parliament Resolu-
tion of 16 November 1993, 1993 O.J. (C 329) 46 (calling upon Arab states to put an
end to the boycott against Israel). The Resolution also called on member states to
adopt laws and regulations prohibiting firms from complying with the dictates of boy-
cotts imposed by non-member countries and called on the Ministers responsible for
Common Foreign and Security Policy to devise a common policy on economic sanc-
tions. THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note
616, at 59.
645 See, e.g., McDONALD, supra note 89, at 92. The text cites a news report from
The Arab World:
[Tihe emblem of the Palestine Liberation Organization conference [in 1964 in
Jerusalem] bore a huge map of Palestine on which was superimposed the slogan:
"We Shall Return!" The oath by some 350 delegates to the congress declared
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and various peace plans affirm the right of return as a key element of a
comprehensive solution to the conflict.646 In addition, Arab states con-
tinue to hold the view that the United Nations bears significant responsi-
bility for the creation of the Palestinian refugee issue and must therefore
share a large degree of responsibility for its resolution.647 Provisions for
enforcement through incentives and disincentives and a clear timetable
for implementation would address potential Arab concerns of Israeli non-
among other things that "Palestine is our homeland ... repatriation is our
goal ... struggle is our road ... unity is our guide ... Palestine is ours ... and
[we] shall accept no substitute homeland. God and history are our witness that
we shall sacrifice our blood for your liberation."
Id. (citation omitted, elipses in original). For more recent policy, see, for example,
Palestinian Proposal on Palestinian Refugees, Jan. 21, 2001, Taba, at art. XX, reprinted
in BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, Principals
and Mechanisms for a Durable Solution for Palestinian Refugees, OCCASIONAL BUL-
LETIN No. 10 (2001), at http://www.badil.org/Publications/Bulletins/B-10.htm (last vis-
ited June 10, 2003). The proposal states:
In accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), all
refugees who wish to return to their homes in Israel and live at peace with their
neighbors have the right to do so. The right of every refugee to return shall be
exercised in accordance with the modalities set out in the Agreement.
Id. at art. XX(5). For a slightly different reading of PLO documents on the right of
return see Rashid I. Khalidi, Observations on the Right of Return, J. PALESTINE STUD.,
Winter 1992, at 29.
646 See, e.g., League of Arab States Council, Res. 231, 10th Sess., Sched. 1 (Mar. 17,
1949), reprinted in KHALIL, supra note 117, at 165 ("The Council considers that the
lasting and just solution of the problem of refugees would be their repatriation and
the safeguarding of all their rights to their properties, lives and liberty, and that these
should be guaranteed by the United Nations."). For more recent documentation, see
The League of Arab States Council, The Beirut Declaration, 14th Sess., at para. 2
(Mar. 28, 2002), available at http://www.saudiembassy.net/press-release/statements/
02-ST-0328-Beirut.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2003) (calling upon Israel to affirm
"Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem to be agreed
upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194"). But see also
KHALIDI, supra note 131, at 31 (stating that during the early years of Palestinian
displacement Arab governments "timidly favored settling Palestinian refugees outside
Palestine, partly in deference to the preferences of the powerful new great power in
the Middle East, the United States").
647 See, for example, views expressed by Arab states during the drafting of the
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 248 and accompanying text. Moreover, Arab
states historically have preferred to approach solutions for the refugee issue as a
multi-lateral and global issue rather than a bilateral issue. For an overview of early
negotiations on the refugee issue under the auspices of the U.N. Conciliation
Commission for Palestine ("UNCCP") see NEIL CAPLAN, Futile Diplomacy, The
United Nations, the Great Powers and Middle East Peacemaking 1948-1954 (1997).
The establishment of a multi-lateral track as part of the Oslo process addressed
similar Arab concerns. BRYNEN, supra note 157.
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compliance. 648 The fact that the temporary protection regime begins with
a phased program of return through family reunification with priority
slots to Palestinian refugees in frontline Arab states should also address
fears that the regime will lead to the forced resettlement (tawtiin) of refu-
gees in Arab host states. Enhanced international protection in 1967-occu-
pied Palestine would gradually alleviate the current humanitarian crisis,
stem the flow of Palestinians seeking security outside the borders of their
historic homeland, and alleviate some of the burden imposed on frontline
Arab states. 649 For the PLO, the regime has an additional advantage so
far as it is able to address "the disparity in power, wealth, influence, infor-
mation and negotiating skill between Israel and the PLO"65 and elimi-
nate the negative negotiation dynamic in which basic rights, including
those of the refugees, are subject to bargaining and political trade-offs.
6 51
Effective Arab participation in such a regime, however, should also be
considered in light of the ability of Arab states to forge effective coopera-
tion and unified participation in such a temporary protection regime;
652
ongoing problems associated with implementation of the 1965 Casa-
648 Arab states, for example, have attempted to use sanctions as a means of
enforcement since the mid-1940s. See League of Arab States Council, The Boycott of
Zionist Goods and Products, Res. 16, 2d Sess., Sched. 11 (Dec. 2, 1945), reprinted in
KHALIL, supra note 117, at 161-163. See also The Arab boycott Regulations (1986),
reprinted in 3 PALESTINE YRBK INT'L L. 189-230 (1986). Several 'rear line states,'
including Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, and Qatar, ended secondary and tertiary boycotts
of Israel during the interim period of the Oslo process. Paul Noble, The Prospects for
Arab Cooperation in a Changing Regional and Global System, in MIDDLE EAST
DILEMMA, THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF ARAB INTEGRATION 65 (Michael C.
Hudson, ed. 1999). Following the election of a right-wing government in Israel in 1997
headed by Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud party, the Arab League adopted
League of Arab States Council, Res. 5629 (Mar. 31, 1997), reprinted in II Documents
on Palestine, supra note 143, at 340 (recommending the "continuation of commitment
to primary degree Arab boycott of Israel, and the activation of such boycott, until the
realization of just and comprehensive peace in the region").
649 The Palestinian Authority and the PLO have petitioned western powers for
international protection within the framework of the Geneva Conventions and at
various U.N. fora, including the Security Council, since the outset of the second
intifada in September 2000. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
650 Falk, supra note 146, at 20.
651 See, e.g., discussions of Camp David II negotiations supra note 623. See also
Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazin), Report on Camp David Summit to the P.L.O Central
Council (Sept. 9, 2000), excerpts reprinted in J. PALESTINE STUD., Winter 2001, at 168-
69.
652 On Arab cooperation see, for example, Noble, supra note 648, at 61
("Conditions in both the Middle Eastern and global systems seem to pose significant
challenges to Arab interests and thus presumably should generate clear incentives for
cooperation. Yet the Arab world remains more fragmented than ever."). But see also
Fawaz A. Gerges, Regional Security After the Gulf Crisis: The American Role, J.
PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1991, at 55, 64-65 (1991). Gerges states:
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blanca Protocol;65 and, weak or non-existent regional refugee and
human rights instruments.654 "[T]he perceived prospects for achieving an
honorable settlement and the sense of urgency regarding negotiations
have varied considerably among Arab frontline parties," observes Paul
Noble, "as have views about tactics and the extent to which the United
States can be relied on to bring about such a settlement. '655 Frontline
Arab states, such as Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, for example, may
have a greater political interest in such a regime if it harbors the potential
for a resolution of the conflict. By comparison, a similar interest among
Arab Gulf states may be tempered by a security reliance on third parties,
namely the United States, which may not have strong interests to partici-
pate in a temporary protection regime. Non-compliance or weak enforce-
ment of legal principles by participating states would likely render the
regime ineffective and lead to the withdrawal of Palestinian and Arab
participation.
There are fewer incentives for U.S. participation in an internationally
harmonized temporary protection regime. The United States generally
does not have the same degree of interest and utility, as the European
Union for example, in multilateralism and international law-i.e., two
primary features of the temporary protection regime-as tools of foreign
policy. 56 Historically, the United States has favored a bilateral approach
Much criticism has been leveled lately against the ineffectiveness of the Arab
League. This view ignores the fact that the League is no more than an extension
of the Arab state subsystem and fails to take into account the subtle and
important role played by the League in managing inter-Arab quarrels. A brief
examination of the League's role in two of the most dangerous crises in the
history of the post-1945 Arab subsystem (the Lebanese crisis of 1958 and the
Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute of 1961) would illustrate this point.
Following American and British military interventions in Lebanon and Kuwait
respectively, Arab rulers, using the political framework of the League, agreed
among themselves to end the war and the American presence in Lebanon and to
send an Arab force to replace British troops in Kuwait.
Id.
653 Supra notes 530-37 and accompanying text.
654 Supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
655 Noble, supra note 648, at 64. Numerous Arab states assume that their interests
are best met through what Noble characterizes as 'vertical cooperation' (i.e.,
cooperation with states outside the Arab world) rather than 'horizontal cooperation'
(i.e., inter-Arab cooperation). Id. A similar pattern is discernable within the field of
economic cooperation. Intra-regional trade still accounts for no more than 5 percent
of the total in the Mediterranean region, despite the fact that successive Euro-Med
Conferences have underlined the importance of intra-regional integration. Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, Regional Strategy Paper, 2002-2006, supra note 635.
656 See, e.g., Pascal Boniface, Reflections on America as a World Power, J.
PALESTINE STUD., Spring 2000, at 5, 6 ("The United States can decide to define single
handedly the rules of international law, political or economic, applicable to all
countries; to determine what is good for all humanity according to its own
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to resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict with direct negotiations between
Israel and individual Arab states.657 Moreover, American policy concern-
ing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has tended to place more emphasis on
process rather than principles. 658 During final status negotiations between
the PLO and Israel at Camp David in July 2000, for example, one
observer noted, "American negotiators became strangely touchy at the
mere mention of principles and rights." 65 9 The collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the bipolar international order has not fundamen-
tally altered American perceptions of the US-Israeli strategic partner-
conscience."). By contrast, Boniface notes that Europeans "have an obvious common
interest in promoting [. .. the development of multilateral constraints that are
assumed, codified and reciprocal. A natural outgrowth of this concept are actions
aimed at strengthening multilateral frameworks and international institutions and
promoting attitudes of cooperation and negotiation." Id. See also Foundation for
Middle East Peace, Special Report: The Middle East in the Shadow of War (2002),
available at http://www.fmep.org/reports/2002/sr Spring2002.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2003).
657 QUANDT supra note 140, at 5. American thinking about the establishment of a
regional security structure following the first Gulf War in 1991 failed to develop into
concrete strategies and mechanisms. Gerges, supra note 652, at 61, stating:
Western powers have been unable to construct viable security structures in the
area because of the different perceptions of threat and of the different security
needs of the rival actors. To the majority of Arabs, Israel is still perceived as 'the
enemy.' In the absence of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, Arab leaders would be reluctant to enter into close and intimate security
arrangements with Israel's patron and strategic ally.
658 QUANDT, supra note 140, at 1, stating:
Sometime in the mid-1970s the term peace process began to be widely used to
describe the American-led efforts to bring about a negotiated peace between
Israel and its Arab neighbors....
In the years since 1967 the emphasis in Washington has shifted from the spelling
out of the ingredients of "peace" to the "process" of getting there. This
procedural bias, which frequently seems to characterize American diplomacy,
reflects a practical, even legalistic side of American political culture.
According to the U.S. position until 1981, Israeli colonies in 1967-occupied Palestine
were illegal under international law. In 1981, the position was reversed by President
Reagan. Id, at 6. In comparison, see the E.U. position as stated in the 1980 Venice
Declaration, that Israeli colonies "as well as modifications in population and property
in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law." I DOCUMENTS
ON PALESTINE, supra note 130, at 284. See also U.S. Draft of an Israeli-Palestinian
Joint Declaration of Principles, Washington, DC, June 30, 1993, reprinted in II Docu-
MENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 143, at 134-45. The U.S. Draft largely mirrors Israeli
draft proposals and is significant, in comparison to Palestinian draft proposals,
because of the exclusion of all references to international law as a framework for
resolution of the conflict. Israeli and Palestinian proposals are reprinted in II Docu-
MENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 143.
659 Hanieh, supra note 623, at 86.
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ship.66 ° Nor does the United States share the same concerns of proximity
and the immediate impact of instability created by the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict that affect Europe. Domestic politics, moreover, continue to have
a substantial impact on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.66' For
these reasons, the United States remains reluctant to adopt positions
inconsistent with Israel's perceived interests.
The prospect of significant U.S. pressure on Israel to come into compli-
ance with international law in crafting durable solutions for Palestinian
refugees also appears remote. Rather than supporting sanctions for non-
compliance with U.N. resolutions, agreements, and international human
rights and humanitarian law, the United States has continued to provide
economic and military aid to Israel.662 Over the past five decades "the
660 See, e.g., The Middle East in the Shadow of War, supra note 656, at 5 ("Leading
members of the Bush administration - from the vice president's office to the highest
political echelons in the Pentagon ... view Israel first and foremost a strategic ally, a
principal partner in confronting what U.S. strategists have identified as the most
pressing contemporary challenge to U.S. interests, not just in the Middle East but
internationally-'rogue nations' wielding missiles aimed against the United States and
its allies.").
For an overview of the US-Israeli strategic partnership see, e.g., Clyde R. Mark,
Congressional Research Service Israel-United States Relations (2003).
661 See, e.g., SETH P. TILLMAN, THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
INTERESTS AND OBSTACLES 276 (1982) stating, inter alia:
The issue is essentially domestic-what it comes down to, in concrete terms, is
that, owing to the unmatched influence of the Israeli lobby in American politics,
Israeli security (or, more exactly, the conceptions of Israeli security held by
incumbent Israeli governments) has been permitted to preempt other vital
interests in American policy. This, rather than the undoubted complexity of the
issues, or the strategic, economic, or moral stakes of one case as opposed to
another, has been the root cause of chronically unbalanced policy that, despite
certain tactical successes, remains a strategic failure.
QUANDT, supra note 140, at 8. More recently see Letter from Eighty-one U.S. Sena-
tors to President William Clinton Warning Him Against Pressing Israel (Apr. 3, 1998),
reprinted in J. PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1998, at 154-55; Letter from Two-hundred
twenty-one U.S. Representatives to President William Clinton Urging Against Pres-
suring Israel (May 6, 1998), reprinted in J. PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1998, at 158.
662 As of 1995 the U.S. Congressional Research Service reported that Israel had
received more than $67 billion in foreign economic and military aid. CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, ISRAEL: US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE (Oct. 6, 1995) reprinted in J.
PALESTINE STUD., Winter 1996, at 148. Recently, the United States provided Israel
with $10 billion in loan guarantees and military aid, despite considerable evidence of
severe violations and grave breaches of international humanitarian law in the context
of the second Palestinian intifada. Israel had requested $8 billion in loan guarantees
and $4 billion in military aid. Aluf Benn et al, U.S. to Give Israel $9B in Loan
Guarantees and $1B Military Aid, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 21, 2003. For an overview of U.S.
policy on the Arab boycott of Israel see, for example, Nancy Jo Nelson, The United
States Legal Response to the Arab Boycott - A Quagmire for the Innocent, 5
PALESTINE YRBK. INT'L. L. 129-83 (1989).
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United States abstained or voted against resolutions expressing some of
its most cherished policies such as self-determination and inalienable
human rights, and against the spirit of such international covenants as the
U.N. Charter and the Fourth Geneva Convention." 663 U.S. policy has also
been slow to respond to new initiatives in the region. It was not until 1975
that the U.S. State Department recognized that the Palestinian issue was
at the heart of the conflict.664 Moreover, it was not until 2001 that the
United States officially endorsed the establishment of a Palestinian state,
nearly two decades after the PLO offered what it considered to be a his-
toric compromise with the creation of a Palestinian state in 22 percent of
historic Mandate Palestine. 665 Regional instability affecting relations with
Israel and oil-producing regimes in the region, however, is of ongoing
concern to the United States. To the extent that it can be demonstrated
that an internationally harmonized temporary protection regime can
deliver on U.S. interests in regional stability, the United States may be a
reluctant partner.666
Admittedly, an internationally harmonized temporary protection
regime does not appear to contain significant incentives for Israeli partici-
pation. The objective and guiding principles of such a regime are not
663 NEFF, FALLEN PILLARS, supra note 619, at 184. The U.S. cast its veto twenty-
nine separate times in the Security Council between 1972 and 1990. At the beginning
of the Oslo process in the 1990s, the United States attempted to expunge all
"contentious resolutions that accentuate political differences without promoting
solutions" resolutions relating to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from U.N. records.
This included resolutions affirming the right of refugees to return to their homes and
the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. Id. at 186.
664 Id. at 1 n.1.
665 On U.S. endorsement of a Palestinian state see, President George W. Bush,
Middle East Statement from his U.N. General Assembly Speech (Nov. 10, 2001),
reprinted in J. PALESTINE STUD., Winter 2002, at 164. On the Palestinian acceptance
of a two-state solution see Palestinian Declaration of Independence II, Algiers, Nov.
15, 1988 reprinted in I DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 130, at 331.
666 The link between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and U.S. interests in regional
stability has been seemingly enhanced by the events of September 11, 2001. See, e.g.,
Camille Mansour, The Impact of 11 September on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, J.
PALESTINE STUD., Winter 2002, at 5. See also The Middle East in the Shadow of War,
supra note 656, stating, inter alia:
Only reluctantly have [Bush administration officials] been compelled to focus on
Palestine and its interminably warring parties, not because they have any hopes
for rapprochement between Sharon and Arafat but because of their concern that
the violence between Israel and the Palestinians will 'spill over' to Israel's eastern
front, engaging Iraq and Jordan as well as Syria and Lebanon and complicating a
US strike against Baghdad.
However, the report further observes that for the Bush administration the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict "is not amenable to American power." Id.
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amenable to Israel's stated interests vis-A-vis Palestinian refugees.667 The
international character of the regime,66 the principled framework,669 and
the inclusion of incentives/disincentives to ensure compliance render the
regime unattractive to Israel. It is unlikely that the current, and any fore-
seeable, Israeli government will voluntarily agree to participate in a
regime that provides for the individual right of return of Palestinian refu-
gees to their homes of origin inside Israel.67° The existence of Israeli offi-
cial and public consensus against the return of Palestinian refugees has
become conventional wisdom. According to opinion polls taken in 2002,
for example, more than three-quarters of Israeli Jews are opposed to the
return of even a limited number of Palestinian refugees, while nearly 78
percent are opposed to recognition of the right of return.671
While Israel faces increased economic, academic and cultural isolation
(not only from the Arab states),672 and increasingly harsh criticism from
667 Supra note 604. More recently see Basic Guidelines of the 30th Government of
Israel, Jerusalem, Feb. 27, 2003, at 1.2, available at http://www.Israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/
go.asp?MFAH0n610 (last visited Mar. 15, 2003) ("The Government will strive to
ensure that Israel remains a Jewish, democratic, Zionist state that encourages aliyah
and guarantees equal rights to all its citizens.").
668 Historically, Israel has preferred bilateral negotiations with Arab states and has
attempted to prevent what it refers to as the 'internationalization' of the issue.
QUANDT, supra note 140, at 5.
669 Israeli draft proposals for interim agreements with the PLO, for example,
exclude all reference to international law as a framework for resolution of the
conflict. See, e.g., Israeli Delegation, Memorandum to the Palestinians Regarding
Autonomy, Feb. 20, 1992, reprinted in II DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 143,
at 65-66; Israeli Delegation, Memorandum to the Palestinians Regarding Autonomy,
Feb. 21, 1992, reprinted in II DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note 143, at 66-67;
Israeli Delegation, The Administrative Council of the Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, Aug. 20, 1992, reprinted in II DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, supra note
143, at 86-92; and, Israel's Revised Self-Government Proposals - Updated Ideas
Addressing Palestinian Concerns, Dec. 14, 1992, reprinted in II DOCUMENTS ON
PALESTINE, supra note 143, at 120-121. For a legal analysis of the agreements see
SHEHADEH, FROM OCCUPATION TO INTERIM ACCORDS, supra note 146. For a
comparative analysis of human rights provisions in peace agreements, including the
Oslo agreements, see BELL, supra note 141.
670 See supra notes 604-06 for an overview of Israel's position on Palestinian
refugees.
671 Market Watch Polls published in MA'ARIV, Mar. 15, 2002, Aug. 30, 2002. See
also Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar & Tamar Hermann, How the Palestinian and Israeli-
Jewish Publics Perceive the Issues, in THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, OLD PROBLEMS -
NEW SOLUTIONS 303-17 (Joseph Ginat et al. eds., 2001).
672 On the Arab boycott, see supra note 648. Since the beginning of the second
Palestinian intifada sanctions and boycotts have become one of the primary tools used
by civil society organizations and members of the Palestinian solidarity movement to
bring about a change in Israeli policy. General information on civil society initiatives
is available at http://www.bigcampaign.org, and http://www.boycottisraeligoods.org
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U.N. bodies and intergovernmental agencies for its policies, 73 it has also
demonstrated a willingness to endure intense political, economic, and
other forms of pressure in order to uphold Zionist principles and preserve
the Jewish character of the state.674 Increasing isolation and international
criticism, however, is also adding pressure to Israel's downward-spiraling
economy. 675 It is conceivable, however, that for the Israeli population,
the resumption of normal relations with, at a minimum, European states,
combined with a greater awareness that agreements not based on a prin-
cipled framework will continue to fuel the conflict, could be an incentive
to participation in at least the international conference on refugees, and
perhaps in the first 5-year temporary protection period. Moreover, it is
important to note that the apparent consensus against refugee return
exists without any serious discussion within Israel of real implications of
(last visited Mar. 15, 2003). On state sanctions see, for example, Sharon Sadeh, UK
Orders End to Import of Goods Produced in Israeli Settlements, HA'ARETZ, July 6,
2002; John Hooper & Richard Norton Taylor, Secret UK Ban on Weapons for Israel,
Blocking of Sales Mirrors German Action, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 13, 2002; Gideon
Alon & Anmon Barzilai, Council of Europe: Suspend Economic Agreement with
Israel, HA'ARETZ, Apr. 25, 2002; Peter Finn, Germany, in Protest, Suspends Arms
Sales to Israel, Decision May Foreshadow European Trade Sanctions as Criticism of
West Bank Incursions Mounts, WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN SERVICE, Apr. 10, 2002.
673 On U.N. bodies, see supra notes 171, 173, 209, 578, 579 and accompanying text.
674 This includes, for example, resistance to U.S. pressure during early negotiations
on the refugee issue facilitated by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for
Palestine. See, for example, comments by Israel's first Prime Minister David Ben
Gurion, supra note 605. But see QUANDT, supra note 140, at 421, stating:
Part of the conventional wisdom about US-Israeli relations is that pressure on
Israeli governments is bound to backfire. But the record suggests a much more
complex reality. [A]t one time or another, each president has tried to persuade
Israel to take some action by implying that refusal would be costly. In a
surprising number of instances, such efforts at influence have succeeded. The
same has been true of dealings with Arab parties.
675 According to recent figures by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, economic
decline in Israel has gone beyond the most pessimistic forecasts of the Finance
Ministry, the Bank of Israel and the private sector. The Israeli standard of living
dropped by an average of 3.3 % in the first nine months of 2002, following a 3.2%
decline in 2001. These represent an unprecedented decline in the country's history.
See also Avi Temkin, Bank of Israel: Unemployment will get Much Worse. The Tax
Revenue Estimate is too High, Even if There is 1 % Growth in 2003, GLOBES, Nov. 20,
2002 (The number of unemployed rose 17% in January-September 2002, compared
with the corresponding period last year, amounting to 40,000 unemployed Israelis. Dr.
Karnit Flug, director of research at Bank of Israel predicted that unemployment will
increase significantly due to the declining economy, and that tax revenue estimates
were too high even on a 1% growth assumption). Moti Bassok and Lior Kagan, 1
Percent Negative Growth in 2002 is Worst in the West, HA'ARETZ, Jan. 1, 2003. The
national deficit for the first two months of 2003 climbed to NIS 5.43 billion - one-third
of the entire deficit for the year as predicted by the 2003 budget. Moti Bassok and
Amnon Barzilai, State Deficit Soars to 6 Percent of GDP, HA'ARETZ, Mar. 4, 2003.
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return itself.6 7 6 It is almost implausible to think that over the last five
decades there has been no systematic effort to engage the Israeli public in
a substantive discussion about durable solutions for Palestinian refugees,
including the right of return.677 The prospect of Israeli participation in an
institutionalized temporary protection regime, as discussed above, may
well depend more on developments within Israeli civil society than on the
initiative of current and future Israeli governments.
The first five years of temporary protection and related conditions
would initiate a period of confidence-building measures, hinging on the
incentive/disincentive process implemented by all the participating states.
As part of this process, Israel will immediately be asked to open up
100,000 slots for family reunification (both to Israel and to the West Bank
and Gaza Strip), to be completed within the first two years. Thereafter,
10,000 slots will be opened each year until all family reunification applica-
tions are completed.67 The first 100,000 slots in Israel should prioritize
those pending cases from the Arab states, which have carried the large
share of the burden for Palestinian refugees over the past five decades.
Within these five years, as Israel meets the family reunification targets,
the temporary protection participants would make funding available to
develop communities within Israel and in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip that would benefit both the reintegrating and the stayee communi-
ties.6 9 Such development would engage civil society across ethnic and
religious communities so that communities affected by reintegration
become vested in the success of the process.
A phased process for return, beginning with family reunification, has
multiple benefits. This process will be the least disruptive to the stayee
communities (Israeli Jewish and Palestinian), because family reunifica-
676 Israel's first foreign Minister, Moshe Sharret, for example, acknowledged that
the Foreign Ministry spoke out publicly against the return of Palestinian refugees as
early as the spring of 1948 in order to galvanize Jewish public opinion against return.
Labor Party Archives. 2-1/1/1, Protocol of the meeting of the party Knesset Faction
and the Secretariat, July 28, 1949, in MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN
REFUGEE PROBLEM, supra note 139, at 281.
677 See, e.g., Ilan Pappe, Israel at a Crossroads Between Civic Democracy and
Jewish Zealotocracy, J. PALESTINE STUD., Spring 2000, at 24, 33; see also, Ilan Pappe,
Israeli Perceptions of the Refugee Question, in PALESTINIAN REFUGEES: THE RIGHT
OF RETURN 71-76 (Naseer Aruri, ed., 2001); Amal Jamal, The Palestinians in the
Israeli Discourse: A Conditional Partnership, J. PALESTINE STUD., Autumn 2000, at 36.
678 For the problem of Israeli denials of thousands of Palestinian applications for
family reunification, see supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. For a detailed
discussion of Israeli family reunification policies and practices, see supra note 198.
679 For the importance of family unity in finding durable solutions for refugees, see
Kate Jastram & Kathleen Newland, Geneva Expert Roundtable, Family Unity and
Refugee Protection, (Oct. 22, 2001). See also Global Consultations on International
Protection, Geneva Expert Roundtable, Summary Conclusions on Family Unity,
(Nov. 9, 2001), available at www.unhcr.ch.
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tion automatically implies an existing support system to assist the
returning family members. The process would provide both returnee and
stayee communities with a controlled and incremental period to assess
the individual and collective impact of refugee return. For refugees, fam-
ily reunification would function similar to "go and see visits" sponsored
by the UNHCR and other international agencies in other refugee
cases. 68 0 Returnees would have the opportunity not only to assess the
viability of return for themselves, but also to report back to individuals,
families, and communities eligible to participate in the broader return
option. For Israeli Jews, controlled family reunification would address
fears of mass influx and would likewise provide a testing ground for the
broader return operation.68' Israel, moreover, already accepts the princi-
ple of family reunification.
Staged return beginning with family reunification would also provide
the international community and domestic authorities an opportunity to
appraise pilot projects initiated during family reunification, to develop a
detailed repatriation operations plan, and to secure international funding
for the panoply of returnee needs, in addition to basic food and shelter, to
make return sustainable. This includes access to education, development
of curricula, health, employment, and a robust land claims mechanism.
Successful integration of reunifying families, including infrastructure
development, schools and curricula, health care services, and equitable
use of land and water, would be the measure for the next phase.682 One
of the lessons of the Bosnian return program was that employment,
health, education, and social security need to be addressed at the same
time as housing reconstruction programs.683 In Mozambique, the positive
donor response to finance the repatriation of millions of refugees was
related to thorough consultation during the drafting process of the repa-
triation plan and the detailed nature of the final operations plans.68 4
Within the first five-year period, a formula for return of additional ref-
ugees to their original homes and lands would be worked out by the
states involved in the process. During this period, temporary protection
participants would also address protection gaps in domestic and regional
680 For the importance of "go and see visits" and cross-border contact between
communities in UNHCR voluntary repatriation programs, see Note on International
Protection, supra note 630, and sources cited.
681 Id. at 26.
682 For the importance of detailed operation plans, committed donor funding for
development needs of both communities in other refugee repatriation situations, see
Evaluation of UNHCR's Repatriation Operation to Mozambique (Feb. 1, 1996),
available at http://www.unhcr.org (last visited April 20, 2003). See generally
HUMANITARIAN AGENDA, supra note 19.
683 See generally U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL REPORT 2001, AT
350-355.
684 See Evaluation of UNHCR's Repatriation Operation to Mozambique, supra
note 682, at 3.
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instruments, and seek wider regional ratification of international instru-
ments. Efforts would also focus on the expansion and/or establishment of
new regional economic, political and security bodies or mechanisms tied
to the dual incentive/disincentive approach discussed above. An impor-
tant part of this process would involve reform and/or repeal of discrimi-
natory citizenship and property law across the region, according to
relevant international standards, to facilitate solutions for regional dis-
placement and outstanding housing and property claims.685 Considera-
tion of dual citizenship and respect for housing and property rights will be
key to this process. Another important feature will be the development of
regional instruments relative to the protection of refugees and human
rights, including enforcement mechanisms for human rights similar to the
ECHR.8 6
After the first five years, the status of reunification and returns based
on refugee choice would be evaluated. The UNHCR/UNRWA would
monitor refugee choice, and once returns have been secured, states would
open other slots based on temporary protection priorities, to accept refu-
gees not wishing to return for resettlement. The incentive/disincentive
process should continue in phases, with donor funding focused on devel-
opment of communities involving both returnee and stayee populations
within Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip (regardless of what state
constructs are in place). The incentives would be targeted money to
develop integrated multi-ethnic communities within Israel coupled with
requirements to dismantle discriminatory laws, and to phase in restitution
with compensation formulae. The disincentives would tie more economic
cuts to Israel, and isolation and pressure from the involved states and the
U.N. bodies that would be a formal part of the process.
Third, we propose temporary protection that is consistent with recog-
nized international refugee and human rights standards concerning bene-
685 The importance of repealing discriminatory property and citizenship legislation
in durable solutions for refugees has been reaffirmed repeatedly by UNHCR and
international experts. See, e.g., Note on International Protection, supra note 630, at 26;
see also 19 REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 3 (2000) (describing housing and property restriction
for returnees); BRET THIELE & SCOTT LECKIE, HOUSING AND PROPERTY
RESTITUTION FOR REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS:
INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCES (2001).
686 Treaty bodies and regional human rights mechanisms have played a critical role
in strengthening refugee protection through monitoring and enforcement capabilities.
See BRIAN GORLICK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEES: ENHANCING PROTECTION
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (working Paper No. 30, 2000); see
also U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEE
PROTECTION (1995).
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ficiaries, duration and conditions for cessation of status, and standards of
treatment.687
3. Beneficiaries
Drawing on the principles established by the African,
688 European,689
and U.S.69° instruments, policies, and regional practices, guidelines can be
readily established for defining and prioritizing the appropriate benefi-
ciaries of Palestinian temporary protection. Temporary protection should
be offered to all UNRWA-registered refugees, no matter where they are
located, with UNRWA continuing to provide the assistance benefits to
those located within the areas of its mandate.691 Temporary protection
should also be offered to all Palestinians who are short-term visa holders,
Palestinians in any kind of indeterminate status, and those with no recog-
nized status, on a prima facie, or group basis, consistent with article 1D.
As temporary protection has worked in a number of mass influx situa-
tions, states should prioritize available temporary protection slots for
various kinds of cases: the Northern and Western state participants might
be asked to take the most Palestinian influx from the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip to relieve the immediate pressure from the frontline Arab
states. In addition, they might prioritize amongst those cases for emer-
gency medical care, family reunification, unaccompanied minors, and
similar emergent situations, according to recommendations from the
UNHCR based on guidelines developed in other refugee crises.692
687 Our proposal is consistent with the international refugee and human rights
framework promoted by UNHCR. See e.g., Global Consultations on International
Protection, available at www.unhcr.ch.
688 Under the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, the reasons for the Palestinian
exodus, both over time and currently, would qualify the majority of them under the
definition of "refugee" of article 1(2), as one who:
owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously
disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek
refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality...
OAU Refugee Convention, supra note 389, art. 1(2), 1001 U.N.T.S. at 47.
689 European temporary protection for Bosnians and Kosovars provides ample
state practice and legal grounding for granting Palestinians temporary protection,
particularly if tied directly to mechanisms for return to their places of origin. See
supra notes 410 and infra and accompanying text.
690 Under the U.S. TPS legislation, the reasons for the current exodus would
clearly qualify the majority of Palestinians for protection, as they are experiencing
"ongoing armed conflict which poses a serious threat to life or safety" and
"extraordinary temporary conditions ... preventing them from returning home in
safety .. " INA, supra note 433, at ch. 477, 244(b)(1).
691 See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
692 See Resolution for Common Guidelines on Admitting Particularly Vulnerable
People from the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 436.
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4. Standards of Treatment
A uniform minimum standard of treatment is essential for temporary
protection to be successful in reducing the incentive for massive secon-
dary refugee movement from the Arab states, including the 1967-occu-
pied territories, to Western or Northern states. The Arab states would be
required to standardize their treatment of Palestinian refugees and to
regularize the rights offered to a standard acceptable to all the temporary
protection participant states, consistent with recognized legal standards.
Although each of the relevant regions for a Palestinian temporary pro-
tection program has differing minimal and optimal rights standards,
693
harmonizing the benefits and rights that are offered under temporary
protection will be one of the most critical factors for the program to be
successful in the Palestinian case. Aside from concerns about secondary
movement, a standard of rights provides a semblance of justice and prin-
ciple much lacking in the Palestinian situation. Moreover, for the pro-
gram to be standardized on a basis that is acceptable to states and
participants, there must be a framework of applicable human rights stan-
dards including civil, economic, and social rights. In the Palestinian situa-
tion, the following rights should be considered fundamental: (1) status,
identity and travel documents (freedom of movement); (2) family reunifi-
cation; (3) employment, housing, and education; (4) health and welfare
benefits; and (5) duration of status and conditions at cessation.
First, freedom of movement should be accorded to Palestinians as a
fundamental right. The Refugee Convention and both conventions on
statelessness require states to issue identification and travel documents to
refugees/stateless persons lawfully in their territories. These provisions
are widely standardized and respected. a94 European temporary protec
tion and U.S. TPS standards require status documents to be issued to
those receiving benefits under those programs,695 and UNHCR and E.U.
guidelines require the same.696 Travel documents and freedom of move-
ment are less respected, both in applicable guidelines and in practice.697
Nevertheless, at a minimum, freedom of movement within the temporary
protection state should be mandated, as noted in the UNHCR Progress
Report on temporary protection.698 Palestinians have long suffered
forced confinement to refugee camps, severe restrictions on freedom of
693 See supra part V.A, B, and C.
694 See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
695 See supra text accompanying notes 443-44.
696 See supra notes 475-83 and accompanying text.
697 See supra part IV.A.3.
698 "[T]he right to education, employment, freedom of movement, assistance, and
personal identification should be granted without discrimination, while it is
understood that any restrictions imposed must be justified on grounds of legitimate
national interest and must be proportional to the interest of the state." Progress
Report, supra note 413, at para 4(1).
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movement without adequate justification, and arbitrary visa restrictions
and re-entry requirements, compounded by forced separation from fam-
ily members.699
Second, family reunification must be considered fundamental. Family
unity, at least as to the nuclear family, is recognized as a core requirement
for temporary protection under the E.U. 2001 Council Directive, which
incorporates detailed provisions obligating states to grant residence to
family members of temporary protection beneficiaries and to respect
rights to family unity.7"' Family rights in the E.U. context are considered
fundamental under the ECHR.7° ' The United States does not protect
family unity under TPS;7 2 however, UNHCR has repeatedly stressed the
importance of family reunification in temporary protection schemes and
in considering durable solutions for refugees.703 For Palestinians, family
separation has been an intergenerational problem, exacerbated by lack of
status, identity, and travel documents, as well as by arbitrary criteria that
screen out large numbers of applicants, and by severe restrictions on
movement. Reunification as a principle for granting temporary protection
and for granting residence to derivative family members of temporary
protection recipients will enhance the durability of the solution of choice
for refugee families.
Third, employment, housing and education rights must be granted to
refugees. The Refugee Convention gives the highest priority to employ-
ment, housing, and elementary education, requiring states to grant refu-
gees lawfully in their territories rights in each of these areas on par with
nationals.70 4 Although E.U. state policies concerning granting employ-
ment authorization vary significantly, the standard-setting guidelines and
Council Directive reflect common agreement that employment should be
authorized for temporary protection recipients.70 5 In the United States,
TPS recipients are authorized to work.70 6 For Palestinian refugees, the
inability to work in many of the areas where they are located has been a
699 See supra part III.A and B.
700 See Council Directive, supra note 426.
701 See ECHR, supra note 72. But see Case No. 18288/9, Eur. Comm'n H.R., May
13, 1992.
702 For TPS provisions, see INA, supra note 433.
703 See e.g., ExCom Conclusion No. 24 (XXXII) (1981) (Family Reunification)
(stating: "(1) every effort should be made to ensure the reunification of separated
refugee families; (2) countries of asylum and countries of origin [should] support the
efforts of the High Commissioner to ensure that the reunification of separated
refugee families takes place with the least possible delay"). See also Global
Consultations on International Protection, Reception of Asylum-Seekers, Including
Standards of Treatment in the Context of Individual Asylum Systems, 3d mtg., U.N.
Doc. EC/GC/01/17 (2001).
704 See supra notes 63-64.
705 See supra notes 475-83 and accompanying text.
706 See INA, supra note 433.
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major source of poverty, frustration, and instability. A Palestinian tempo-
rary protection program would appear far more palatable if its recipients
were able to work rather than receive welfare benefits. Housing and edu-
cation, at least at the elementary level, are also considered core rights
under human rights and refugee standards, as is widely reflected in the
main international human rights instruments.7 °7 For Palestinians receiv-
ing formalized temporary protection, those who will be able to work and
have freedom to secure housing and education will relieve already over-
stressed UNRWA programs and state benefits. For UNRWA, reduction
in services based on reduced need for services, rather than on fiscal
shortfalls, would provide the agency with the opportunity and resources
to retool programs toward durable solutions. Skill development would
also enhance the ability of such individuals to integrate as economic con-
tributors to new communities when they either return to their place of
origin, resettle, or integrate in host states.
Fourth, refugees must be granted health and welfare benefits. The
majority of Palestinian refugees in the Arab states receive minimum
health and welfare benefits through UNRWA.7 °8 It would be illogical to
structure a temporary protection program that did not provide equivalent
guarantees to UNRWA standards, and E.U. and international human
rights standards would mandate additional guarantees in these areas.
Consistent with the Refugee Convention, states would be expected to
incrementally improve the rights and benefits offered temporary protec-
tion recipients over time. For the second five years, refugee rights would
increase consistently with other state temporary protection policies and
practice, and with U.N. guidelines. 70 9 Greater consideration would need
to be given to the areas of gender equality, higher education and voca-
tional training benefits, the granting of equal employment opportunities
with nationals of the host state, additional economic, social and cultural
rights,710 and expanded notions of family unity.71' Ultimately, as part of a
707 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing the statelessness
conventions); ICESCR, supra note 67, 993 U.N.T.S. at 3; supra note 72-74 (discussing
the European instruments); African Charter, supra note 321, 21 I.L.M. at 58;
Casablanca Protocol, supra note 100.
708 See supra note 251.
709 See supra note 448 and accompanying text.
710 Fitzpatrick notes that rights standards for temporary protection beneficiaries
should be guaranteed at a level between two concerns; rights cannot be afforded at a
level higher than that afforded citizens of the host states, but restrictions must be
directly related to a legitimate state objective. She also notes that standards set by the
Refugee Convention for economic, social and cultural rights are appropriate
standards for temporary protection beneficiaries as well, in particular because many
temporary protection beneficiaries would meet the refugee definition and should not
be deprived of the guaranteed level of rights simply because they are receiving a less
permanent status. See Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees, supra note 12, at
304. Kalin also supports progressive guarantees of social, economic and cultural rights
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comprehensive peace, all those in temporary protection who choose not
to return would be offered permanent residence, either in the host state
or in resettlement states through a responsibility-sharing formula, such as
in the Indochinese orderly departure program.
Finally, duration of status and conditions at cessation of temporary pro-
tection must be considered. In the Palestinian case, the duration of status
should be tied to safe return in the context of a comprehensive and dura-
ble peace settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as is most consis-
tent with general refugee law principles, accepted principles for
temporary protection, and the special Palestinian regime of article 1D
and its companion provisions and instruments.
5. Additional Critical Components of a Successful Temporary
Protection Strategy Linked to Return
In order for temporary protection to be meaningfully connected to
return and a comprehensive durable solution for Palestinian refugees, it
must include solution-oriented components. These components can be
usefully categorized as maintaining refugees' social structures, developing
refugees' skills and resources, creating linkages between refugees and
communities in the home state, and confidence-building measures in both
returning and stayee communities prior to return.
712
a. Respect for Refugees' Social Structures
Promoting family unity during the temporary protection process will be
a significant factor in ensuring durability of the refugee solutions.713
Community identification as a foundation for self-organizing around
repatriation was one of the critical aspects of the durability of refugee
as established by the Refugee Convention for temporary protection recipients, related
to the length of time they remain in such status. See id. (citing KALIN, supra note 416).
711 Due to the unique situation of Palestinian refugees and their displacement in
many parts of the world, family unity considerations must remain a pivotal criteria for
temporary protection benefits. For cultural, identity and economic reasons,
Palestinians consider their close families as extending beyond the nuclear family.
More appropriate for defining qualifying family members is the UNHCR's approach
which recommends that undue restrictions not be placed on family relationships, and
recommending special consideration for "vulnerable beneficiaries," such as children,
the elderly, disabled, and victims of physical or psychological trauma. Progress Report
on Informal Consultations on the Provision of International Protection to All Who
Need It, supra note 448, at para. 4(m).
712 Hathaway and Neve detail an extremely helpful framework for solutions-
oriented temporary protection, from which we derive these critical components for
temporary protection to be a successful strategy in the Palestinian case. See Hathaway
& Neve, supra note 34, at 173-81.
713 Id. at 173-74.
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return in the CIREFCA process, 1  and in the Mozambique
repatriation.715
In the Palestinian situation, the extended family and village ties have
been the primary source of support and stability for a scattered and trau-
matized refugee population. Perhaps even more than other expelled
populations, Palestinians have relied on their family and community
structures for physical and psychological survival. These relationship-
based structures will provide essential resources and the foundation for
successful and long-term reintegration into the home country or for per-
manent integration in the new or old host state. These community struc-
tures, which have been largely preserved by Palestinian refugees in
various places of exile, also provide the base for self-organization for
investment or reinvestment, for building viable communities based on
common language and identity, and for preserving culture.716
b. Development of Skills and Resources During Temporary
Protection
A second important factor in a successful temporary protection pro-
gram is skills-development and resource-development, both prior to and
after return or integration. James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve
emphasize that economic development programs must be geared toward
refugee needs.7 17 However, investment must include both the refugee and
the stayee or host communities, or resentment will develop that could
impede durability. The ONUMUZ example illustrates creative invest-
ment in quick impact projects-rehabilitation projects such as roads,
schools, and clinics that benefit both the returning and staying communi-
ties. 718 A significant additional advantage of collaborative economic and
social development projects is that they can foster mutual trust and
investment in joint projects in a way that diffuses existing inter-communal
tensions. The ONUMUZ, as well as the CIREFCA, illustrate how initial
international investment and resources that are focused and creative can
generate self-reliance and self-investment within returning
communities.719
c. Linkages with Returnees/Stayees
Although Palestinian refugee return to Israel appears to present insur-
mountable problems concerning secondary property use or ownership,
causing resentment and animosity when such property must be relin-
quished, the legal framework for respecting property rights in such a con-
714 See supra text accompanying notes 503-05.
715 See supra notes 508-13 and accompanying text.
716 Id. at 173.
717 Hathaway & Neve, supra note 34, at 176-77.
718 See supra note 508.
719 See supra text accompanying notes 503-13.
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text has been well-developed in other refugee situations. However, for
such a framework to be established and implemented there must be a
simultaneous process of reconciliation, perception of mutual gain in the
long-term for both communities involved, and a framework incorporating
respect for both primary and secondary property rights. The Dayton
Peace Accord, Annex 7, provides the most developed framework, based
on legal principles, of the recent major refugee solution mechanisms in
the last twenty years concerning housing and other property rights.72 °
Aside from legal frameworks and legally-grounded mechanisms to pro-
tect rights, there must be immediate links developed between the two
communities to begin the reconciliation process. 2 These linkages should
begin long before the repatriation process commences, and should be
part of the focus during the temporary protection period.
d. Confidence-Building in Anticipation of Repatriation
Security issues are also a major factor that must be addressed before
repatriation commences, but, like secondary property ownership, are not
unique issues to the Israeli-Palestine situation. In fact, security issues
often dominate the agenda in the search for durable solutions for refu-
gees.72 Mechanisms have been developed that provide precedent for suc-
cessful management of security concerns, including U.N. monitoring/
peacekeeping, 723 regional monitoring/peacekeeping mechanisms, the
720 See supra note 335.
721 See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 34, at 178-79.
722 Security issues have rarely been absent in major refugee flows. For the
UNHCR's framework addressing security concerns in the context of implementing
durable solutions, see U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Protection of Refugees in
Mass Influx Situations, Overall Protection Framework, U.N. Doc. EC/GC/01/4 (2001).
See also U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, The Civilian Character of Asylum:
Separating Armed Elements from Refugees, U.N. Doc. EC/GC/01/6 (2001). On
security issues addressed in negotiations and agreements on specific situations
discussed in this article, see generally Evaluation of UNHCR's Repatriation Operation
to Mozambique, supra note 606; Reclamation and Concerted Plan of Action in Favor
of Central American Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons, U.N. Doc.
CIREFCA/89/14 (1989); Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the
Cambodia Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/46/608-S/23177 (1991).
723 For a critique of the success and failures of U.N. peacekeeping efforts in major
conflict and post-conflict situations, see David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and
International Security: United Nations Field Operations Redux, in P.R. BAEHR, THE
ROLE OF THE NATION -STATE IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY 265, 268-76 (1998). For a
comparison of the intervention (generally considered unsuccessful) efforts of the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), see 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 841 (1999);
Chronology: U.N. Interim Administration in Kosovo, available at http://www.un.org/
peace/Kosovo/kosovostatus.htm. See also Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, Kosovo: Kosovo as Seen, as Told, Part 11 (1999), available at http://www.
osce.org.Kosovo/reports/hr/part2/ndex.htm.
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involvement of major security organizations (such as the Organization of
Security and Co-operation in Europe or North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion), truth and reconciliation processes or tribunals with effective sanc-




Granting temporary protection would be consistent with article 1D of
the Refugee Convention as a mechanism toward implementing the
appropriate U.N. General Assembly-mandated durable solution for refu-
gee protection. The right of return called for in U.N. General Assembly
Resolutions would be to the refugees' place of origin. Temporary protec-
tion would provide Palestinian refugees in Arab states, as well as other
states of the Palestinian diaspora, a recognized legal status. Consistent
with the parameters of temporary protection in Europe, or TPS in the
United States, temporary protection for Palestinian refugees should
afford them the basic protection rights of other persons who are granted
such status when fleeing emergency situations, whether Convention-
defined refugees or not. Temporary protection specifically addresses the
real needs of Palestinian refugees: the need to work, to travel freely, to
live where they choose within the temporary protection state, to reunite
with family members, and to travel outside and return with special per-
mission. Temporary protection also specifically addresses the fears of
both Arab and other states that they would either have to grant asylum or
some more permanent type of status to the refugees, or else expel them.
Finally, temporary protection addresses the ongoing concern of Palestin-
ian refugees and the PLO that the post-Oslo process might vitiate the
international consensus, so firmly embodied in U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 194 and in customary international law, that the durable solu-
724 For a comparative review of the experiences of South Africa with its Truth and
Reconciliation Process, with the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, see John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience,
8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277 (1988); Herman von Hebel, An
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Act of Powerlessness or a New
Challenge for the International Community, 11 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 437 (1993);
Dapha Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7
EUR. J. INT'L L. 501 (1996).
725 In major refugee repatriation situations such as Central America, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Mozambique, non-governmental organizations have played a crucial
role in the repatriation and reintegration, as well as redevelopment, process. See U.N.
HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 17, at
136-53. A detailed analysis of these issues, although critical to the framework required
for successful repatriation and related aspects of durable solutions for Palestinian
refugees, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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tion for Palestinian refugees is return to their place of origin, restitution,
and compensation.
